core principles

A tale of two corporations

PNRJ core principles, critique of neoclassical economics, ethics, inequality , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

May 10 JDN 246171

Consider two corporations.

Corporation A has net income equal to 2.9% of its total revenue, and pretax income equal to 4.1% of its total revenue. The cost of its goods sold accounts for 77% of its revenue, with most of the remainder going to wages.

This seems reasonable, right? It doesn’t seem like this corporation is being especially exploitative.

Corporation B has 2.1 million employees, and made net income of $21.8 billion, meaning that it could afford to pay every single employee an additional $10,000 and still be profitable. The median employee at this corporation makes approximately $16 per hour, meaning that this would an income increase of over 30%—an absolutely huge jump in income that would make a big difference in millions of lives. Yet instead they have chosen to buy back $30 billion in shares to raise their stock price even higher.

Corporation B seems like they are obviously exploiting their workers and favoring their shareholders, and directly contributing to the extreme inequality in our society.

But I have a bit of a surprise for you.

They are the same corporation. All of these facts are true of Walmart: Here is their income statement, here is their announced stock buyback, and here are estimates of their number of employees and median pay.

Walmart is not a particularly exceptional case. Similar stories hold for most major corporations: the profit margin doesn’t sound that high as a proportion of revenue, but it still amounts to an enormous sum of money that is being hoarded by shareholders instead of paid to workers.

Amazon’s net income of $90 billion on $742 billion in revenue gives it a profit margin of 12%, but would be enough to give all 1.6 million employees an additional $56,000—in many cases doubling their incomes.

United Health Group made $12 billion in profit on $447 billion in revenue, which is only 2.7%; and yet with 400,000 employees, they could still afford to give each one an extra $30,000. How many nurses would be very happy to see another $30,000?

Exxon Mobil’s $28 billion profit was made on $324 billion in revenue, a reasonable-sounding margin of 8.6%. Yet with only 58,000 employees, that’s $480,000 each.

McDonald’s made $8.5 billion on $26 billion in revenue, a margin of 33% (which is actually pretty high). Yet more than 1.8 million people work at McDonald’s including all its franchises, so it could really only afford to give each one an extra $4,700—which sounds small compared to these other figures, but for a minimum-wage employee ($7.25 per hour is about $14,500 per year), that’s still an extra 32%.

This is something I think we have failed to reckon with as a society.

Once a corporation becomes sufficiently large, it doesn’t need to have a big-sounding profit margin to nonetheless control staggering amounts of wealth and funnel it away from employees into the hands of shareholders. Especially with regard to Walmart and United Health Group, those margins honestly sound small as a proportion of revenue—and yet, they still amount to incredibly vast sums of wealth that are being hoarded away from thousands or millions of workers that desperately need help.

I don’t know exactly what to do about this. More progressive taxes, especially on capital income, might help, and would certainly raise much-needed revenue; but they don’t seem like enough on their own. I think we may need something more radical, like requiring employee ownership of a certain proportion of shares—essentially turning corporations into co-ops.

Another option would be simply not allowing corporations to ever get this big, and splitting them up if they already are. Perhaps being CEO of a corporation with billions of dollars in revenue really is just too much power for one person to have. But I am genuinely concerned that this could reduce economic efficiency and thereby lower the standard of living of everyone.

Some corporations actually seem to behave more fairly.

Car companies, for instance, don’t seem to hoard huge amounts.

Ford actually lost money last year, losing $6 billion on $189 billion in revenue (3.1%). With 168,000 employees, that’s $35,000 each—essentially they gave each employee a free car. And Ford employees do fine: Median annual compensation is $126,000.

General Motors made $2.4 billion in profit on $184 billion in revenue, a margin of only 1.3%. With 150,000 employees, it could give each one an extra $16,000. Given that most of its employees are well-paid (median employee salary is $99,000), I actually don’t begrudge them this. Accounting for the risk of bad years like Ford had, I think GM is being reasonable by not simply plowing that $2.4 billion back into their own employees.

Even Tesla isn’t really an exception to this pattern. Tesla made $3.8 billion on $98 billion in revenue, which is 3.9%. With 135,000 employees, this is $28,000 each—more than GM, but still not completely crazy. Median employee pay at Tesla is over $160,000, so these workers are doing well. What’s weird about Tesla, however, is that its revenue is half that of Ford or GM, yet its market capitalization is a staggering $1.5 trillionwhile Ford’s is only $46 billion and GM’s is only $71 billion. A P/E ratio of 20 is considered reasonable. Tesla’s is 365.)

But there are some corporations that don’t even sound reasonable.

Tech companies in particular tend to have very high profit margins.

Consider Apple; its net income of $122 billion on $451 billion in revenue gives it a net profit margin of 27%. It could give all 550,000 of the employees of not only Apple itself but also all its foreign suppliers a raise of $221,000. Some of these employees are sweatshop workers in China—they would be set for life on a sum like that.

Alphabet’s profit margins are even higher than that; its net income of $160 billion was on $422 billion in revenue, for a net profit margin of 37%. With 190,000 employees, that would be $840,000 each.

Yet Microsoft’s margins are even higher; its $125 billion net income was on only $318 billion in revenue, giving it a net profit margin of 39%. It has 228,000 employees, so it could give every single one an additional $540,000.

SpaceX isn’t publicly-traded, so they don’t have to disclose everything; but it is estimated that they made about $8 billion in profit on $16 billion in revenue—a staggering margin of 50%—and with only about 12,000 employees, it could give every single one an extra $660,000. In fact, Elon Musk himself owns enough stock that he could personally give every single SpaceX employee some $60 million in shares and still be a billionaire. That’s a life-changing sum for anyone who works for a living—neurosurgeons would be awed, and even NBA players would consider that a successful career unto itself. But Elon must see number go up!

This is why I’m still somewhat sympathetic to Marxism, despite not being a Marxist.

There really is something terrible going on here, with capital owners making absolutely obscene sums of money and using it to wield enormous power over our society, leaving their own workers to struggle even though they could easily give those employees enough additional pay to significantly change their lives—and if they all did so, even the capital owners wouldn’t be meaningfully worse off, because they already have more wealth than any human being could possibly need and the overall boost to the economy might even compensate them in the long run.

And turning corporations into co-ops (which is, arguably, seizing the means of production) could actually make a very big difference here, and both theory and empirical data suggests that it would greatly reduce inequality without greatly reducing economic efficiency.

But the labor theory of value is still garbage.

On labor theories of value

PNRJ core principles, inequality, mathematical models , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

May 3 JDN 246164

I got into an argument a little while ago with an acquaintance of mine who is an avowed Marxist. He posted something that’s been going around Marxist social media about the “irony” that Marx’s labor theory of value is based on Smith and Ricardo’s labor theories of value (plural; they’re not the same), and thus when defenders of capitalism criticize the labor theory of value, they are in effect betraying their founding figures.

