co-op

What if we just banned banks?

PNRJ critique of neoclassical economics, ethics, financial fraud, inequality, market failure, public policy , , , , , , , , , ,

Feb 22 JDN 2461094

I got a mailer from Wells Fargo today offering me a new credit card. The offer seemed decent, but the first thing that came to my mind was: Why is this company still allowed to exist?

In case you didn’t know, Wells Fargo was caught in 2016 creating millions of fraudulent accounts. They paid a fine of $185 million—which likely was less than the revenue they earned via this massive fraud scheme. How am I supposed to trust them ever again? How is anyone?

It’s hardly just them, of course. Almost every major bank has been implicated in some heinous crime.

JP Morgan Chase helped Jeffrey Epstein conceal assets, rigged municipal bonds transactions, and of course misrepresented thousands of mortgages in a way that directly contributed to the 2008 crisis.

Bank of America also committed mass fraud that contributed to the 2008 crisis.

A case against Citi is currently being tried for failing to protect its customers against fraud.

Capital One is being sued for failing to pay the interest rates it promised on savings accounts.

And let’s not forget HSBC, which laundered money for terrorists.

If these were individuals committing these crimes, they would be in prison, probably for the rest of their lives. But because they are corporations, they get slapped with a fine, or pay a settlement—typically less than what they made in the criminal activity—and then they get to go right back to work as if nothing had happened.

I think it’s time to do something much more radical.

Let’s ban banks.

This might sound crazy at first: Don’t we need banks? Doesn’t our whole financial system rest upon them?

But in fact, we do not need banks at all. We need loans, we need deposits, we need mortgages. But we already have a fully-functional alternative system for providing those services which is not implicated in crime after crime after heinous crime:

They are called credit unions.

Credit unions already provide almost all the services currently provided by banks—and most of the ones they don’t provide, we probably didn’t actually need anyway. There are already nearly 5,000 credit unions in the US with over 130 million customers.

Credit unions almost always fare better in financial crises, because they don’t overleverage themselves. They are far less likely to be involved in fraud. They don’t get involved in high-risk speculation. They offer higher yields on savings and lower rates on loans and credit cards. Basically they are better than banks in every way.

Why are credit unions so much better-behaved?

Because they are co-ops instead of for-profit corporations.

Customers of credit unions are also owners of credit unions, so there are no extra profits being siphoned off somewhere to greedy shareholders whose only goal in life is number go up.

Free markets are genuinely more efficient than centrally-planned systems. But there’s nothing about free markets that requires the owners of capital to be their own class of people who aren’t workers or customers and make their money by buying, selling, and owning things. That’s what’s wrong with capitalism—not too little central planning, but too concentrated ownership.

As I’ve written about before, co-ops are just as efficient as corporations, and produce much lower inequality.

For many industries, transitioning to co-ops would be a major change, and require lots of new organization that isn’t there. But for banking, the co-ops already exist. All we need to do is ban the alternative and force everyone to use the better, safer system. Come up with some way to transfer all the accounts fairly to credit unions, and—very intentionally—leave the shareholders of these criminal enterprises with absolutely nothing.

In fact, since credit unions are more likely to support other co-ops, forcing the financial system to transition to credit unions might actually make the process of transitioning our entire economy to co-ops easier.

It may seem extreme, but please, take a look again at all those crimes that all these major, highly-successful, market-dominating banks have committed. They’ve had their chance to prove that they can be honest and law-abiding, and they have failed.

Get rid of them.

A new theoretical model of co-ops

PNRJ critique of neoclassical economics, inequality, market failure, mathematical models, public policy , , , , , , , , ,

Mar 30 JDN 2460765

A lot of economists seem puzzled by the fact that co-ops are just as efficient as corporate firms, since they have this idea that profit-sharing inevitably results in lower efficiency due to perverse incentives.

I think they’ve been modeling co-ops wrong. Here I present a new model, a very simple one, with linear supply and demand curves. Of course one could make a more sophisticated model, but this should be enough to make the point (and this is just a blog post, not a research paper, after all).

Demand curve is p = a – b q

Marginal cost is f q

There are n workers, who would hold equal shares of the co-op.

Competitive market

First, let’s start with the traditional corporate firm in a competitive market.