The first point I made in response to this was basically, “Yeah. So?” I think one thing that Marxists—at least this flavor of Marxist; I am prepared to exempt more serious Marxian economists—don’t really understand is that mainstream economists don’t have a founding figure that they worship and consider infallible. There is no inerrant text. I am fully prepared to acknowledge—and did, in fact, in that conversation, acknowledge—that Adam Smith made errors and his labor theory of value was one of them. And quite frankly, any defender of capitalism who worships Milton Friedman or Ayn Rand isn’t a mainstream economist, or is at best a very bad one.

My interlocutor then challenged me to describe these different labor theories of value, and I was foolish enough to take the bait, and then the whole conversation devolved into him playing this smug game of “That’s not what Marx really meant” and “clearly you haven’t read Das Kapital” (even though I have, but I admit it was several years ago; I did call up a PDF copy to refresh my memory during the conversation).

But it got me thinking about labor theories of value, and trying to understand why so many people find them seductive when it really doesn’t take much thought to show that they can’t possibly be right. (This post turned out to be a bit long, but I promise I won’t be as long-winded as Marx.)

So what’s wrong with labor theories of value?

If objects are valued based on the labor put into them, the following four propositions should hold:

  1. A project you spend 100 hours on which ultimately failed and produced nothing useful was extremely valuable.
  2. Everything in the Garden of Eden is worthless, because it doesn’t require labor to access.
  3. If you come up with a cure for cancer in a random stroke of insight, it’s worthless because you didn’t put any labor into it, even though both its utility (the lives it will save) and its price (the money you could make off of it) are surely astronomical.
  4. Increased productivity is worthless, because all it does is make our goods worthless as we get better at making them.

All four of these propositions are clearly preposterous, and yet they all seem to follow directly from the basic concept of valuing things by the labor that goes into them. Mainstream economists eventually realized this, and gave up on labor theories of value in favor of the now-consensus utility theory of value.

To be fair, Marx was no idiot, and he did try to address concerns like these in Das Kapital. (Well, the first three he does; I’ll talk about the fourth one in a moment.) But the way he does so is by continually re-defining his terms in contradictory ways, so that by the time you get through the book, you realize he doesn’t even have a labor theory of value. He has many labor theories of value, and he substitutes them ad hoc whenever they seem to yield the conclusions he’s looking for.

For example: Sometimes he says that it’s the actual labor that goes in which matters. Other times that it’s the “usual” or “socially necessary” amount of labor. Other times that it’s the average amount of labor that would be required for this production across the whole economy. These are not the same thing! They yield radically different results in many cases!

Marx tries to distinguish use-value (approximately utility) from exchange-value (approximately price), which is good; those two things are different. It’s very important to distinguish price from value.

But then he doesn’t even use these concepts consistently! At one point, he gives us this absolute howler:

The use-value of the money-commodity becomes two-fold. In addition to its special use-value as

a commodity (gold, for instance, serving to stop teeth, to form the raw material of articles of

luxury, &c.), it acquires a formal use-value, originating in its specific social function.

– Das Kapital, Volume 1, Chapter 2, p. 63

No, dude. That is exchange-value. That is paradigmatic exchange-value. People mainly want gold because they can sell it at a high price to buy stuff that’s actually useful. If this is use-value, then the distinction between use-value and exchange-value collapses to, well, useless.

I think what Marx is doing here is that he wants use-value to always be higher than exchange-value, so that surplus-value can be the difference between them and always be positive. But gold is a very clear example of a good for which the price greatly exceeds the marginal utility, which I think you can convince yourself by imagining being stranded alone on a desert island with a crate full of gold. If that crate had contained non-perishable food, or water purification equipment, or tools and materials for building shelter, or best of all, a satellite phone and some solar panels, you’d be overjoyed to have it. Even a crate full of books, plushies, or underwear would have some use to you. (Plushies make better friends even than Wilson!) But gold? You have nothing to do but laugh—or cry—at the cruel irony. (And cash would be the same way, though maybe you could use the linen for something.)

But we actually do have a good explanation for how assets such as gold (and Bitcoin) can have prices far exceeding their marginal utility; expectations. If you expect that you’ll be able to sell an asset for more than you paid for it, you have reason to buy that asset, even if it’s useless to you. And for gold, that’s actually been a pretty smart gamble most of the time (Bitcoin, it very much depends on when you bought it). This could be a non-stationary equilibrium in rational expectations, or it could just be an ever-replenishing array of Greater Fools; but one way or another, the reason gold has a high price is that people expect it to have an even higher price in the future.

In fact, this seems like a deep flaw in capitalism! Marx could have spent a whole chapter on why gold is stupid and financial markets are basically a casino—he would have beaten out Keynes on that by decades. (If I were going to worship an economist, it would be Keynes. But again, I still don’t think his work is inerrant. Just very, very good.) But instead, Marx accepted that gold is priced the way it should be, and contorted his already-tortured theory of value into accommodating that.

I really don’t know why Marx was so insistent that all goods had to be valued based on labor. Marx actually had a lot of good insights about capitalism, and he wasn’t entirely wrong that capitalism as we know it breeds exploitation and ever-growing inequality. I believe that relatively simple reforms (like antitrust enforcement, co-ops, and progressive taxation) can solve, or at least mitigate, these problems, and allow us to enjoy the fruits of higher productivity that capitalism provides. But I recognize that I could be wrong about that; maybe some more radical change is genuinely needed. Yet this in no way vindicates Marx’s theory of value, which was simply wrongheaded from the start.

Indeed, why was he so insistent about it?

Why not simply give up on it, and adopt a new theory, or state it as an unsolved problem?

I have a hypothesis about that. Let me reprise proposition 4:

  1. Increased productivity is worthless, because all it does is make our goods worthless as we get better at making them.

This proposition is preposterous, as I’ve already said: A technology that allows you to make 100 cars with the same labor previously required to make 1 car does not make cars less useful. It simply makes them available to more people at lower prices, and this is generally a good thing.

But I think that Marx did not regard it as preposterous; in fact, I think he regarded it as true.

Consider this paragraph:

In proportion as capitalist production is developed in a country, in the same proportion do the

national intensity and productivity of labour there rise above the international level.2 The

different quantities of commodities of the same kind, produced in different countries in the same

working-time, have, therefore, unequal international values, which are expressed in different

prices, i.e., in sums of money varying according to international values. The relative value of

money will, therefore, be less in the nation with more developed capitalist mode of production

than in the nation with less developed. It follows, then, that the nominal wages, the equivalent of

labour-power expressed in money, will also be higher in the first nation than in the second; which

does not at all prove that this holds also for the real wages, i.e., for the means of subsistence

placed at the disposal of the labourer

– Das Kapital, Volume 1, chapter 22, p. 394

So he does get one qualitative fact right here: Nominal prices are higher in rich countries, for goods and services that are not traded across international borders. This is why we use purchasing power parity.

But he then goes on to say that real wages aren’t higher in rich countries. This… is just clearly false. By any reasonable measure, real wages are higher in the United States or France than they are in Congo or Haiti.

One can quibble with the particular measure used; I in fact happen to believe that we do overestimate real wages in the US by using the CPI instead of an index that better reflects the price of necessities. But there’s just no plausible way to say that a laborer in Malawi who makes $600 a year is at the same standard of living as a laborer in the US who makes $20,000. They might both be legitimately considered poor; but saying that real wages aren’t better here just isn’t plausible.

And Marx’s views on wages get weirder from there:

But hand-in-hand with the increasing productivity of labour, goes, as we have seen, the cheapening of the labourer, therefore a higher rate of surplus-value, even when the real wages are rising. The latter never rise proportionally to the productive power of labour. The same value in variable capital therefore sets in movement more labour-power, and, therefore, more labour.

Das Kapital, Volume 1, Chapter 24, p. 421

I’d in particular like to draw your attention to these two clauses: “the cheapening of the labourer, […] even when the real wages are rising.” What in the world does that mean? How can labor simultaneously get cheaper and more expensive? How can I be “cheapened” even as I am better off?

A bit later, he gets close to acknowledging that higher productivity increases value, but he characterizes it in a very strange way:

Labour transmits to its product the value of the means of production consumed by it. On the other

hand, the value and mass of the means of production set in motion by a given quantity of labour

increase as the labour becomes more productive. Though the same quantity of labour adds always

to its products only the same sum of new value, still the old capital value, transmitted by the

labour to the products, increases with the growing productivity of labour.

– Das Kapital, Volume 1, Chapter 24, p. 422

So what he seems to be saying here is that the value added from capital is itself denominated in terms of the labor that was used to create that capital. Yet this is a very strange accounting indeed, as I think a simple model will help you see.

Consider a productivity-enhancing technology.

Suppose that, initially, one can make 1 widget per person-hour. So, Marx says, the value of 1 widget is precisely 1 person-hour.

And suppose there are enough laborers to do 20 person-hours of work. Then we make 20 widgets, and we get value equal to 20 person-hours. Okay, seems reasonable so far.

Then, an engineer comes along, spending 100 hours to invent a machine that costs 10 person-hours to build, and can produce 1000 widgets using 10 person-hours of labor.

So the value of that machine, according to Marx as I understand him, is 10+X person-hours, where X is some amortized fraction of the 100 person-hours involved in inventing it. It’s unclear how to do this amortization; what time frame should be using? Once invented, the machine can be built many times. But I guess we could maybe make sense of it as the patent duration—the price of the machine will surely be higher during the time the patent is still valid, and I guess we could say that is somehow reflected in its value. (Notice how this is already getting pretty weird.)

Now, let’s go ahead and make 1000 widgets with the machine.

We have spent 10 person-hours of labor running the machine, another 10 building it, and we’re supposed to count in X from inventing it in the first place. X ranges somewhere between 0 and 100.

So at the low end, when X=0, these 1000 widgets have only cost us 20 person-hours to make, increasing productivity 50-fold. This is sort of where we expect to end up after the machine goes out of patent and becomes commonplace.

But at the high end, when X=100, these 1000 widgets have cost us 120 person-hours to make, increasing productivity a lesser, but still substantial, 8-fold. This might be where we find ourselves when the very first machine comes online and it’s still an experimental prototype.

Under the utility theory of value (which, again, virtually all mainstream economists, including both neoclassical, behavioral, and even Marxian economists, accept), the value of widgets has increased from U(20) to U(1000); exactly what this value is depends on how many consumers there are and what their utility functions are, but two things we can say for sure:

  • This is definitely much higher than before. (Probably more than 10 but less than 50 times higher.)
  • The value is the same regardless of how we account for the person-hours that went into inventing the machine.
  • The cost gets lower over time, as the technology becomes established.
  • Thus the value added should increase over time. (Whether or not profit does depends upon additional factors we haven’t modeled.)

But as Marx seems to be saying here (again, he may say differently elsewhere, but that’s kind of my point; he doesn’t have a coherent theory), we are to value these 1000 widgets as follows:

When the technology is new, X=100, and so the value of the 1000 widgets is 120 person-hours, the labor that went into inventing, producing, and using the machine. So this productivity enhancement has increased value somewhat—a 6-fold increase—but not all that much. And the value of each widget has been radically reduced: It is now only 0.12 person-hours, or about 7 person-minutes.

Yet once the technology becomes established, X=0, and so the value of the 1000 widgets is 20 person-hours, the labor that went into producing and using the machine. So now this productivity enhancement has not increased value at all. The value of each widget has fallen even further: It is now a mere 0.02 person-hours, or just over 1 person-minute.

This weird dynamic, where technology increases value temporarily, then brings it back down to exactly what it was before, is clearly not how technology actually works. The value added from new technologies—in terms of utility, what really matters—is permanent and increasing over time.

Yet upon re-reading Marx and reflecting some more on his labor theories of value, I think Marx believed that this is actually what happens.

I think that Marx’s whole account of why the rate of profit must fall (even though it absolutely hasn’t, empirically, and even Marxian economists today recognize there’s no particular theoretical reason it should) is based on this misconception.

I think because he believed that labor is the correct measure of value, the fact that human beings can only do so much labor (which hasn’t really changed much over the millennia) means that standard of living can never really increase, because higher productivity simply translates into stuff becoming more and more worthless.

And I think part of where the confusion comes from is that price does sort of behave this way, at least qualitatively; no doubt in a world where widgets can be produced with only 1 minute of labor instead of 60 is one in which widgets are much cheaper to buy. But that doesn’t mean that their value has been correspondingly reduced; they are still just as useful (for whatever widgets do) as they were before, and any decline in marginal value merely comes from diminishing marginal utility as people get more and more of them.

Yet I think Marx didn’t want that result, because it seemed to imply that capitalism could actually make life better, even for workers. (As, empirically, it absolutely did.) He wanted to be able to prove that, despite all appearances, workers have gained absolutely nothing from capitalism and technology, and live just as poorly today as they did in the Middle Ages. And a labor theory of value was just the way to do that, for we only work slightly more hours today than most people did in the Middle Ages (and given the state of Medieval scholarship at the time, Marx may have even thought it was the same). Yet I for one am really a fan of vaccines and flush toilets; I don’t know about you.

He quickly realized many of the problems with this theory, and so he added more and more epicycles to try to correct these problems; but the result was a theory that wasn’t even coherent. Yet in part because of Marx’s incredibly dense and verbose writing style (please note; there are 547 pages in Volume I of Das Kapital, and it has three volumes.)it remained plausible enough to non-experts to catch on, and due to its very complexity, it becomes genuinely hard for anyone to understand. So then we can have the argument I had, where even as I clearly demonstrated the deep flaws in the theory, my interlocutor could always insist I hadn’t really understood what Marx was saying, and it was all my failing, not anything wrong with the theory, which is of course inerrant and handed down from On High.