Since the market is competitive, price would equal marginal cost would equal wage:

a – b q = d q

q = a/(b+f)

w = d (a/(b+f)) = (a d)/(b+f)

Total profit will be

(p – w)q = 0.

Monopoly firm

In a monopoly, marginal revenue would equal marginal cost:
d[pq]/dq = a – 2 b q

If they are also a monopsonist in the labor market, this marginal cost would be marginal cost of labor, not wage:

d[d q2]/dq = 2 f q

a – 2 b q = 2 f q

q = a/(2b + 2f)

p = a – b q = a (1 – b/(2b + 2f)) = (a (b + 2f))/(2b + 2f)

w = d q = (a f)/(2b + 2f)

Total profit will be

(p – w) q = ((a (b + 2f))/(2b + 2f) – (a f)/(2b + 2f))a/(2b + 2f) = a2/(4b + 2f)

Now consider the co-op.

First, suppose that instead of working for a wage, I work for profit sharing.

If our product market is competitive, we’ll be price-takers, and we will produce until price equals marginal cost:

p = f q

a – b q = f q

q = a/(a+b)

But will we, really? I only get 1/n share of the profits. So let’s see here. My marginal cost of production is still f q, but the marginal benefit I get from more sales may only be p/n.

In that case I would work until:

p/n = f q

(a – b q)/n = fq

a – b q = n f q

q = (a/(b+nf))

Thus I would under-produce. This is the usual argument against co-ops and similar shared ownership.

Co-ops with wages

But that’s not actually how co-ops work. They pay wages. Why do they do that? Well, consider what happens if I am offered a wage as a worker-owner of the co-op.

Is there any reason for the co-op to vote on a wage that is less than the competitive market? No, because owners are workers, so any additional profit from a lower wage would simply be taken from their own wages.

If there any reason for the co-op to vote on a wage that is more than the competitive market? No, because workers are owners, and any surplus lost by paying higher wages would simply be taken from their own profits.

So if the product market is competitive, the co-op will produce the same amount and charge the same price as a firm in perfect competition, even if they have market power over their own wages.

Monopoly co-ops

The argument above doesn’t assume that the co-op has no market power in the labor market. Thus if they are a monopoly in the product market and a monopsony in the labor market, they still pay a competitive wage.

Thus they would set marginal revenue equal to marginal cost:

a – 2 b q = f q

q = a/(2b + f)

The co-op will produce more than the monopoly firm..

This is the new price:

p = a – b q = a(1 – b/(2b+f)) = a(b+f)/(2b + f)

It’s not obvious that this is lower than the price charged by the monopoly firm, but it is.

(a (b + 2f))/(2b + 2f) – a(b+f)/(2b + f) = (a (2b + f)(b + 2f) – 2 a(b+f)2)/(2(b+f)(2b+f))

This is proportional to:

(2b + f)(b + 2f) – 2(b+f)2

2b2 + 5bf + 2f2 – (2b2 + 4bf + 2f2) = bf

So it’s not a large difference, but it’s there. In the presence of market power in the labor market, the co-op is better for consumers, because they get more goods and pay a lower price.

Thus, there is actually no lost efficiency from being a co-op. There is simply much lower inequality, and potentially higher efficiency.

But that’s just in theory.

What do we see in practice?

Exactly that.

Co-ops have the same productivity and efficiency as corporate firms, but they pay higher wages, provide better benefits, and offer collateral benefits to their communities. In fact, they are sometimes more efficient than corporate firms.

Since they’re just as efficient—if not more so—and produce much lower inequality, switching more firms over to co-ops would clearly be a good thing.

Why, then, aren’t co-ops more common?

Because the people who have the money don’t like them.

The biggest barrier facing co-ops is their inability to get financing, because they don’t pay shareholders (so no IPOs) and banks don’t like to lend to them. They tend to make less profit than corporate firms, which offers investors a lower return—instead that money goes to the worker-owners. This lower return isn’t due to inefficiency; it’s just a different distribution of income, more to labor and less to capital.

We will need new financial institutions to support co-ops, such as the Cooperative Fund of New England. And general redistribution of wealth would also help, because if middle class people had more wealth they could afford to finance co-ops. (It would also be good for many other reasons, of course.)