For some people (not all, but some), Marxism really does seem more like a religion than a scientific theory: “I don’t know exactly what it means, but dammit, I know it’s true and you’ll never convince me otherwise.”

Is there a way to make a labor theory of value work?

I’m pretty well convinced that Marx’s labor theory of value is either wrong, or so incoherent as to be not even wrong. (Adam Smith’s and David Ricardo’s theories were coherent, so they were definitely just wrong.)

But could there, somewhere buried in all those hundreds of pages of mind-numbingly dense and self-contradictory text, be a theory worth salvaging?

Can I steelman the labor theory of value?

I’m going to give it a try.

Okay, so clearly it’s not the actual amount of labor used, as that runs afoul of proposition 1 immediately:

  1. A project you spend 100 hours on which ultimately failed and produced nothing useful was extremely valuable.

That’s nonsense, so we’ll rule that theory out.

Okay, maybe we can patch it up by saying it’s the socially necessary amount of labor required; the amount of labor that the most-efficient worker would require. Clearly, if you are spending 100 hours on something useless, you’re not being the most-efficient worker.

This seems to be closer to Marx’s account, but it still runs afoul of propositions 2, 3, and 4:

  1. Everything in the Garden of Eden is worthless, because it doesn’t require labor to access.
  2. If you come up with a cure for cancer in a random stroke of insight, it’s worthless because you didn’t put any labor into it, even though both its utility (the lives it will save) and its price (the money you could make off of it) are surely astronomical.
  3. Increased productivity is worthless, because all it does is make our goods worthless as we get better at making them.

Marx actually seemed to like proposition 4, but we can see that it’s wrong. So this is a problem.

Also, while propositions 2 and 3 may seem like extreme thought experiments, consider the following:

First, “The Garden of Eden” is very much what a Star Trek-style fully automated luxury communism would feel like. Many leftists say that they really would like to see such a world, and I agree with them on this. But on this theory of value, it’s all worthless, because nobody has to work to get anything.

Second, a sudden insight into a miracle cure that ends up becoming cheap and plentiful is pretty much what happened with penicillin and vaccines. Yes, there was some labor involved in making them (and still is), but it was clearly far less than the utility gained from all the improvements in health and lifespan that we have received from these inventions. Valuing these technologies in terms of their labor cost seems to completely miss the point of why they were such miracles.

So is there some other way to make a labor theory of value work?

The best I can come up with is this:

The value of a product is the amount of labor it would take to make that product by hand with pre-historic technology.

This is my attempt at steelmanning the labor theory of value. It does solve propositions 2, 3, and 4:

For 2, the fact that everything is handed to you (perhaps by robots) doesn’t change the fact that making it yourself would be really, really hard.

For 3, it’s much harder to make penicillin by hand than in a factory (though it can be done!), so improved penicillin technology is a gain in value. And every new vial of penicillin is worth the many hours that would have gone into making it by hand.

And for 4, any improvement in labor productivity works exactly how you’d expect: A machine that can do the work of 100 people produces 100 times as much value in goods. (In some ways, this is even more intuitive to most people than the utility theory of value, which predicts an increase, but not a one-to-one increase.)

So, okay, this theory is not preposterous, unlike everything we’ve considered so far.

But it really can’t be Marx’s theory, because he contradicts it very heavily in multiple places, and this theory, unlike his, does not predict that the rate of profit must fall. (Which, again, is good, because it doesn’t.)

Yet even this theory is ultimately unsatisfying, for the following reasons:

  1. Some products literally cannot be made by hand using pre-historic technology. Consider a graphics card or a strong-force microscope. In order to make these things, we had to make tools to make better tools to make even better tools to make still better tools to make yet even better tools to make staggeringly near-flawless tools to make them. Even if you had the complete schematics for all the necessary tools and machines, all the raw materials you needed, and an unlimited supply of labor, I’m not sure you could build a graphics card from scratch within a single lifetime.
  2. While it can account for the value of increased efficiency in producing a given good, it doesn’t seem to be able to account for the value of inventing whole new classes of goods. (Yes, penicillin can be made by hand using pre-historic tools, but nobody did as far as we know, and the value of that invention was absolutely enormous in a way that even this labor theory of value cannot account for.)

These two problems are related: The new products you can make now that you couldn’t before are made possible by a mix of new ideas and an accumulation of better and better tools.

As far as proposition 5, I think we might be able to shore up the theory by counting the value of capital accumulation in terms of the labor that would be needed at each level of technology: however many person-hours to make the optical microscope, and then however many person-hours to make lasers, and however many person-hours to make sulfuric acid, and so on and so forth, until you’ve finally added up all the labor that went into producing the things that produced the things that produced the things that produced the things that produced graphics cards.

But as for proposition 6? I think this is just fatal. I don’t think there’s any way for a labor theory of value to not systematically and catastrophically undervalue new discoveries and new inventions.

The whole point of new inventions is that they make new things possible or allow us to do things with far less effort or cost than before. The value they create is in the labor they save. But if they are things we theoretically could have done, just didn’t know how (like penicillin), then there is no value added by the discovery (though at least there can be a lot of value added by the actual production). And if they are things we couldn’t have done until we reached a certain level of technology and capital, the value added seems to all be captured by the production of each new tier of technology, with nothing left to go to the discovery itself.

Maybe there’s still a way to save this theory. But at some point, we have to stop and ask ourselves:

Why?

Why do we even want a labor theory of value, when we already have a utility theory of value?

Maybe it’s the fact that utility is hard to measure precisely, and so the idea of basing our value system on it is uncomfortable? Yet I think this is just a fact of life: The things that really matter are hard to measure precisely.

And it’s not as if we have absolutely no idea: We can tell the difference between happiness and suffering, and we can see how various products and technologies can contribute to happiness and alleviate suffering. (We can also see how some products and technologies can reduce happiness and contribute to suffering! Not all new technologies are good, and some products that are good for their users are bad for other people!)

Indeed, we even have a unit of measurement: The QALY. And for some particular technologies—such as penicillin and vaccines—we actually have a pretty good idea of the number of QALY they’ve added to the world, and it’s enormous.

I’m not even saying Marx was wrong about everything. He had some good ideas, actually. And Marxian economists today do sometimes come up with useful findings that can be integrated into a deeper understanding of political economy.

But he was wrong about some things, and the labor theory of value is one of them.

Wonderful news from Hungary

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Apr 19 JDN 246150

Hungary’s recent election results were just about as good as they could possibly have been. Victor Orban was not only defeated, but crushed; Magyar’s party didn’t just win, they won a supermajority. They now have the power to implement sweeping reforms that could prevent authoritarians like Orban from ever taking power in Hungary again.

Already Magyar has suspended Hungarian state media broadcasts and released $90 billion in EU aid for Ukraine that Hungary had been holding up. These are immediate, concrete results from just his first few days in office.

I have two goals for this post:

First, I just want to celebrate.

This is a huge victory for democracy, not just in Hungary, but across Europe and indeed around the world. It brings hope in a time when we needed it most. It proves to the world that authoritarians can be toppled, and democracy can be restored—sometimes even without bloodshed.

There is a light at the end of this tunnel. We must keep pressing forward.

Second, I want to use it as a model.

I think the biggest thing that this event teaches us is that democracy and nonviolence can succeed. This is something we should already have recognized from the empirical evidence, but rarely do we see such a clear, unambiguous example of a triumphant victory by nonviolent, democratic means alone.

Hungarians protested, and lobbied, and voted, and they did so in a united voice against Orban’s tyranny. But there was very little violence—and most of what there was, was instigated by the government against peaceful protesters. (Remember, nonviolence doesn’t mean nobody gets hurt.)

And once he took power, Magyar already began the process of reform. It will no doubt be a long and difficult process, and may take years to complete. Orban and his party are defeated, but not destroyed, and they will continue to mount resistance. But Magyar did not wait. He did not try to reconcile or compromise. He immediately set out to make things better.

This is what the Democrats must do when they win the midterm elections this year. They must not be timid and careful, not taking any bold moves to avoid upsetting “moderates”. (Anyone who still thinks Trump belongs anywhere near public office at this point is not and never was a moderate. At best, they might be a low-information voter who literally doesn’t know what’s going on.) They must act swiftly and decisively to repair the damage Trump has done and fix our system so that no similar maniac can do such damage again in the future. This is exactly what Biden failed to do when he took office in 2020. (Yes, I know that Congress and the Supreme Court fought him on a lot of things. But there was definitely still more that he could have done and didn’t, and people are suffering now because of it.)

Ideally, in fact, they would impeach and remove Trump before 2028. (And if it’s not too much trouble, try him at the Hague for all the children he starved?) But if they don’t manage to do that, at the very least, they must ensure that they continue to have such a strong campaign for Congress and the President in 2028 that they take both of those branches of government—and then, they need to pack the Supreme Court in order to secure the third. This damage will not be undone until Republicans are completely removed from the seats of national power, and stay removed for at least a decade.

Of course, in order for that to happen, the Democrats are going to need to win a lot of elections. And that isn’t just on them—it’s also on us. They need to run better candidates, we need to vote for those candidates, and we need to hold those candidates accountable for taking the bold measures necessary to repair America after this disaster. They need to stop taking their own electoral victories for granted: Yes, Clinton and Biden absolutely deserved to win all three elections. But they only actually won one of them, and that is what matters. The Democratic Party should be looking long and hard at what went wrong in 2016 and 2024, and learning from those mistakes.

I’m not even saying the Democrats are perfect; they are not. (Neither is Magyar.) But we need a powerful party to defeat the Republicans and restore American democracy, and only the Democrats are currently in a position to fulfill that role. After the Republicans are totally destroyed and only a distant, unsettling memory like the Nazis, then you can start voting for the Greens or the Libertarians.

And since “Magyar” basically just means “Hungarian”, maybe we should run a Presidential candidate named something like John T. American, just in case.

Inerrancy is an absurdly strong claim

PNRJ core principles, current events, ethics , , , , , , , , , , ,

Apr 12 JDN 246143

I’ve had a really hard time writing a post this week. Between my late father’s birthday coming up soon (April 15) and the fact that a man with full authority over a full-scale nuclear arsenal threatened to destroy an entire civilization—a literal imminent threat of genocide—and the people with the power to remove him did absolutely nothing, the world just feels like a nightmare I’ve been trying to wake up from.

And yes, it matters that he has authority over nukes. If you’re in a fistfight and the other guy says, “I’ll kill you!” that’s very different than if he draws a handgun and says the same thing. The President of the United States should essentially be treated as always brandishing a deadly weapon, and it is his responsibility to have the decorum to not make statements that can be read as imminent threats.

This means that trying to be topical about current events is just too painful and disorienting for me to write anything that feels useful to say. (I mostly feel like screaming.)

So, perhaps ironically, I’m going to write a post that’s completely un-topical, that could honestly have been written any time between roughly 300 AD and the present, and—much to my chagrin—will probably still be relevant in 3000 AD if humanity survives that long.

It concerns the doctrine of scriptural inerrancy.

Simply put, inerrancy is the belief that divine scriptures (especially the Bible or Qur’an) are without error: That is, that literally every proposition contained therein is absolutely and completely true.


This is not by any means a rare or fringe belief. 55% of Christians in the United States report that they believe in Biblical inerrancy. I was not able to obtain a similar figure for Muslims, but I can tell you that a majority of US Muslims and over 90% of African Muslims believe in the even stronger claim of Qur’anic literalism.

We can set aside the question of copyediting. I don’t care about typos or grammar mistakes. Translation errors are somewhat more serious—as they can affect real doctrines—but I’m willing to set those aside as well. We can say that we are talking about the original texts in their original languages, and idealized so that they do not contain any errors of grammar or typography.

This is already asking a lot, but I am prepared to concede it.

Even so, inerrancy is an absurdly strong claim that no rational person should ever take seriously.

The claim is that this entire text—hundreds of pages by dozens of authors over hundreds of years—is entirely true, without a single false assertion anywhere within it.

I want to be absolutely clear about this: I do not believe that about any text I have ever encountered.

I do not believe that The Origin of Species is inerrant. I do not believe that calculus textbooks are inerrant. I do not believe that Einstein’s 1905 paper on special relativity is inerrant.

I can’t point you to any specific errors in these books right now (especially since we haven’t even specified a calculus textbook), but if someone did point me to an error, I would not be the least bit surprised. Even if I combed through the entire text multiple times and didn’t spot any errors, I would still be doubtful that I hadn’t missed one somewhere.

Honestly, I find it improbable that any nonfiction work by human beings of significant length and complexity is completely without errors. (Okay, a 5-page book on counting for kindergartners might actually be inerrant. Maybe.)

Let me try putting it this way. What is the probability that any given proposition stated by a given source is correct? For a very reliable source, it could be 99%, or 99.9%, or even 99.99%. Perhaps you literally trust some sources so much that they must assert 10,000propositions before they get one wrong. (I’m not sure there’s anyone I trust this much—I certainly do not trust myself this much—but I’ll allow it for the sake of argument.)

There are 30,000 verses in the Bible. Many of these verses assert multiple propositions.

Even if each and every proposition is 99.99% reliable, the probability that all of 30,000 distinct propositions is correct is less than 5%. Even if you trust the Bible that much, you should still be 95% certain that it got something wrong somewhere.

In fact, it’s much worse than that, as we know for a fact that there are explicit contradictions between different parts of the Bible. The Skeptic’s Annotated Bible counts over 500 explicit contradictions, some relatively trivial (did Enoch die?) but others absolutely core to Christian theology (do Heaven and Hell exist?). If even one of those holds up—and as far as I can tell, most of them hold up, maybe even all of them (though I wouldn’t be surprised if some don’t; are you getting it yet?)—then the Bible is not inerrant. Indeed, just counting contradictions, if 500 of 30,000 propositions are contradictions, then the accuracy of each proposition can’t be more than 99%.

We don’t even need the extensive empirical evidence that refutes the creation stories in the Bible to know that those stories are wrong. The creation stories themselves contradict each other in vital ways.

We don’t need to consider the vanishingly small prior probability that a human being can rise from the dead to take issue with the resurrection story. Simon and Peter can’t both simultaneously have known in advance that Jesus would resurrect and not known that until it happened. Jesus can’t have been crucified to death both before and after Passover.

Some of these kinds of contradictions are exactly the sort of thing you would expect to slip into a historical account that was delivered by oral tradition over multiple generations. (They do not, for instance, give me reason to doubt that there was in fact a historical figure named Yeshua of Nazareth who gathered a group of apostles and was crucified to death by the Roman state. The vast majority of historians agree that this man did, in fact, exist.)

But they are exactly what you are not allowed to have in a book that is inerrant!

A book that is literally without error, without flaw, should not contain even one single contradiction, no matter how trivial—and come on, whether or not Heaven and Hell exist is not trivial!

Inerrancy is not simply saying “the Bible is basically true” or “the Bible is a reliable source” or even “Christian theology is true.”

I believe that The Origin of Species is basically true, and a reliable source, and that Darwinian evolutionary theory is true. But I absolutely do not believe that The Origin of Species is inerrant.

I believe that most calculus textbooks are basically true, and are reliable sources, and that the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus is true. But I absolutely do not believe that any calculus textbook is inerrant.

Inerrancy isn’t even simply saying that “the Bible was written by God”! It’s very clear that the Bible is not simply dictated verbatim from On High; there was some kind of human process involved in its creation, and even if you believe that the Council of Nicaea was right about all their choices of the canon, you should still recognize that there is plenty of room for errors to have crept in during this long, convoluted, and controversial human process.

(For the Qur’an, we actually have mostly the original text by the original author—but even then, you should still be doubtful that any document with thousands of claims could be absolutely, 100% true.)

So, please, Christians, Muslims, and everyone else, I am literally begging you:

Please, give up on inerrancy. Admit that your book could be mistaken.

I’m not asking you to give up on your religion. You can keep your theology. You can still mostly believe in the book. But please, recognize how incredibly unreasonable you are being by asserting that it is impossible that anything in the book could ever be wrong.

I beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, think it possible that your book could be mistaken.

What would a world without poverty look like?

PNRJ core principles, critique of neoclassical economics, development economics, education, ethics, futurism, inequality, public policy , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Mar 22 JDN 2461122

In my previous post I reflected on the ways that conventional measures of poverty seem inadequate—and that a richer understanding of poverty suggests that it is far more ubiquitous than such measures suggest.

In this post, I will ask: Given this richer understanding of poverty, what would a world without poverty look like? Is it something we can realistically hope to achieve?

In techno-utopian circles (looking at you again, Scott Alexander), it is common to speak of “post-scarcity”: A world where there is no poverty because resources are effectively unlimited.

I don’t think that’s possible.

Not for humans as we know them. Perhaps in a future where greed is a recognized and treatable psychiatric disorder, we could genuinely have an economy where people really just take whatever they want and it works out because nobody wants an unreasonable amount.

But the fact that there are people with hundreds of billions of dollars tells me that among humans as we know them, some people’s greed is just literally insatiable. Give them a moon and they’ll demand a planet; give them a planet and they’ll demand a solar system. Whatever they are getting out of more wealth (status? power? the dopamine hit of number go up?), they’re never going to stop getting it from even more wealth, no matter how much we give them. For if they were going to stop at a reasonable amount, they would have stopped four orders of magnitude ago.

So let’s try to imagine what a world would look like if it really had no poverty, but not by somehow producing such staggering amounts of wealth that everyone could literally take whatever they want.

I think the key is that it would require all basic material needs to be met.

Everyone would have, at minimum:

  • Clean air to breathe
  • Clean water to drink
  • Nutritious food to eat
  • Shelter from the elements
  • Security against theft and violence
  • Personal liberty and political representation
  • A basic education
  • A basic standard of healthcare

(I will note that these resonate quite closely with the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights.)

Some of these needs can probably never be completely satisfied—there is an inherent tension between liberty and security which requires us to balance them against each other. A society with zero crime is a horrific totalitarian police state; a society with complete liberty is an equally horrific Hobbesian nightmare. But we have achieved, in most of the First World at least, a reasonable standard of security along with a great deal of liberty, and preserving that balance should be of a very high priority.

Even clean air and water would be difficult to satisfy perfectly: even if we pivot our whole economy to solar, wind, and nuclear power (as we very definitely should be doing!), some amount of pollution is probably necessary just to have a functioning industrial society. So we need to establish reasonable standards for what amounts of pollution exposure are safe, and effective mechanisms for ensuring that people are not exposed to pollution outside those standards—we have largely done the former, but seriously fail at the latter.

But probably the most difficult needs to satisfy are actually difficult to even define.

Just what constitutes a basic standard of education, and a basic standard of healthcare?

These seem like moving targets.

Let’s start with education:

Someone who is illiterate and can barely add two numbers together would be considered to have very poor education today, but would be considered completely average among peasants in the Middle Ages. Someone like me with a PhD has education well beyond what anyone had in the Middle Ages: While Oxford was already graduating doctors in the 12th century, those doctors didn’t have to write dissertations, and didn’t know nearly as much about the world as you must to earn a modern PhD. (Most of the mathematics required to get an economics PhD specifically literally had not been invented.)

So it’s conceivable that educational standards will continue to rise over time, especially if we are able to radically improve learning via new technologies. In the most extreme case, if everyone can just download knowledge like in The Matrix, then it wouldn’t be unreasonable to expect the average person to know as much as a typical PhD today in dozens of fields.

Suppose that such technology did exist. Would it be fair to consider someone poor if they didn’t have access to it?

Yes, I think it would.

Because if it’s really cheap and easy to give breathtakingly vast knowledge on a variety of subjects to anyone instantly, then letting some people have that while others do not puts those others at a severe disadvantage in life. If you must know how to solve partial differential equations to get a job, then someone who only made it through high school algebra isn’t going to be able to find jobs.

So I think what we’re really concerned about here is inequality: The education of a rich person should not be too much better than the education of a poor person, lest “meritocracy” simply reinforce the same generational inequality it was supposed to eliminate.

Now consider healthcare:

This, too, has radically improved over time. Indeed, I’m not really sure it’s fair to call Medieval doctors doctors at all; they lacked basic knowledge of human physiology and their intervention was as likely to hurt patients as to help them. Surgeons certainly existed: They knew how to amputate a gangrenous limb or suture a wound. (They did so without antiseptic, let alone anaesthetic!) But should you come to them with a fever or a headache, they would likely do you as much harm as good.

So we could imagine a world of Star Trek medicine, where you lie in a bed, get scanned for a few moments, and the doctor immediately knows what’s wrong with you and what kind of painless injection to give you to fix it.

Once again, we must ask: If you don’t have that, are you poor?

And again, I’m going to say yes.

If the technology exists to heal people this effortlessly, and some people get access to it while others do not, the latter are being allowed to suffer when their suffering could be easily alleviated.

But now we must consider: what if the technology exists, but it’s too expensive to use routinely?

Most technologies are like this when they are first invented. Over time, the technology improves (and the patents expire!) and they become cheaper and more widely available.

Unlike education, healthcare doesn’t usually impose large advantages on those who receive it—though it can, especially in a society where disabilities are not adequately accommodated.

So I think I’m prepared to allow “early adopters” of new medical technology, people who are rich enough to pay for advanced treatments before they are available to everyone—within certain limits. If some new treatment grants radically higher productivity or lifespan, then in fact I think we have a moral obligation to wait until it can be universally shared before we give it to anyone—precisely because of the risk of reinforcing generational inequality.

Once again, in our effort to define poverty, we end up returning to inequality: The rich should not be allowed to be too much healthier than the poor.

This definitely makes education and healthcare more complicated than the others.

While we can pretty clearly define how much food and water a human being needs to live, and we could provide it to everyone, and then nobody would be poor in terms of food or water.

But making nobody poor in terms of education and healthcare requires meeting a standard that may in fact increase over time, and it is no contradiction to imagine that someone living in the 31st century could be receiving better healthcare than I ever will and yet is still not receiving adequate healthcare based on the technology available.

Furthermore, that person demanding better healthcare is not being ungrateful or envious—they are quite reasonably demanding that society fairly allocate healthcare so that there aren’t some people who live in eternal youth while other people still die of old age.

Are they richer than I am? In some sense, perhaps. We could stipulate that in every material way they are better off than I am now. But there’s a treatment that could extend their life by centuries, and nobody’s giving it to them, because they can’t afford it—and that’s wrong. That makes them poor, and it makes their society unfair and unjust. It isn’t just a question of how many QALY they have; it’s also a question of what it would cost to give them a lot more.

But with all that said, I do believe that a world without poverty is possible.

In fact, I believe that technologically we could already provide that world, if we had the political will to do so. Maybe we don’t quite have the economic output to support it worldwide, but even that is not as far off as most people seem to think.

Providing an adequate standard of food and water, for example, we could already do with existing food supplies. It would cost about one-eighth of Elon Musk’s wealth per year, meaning that, with good stock returns (as he most certainly gets), he could very likely afford it by himself!

Clean air for all would be harder, but we are moving the right direction now that solar power is so cheap.

Universal liberty and security would require radical shifts in government in dozens of countries, so that one seems especially unlikely to happen any time soon—yet it is very definitely possible, and by construction only requires political change.

Universal education and healthcare would be very expensive, and most countries are too poor to really provide them on their own. They are not simply poor in money, but poor in skills: There aren’t enough doctors and teachers, and so we would need to use the ones we have to train up a new generation, and perhaps a new generation after that, before the world’s needs would really be met. (Fortunately, there are people trying to do this. But they don’t have enough resources to really achieve these goals.) So this is not a technological limitation, but it is an economic one; it will probably be at least another generation before we can solve this one.

What about universal shelter? Now there’s the rub. Even in prosperous First World countries, housing shortages and skyrocketing prices are keeping homeownership out of reach for tens of millions of people, and leaving hundreds of thousands outright homeless. We clearly do have the technology to produce enough homes, especially if we are prepared to build at high density; but the economic cost of doing so would be substantial, and our policymakers don’t seem at all willing to actually pay it. I think as long as housing is viewed as an asset one invests in rather than a good that one needs, this will continue to be the case.

The problem isn’t that we don’t have enough stuff. It’s that we are not sharing it properly.

What is poverty?

PNRJ core principles, critique of neoclassical economics, development economics, ethics, inequality , , , , , ,

Mar 15 JDN 2461115

What is poverty? It seems like a simple question, one we should all already know the answer to; but it turns out to be surprisingly complicated.

In practice, we mainly define some amount of income or consumption that is considered a “poverty line”, and declare that everyone below that line is in poverty, while everyone above it is not.

This post is about why that doesn’t work.

The most obvious question is of course: How do we draw that line? Some absolute level, or relative to income in the rest of society? Different places do it differently.

But I have come to realize that there is actually a deeper reason why there will never be a satisfying choice of “poverty line”:

There is no specific amount of income that could ever decide whether someone is in poverty.

It’s not a question of purchasing power. prices, or inflation. It’s not something you can adjust for statistically. It’s a fundamental error in defining the concept of poverty.

The problem is this:

Human needs are not fungible.

This Less Wrong post on “Anoxistan” really opened my eyes to that: No amount of money can make up for the fact that you’re missing something you need, be it a roof over your head, food on your table, clean water to drink, or medical care—or, as in the parable, air to breathe.

The best definition of poverty, then, is something like this:

Poverty is having to struggle to meet basic human material needs.

(I specify “material” needs, because someone who is alone and unloved has unmet human needs, but it is not the responsibility of even a utopian fully automated luxury communist society to provide for those needs. They may very well be miserable, but it does not make them poor.)

Maybe—maybe—in a well-functioning market economy, we can sort of muddle through by making a list of what everyone needs, finding the prices for all those goods and services, adding that up, and declaring that the poverty line. (This is often what we actually do, in fact.) The notion would then be that, as long as you have at least that amount of money, you can probably buy all the things you need.

But this rapidly breaks down if you aren’t facing the same prices as what were used to make that aggregation—which you almost never are, because nobody is the average American living in the average American city. And it also misses the fact that security is a human need, and simply having the necessary income for now is not at all the same thing as knowing that you’ll continue to have the necessary income in the future.

One Libertarian commentator asked me: “Would you really switch places with Rockefeller if you could?”

I had to think about it: I’d be losing a lot of things, for sure. No Internet, no cell phone, no computer, no video games. The quality of my clothes might actually be worse (though my wardrobe would surely be larger). Finding vegetarian food I enjoy might actually be more of a challenge, though I could surely import it from anywhere. Worst of all, I would lose access to many medical treatments I currently depend upon: Treatment of migraines in the late 19th century was considerably worse, and treatment of depression was essentially nonexistent.

Since this is about wealth, I think we can ignore the fact that I’d be moving into a terrifyingly racist, misogynistic and homophobic society. That itself might actually be the reason I wouldn’t really want to make the switch. But you can simultaneously believe that the late 19th century was a worse time than today for everyone who wasn’t a White cisgender heterosexual man, and also that Rockefeller was much richer than you’ll ever be.

But what would I gain? Power, though I have very little interest in that. Opportunities for philanthropy, which I do care about, but they’d benefit other people more than myself. Real estate—I don’t even own my own home, and Rockefeller owned multiple mansions, including, famously, the Casements in Florida.

But above all, I would gain security. Owning an oil company would allow me to live comfortably for the rest of my life, and most likely also allow my heirs to live comfortably for their entire lives, without me ever needing to work another day. I could still take jobs if I wanted them, but no employer would ever have any power over me. If I was unhappy at a job, I could just leave. If I wanted to spend a month, or a year, or a decade, without working at all, I could just do that. That is what it means to be rich. That is what Rockfeller had that I don’t think I will ever have.

The difference between being rich and being poor is security.

As long as anyone is struggling to make ends meet, poverty exists.

As long as anyone is afraid to lose their job, poverty exists.

As long as anyone is choosing not to have children because they don’t think they can afford them, poverty exists.

As long as bosses can abuse their employees and get away with it, poverty exists.

And in fact, it begins to look like poverty in the United States has not been decreasing over the last two generations, even as our per-capita GDP and median income have continued to rise and our population below “the poverty line” have fallen. (Indeed, that particular measure of “unable to afford children” has very clearly greatly increased, and is a very bad sign for our society’s future.)

This is how our economy is failing. It has given us lots more stuff, and made some things available to all that were once only available to the rich; but it has not freed us from the constant struggle to meet our basic needs, even though there are clearly plenty of resources available to do that.

How could we make job search less of a nightmare?

PNRJ core principles, market failure, personal, public policy , , , , , , , , , , ,

Mar 1 JDN 2461101

This has been my “career” for the last two years:

I search through thousands of job postings, which, despite various filters and tags on my searches, almost none of which are actually good fits for me—in part because the search engines simply do not contain a great deal of information that would be vital, like “LGBT friendly”, “supportive of neurodivergent employees”, or “good at accommodating disabilities”. Instead it’s all sorted by “job title”, which at this point is clearly an arms race of search-engine optimization, because I keep getting listings called “tutor” which are actually some sort of interactive training of yet another large language model nobody actually needs. (Actual tutoring of actual human students often is a good fit for me—though it pays much better if you’re freelance than if you work for a company, because the companies take a huge cut of what the customers pay.)

But, after an hour or two of searching, I find a few that seem like they might be worth applying to. They’re never a perfect fit, but beggars can’t be choosers, so I decide I’ll go ahead and apply to them.

They ask for a resume. No problem. Perfectly sensible, I have one handy; maybe I’ll tweak it a bit, but if it’s an industry I often apply to, I may already have a tweaked version ready to go.

They ask for a cover letter. Okay, I guess. There usually isn’t much I can really say there that isn’t already in my resume, but occasionally there’s something worth adding, and it’s only maybe half an hour of work to update an existing cover letter for a new application.

Then, they ask me to input my work history in their proprietary format on their website. WHAT!? WHY!? I just gave you a resume! You aren’t even willing to read it? You want to be able to automate the reading of my resume, so I have to enter into your proprietary database? But okay, fine; beggars can’t be choosers, I remind myself. So I enter everything that’s in my resume again.

Then, they ask me what salary I want. I know this game. You’re trying to make me reveal my preference in this bargaining game so you can gain bargaining power. So I look up what kind of salaries companies like them usually offer for jobs like this, and then I hike it up a bit as the opening bid in a negotiation.

Then, they ask me to fill out some questions that are supposed to assess… something. Some kind of personality test, or “culture fit”, or something similarly fuzzy. I try to interpolate my answers between my genuine feelings and the kind of hyper-obedient corporate drone they’re probably looking for, because I’m not an idiot who would answer honestly (I’m not that autistic), butI wouldn’t actually want to work for anyone who required the very topmost corporate-drone answers.

And then, what happens?

Absolutely nothing.

No response. Weeks pass. At some point, I have to assume that they’ve filled the position or closed it, or maybe that the vacancy was never real at all and they posted it for some other reason—likely to give some sense of searching when they in fact already have someone in mind. (Apparently over a third of online job postings are fake.)

I have done this process over two hundred times.

And in doing so, I have chipped off pieces of my soul. I feel like a shell of the person I was. And I have absolutely nothing to show for it all.

I am not even unusual in this regard: Recruiters often complain that they are swamped because they get 200 applicants per posting—but that means, mathematically, that an average job-seeker must apply to 200 postings before they can expect to get hired. (And which is more work, do you think: Writing a cover letter, or reading one?)

How could we make this better?

There are a lot of problems to fix here, but I have one very simple intervention that would only slightly inconvenience recruiters, while making life dramatically better for applicants. Here goes:

Require them to show you the resume of the person they actually hired.

There should be a time window: Maybe 30 days after you applied; or if it’s a position like in academia where they don’t do interviews for a long time after the application deadline, within 7 days of them starting interviews.

Anonymize the resume appropriately, of course; no photos, no names, no contact information. We don’t want the new hire to get harassed by their competitors. (And this takes, what, 5 minutes to do?)

But having to send that resume solves several problems simultaneously:

  1. It means they have to actually respond—they cannot ghost you. It can be a two-line form letter email with a one-page attachment that’s the same for all 200 applicants—but they have to send you something.
  2. It means they have to actually hire someone—the posting cannot be completely fake. If they are for some reason unable to fill the vacancy and have to close it, they should have to tell you that, and give a reason—and that reason should be legally binding such that if you ever find out it’s not true, you can sue them.
  3. It means that person had to actually apply—they couldn’t have been someone’s nephew who was automatically given the job and the posting was only made to make it look like there was a hiring process. At the very least, said nephew had to actually cough up a resume like the rest of us.
  4. It allows you to compare qualifications—you can see how you stack up against the new hire. If they are genuinely far more qualified? Well, fair enough; perhaps this job was a stretch for you, or it’s a very rough market. If they are about as qualified, or better in some ways, worse in others? Well, you surely were to apply, but you can’t win ’em all. But if they are far less qualified? You now have the basis for a lawsuit, because that looks like nepotism at best and discrimination at worst—and they had to give you that evidence, in writing, in a timely fashion.

The penalty for failing to comply with this regulation could be a small fine, perhaps $100—per applicant. The more people you ghost, the more you have to pay up.

This is clearly a very small amount of extra effort for the recruiters. They already have the resume—hopefully—and all they need to do is anonymize it, grab a standard form letter rejection email, BCC all the applicants to this position (which are—again, hopefully—already stored in one place in the company’s database), attach the anonymized resume, and click Send. We’re talking 15 minutes of work here, regardless of the number of applicants. In fact, it could probably be automated so as to require almost zero marginal effort for each new job: Just check the box next to the name of the person who was hired in the applicant tracking system, and it does the rest. (And if the person you hired wasn’t in the applicant tracking system? That sounds like a you problem, because you’re clearly not treating the other applicants fairly.)

Love in a godless universe

PNRJ core principles, current events, ethics, personal, tribal paradigm , , , , , , , , ,

Feb 15 JDN 2461087

This post will go live just after Valentine’s Day, so I thought I would write this week about love.

(Of course I’ve written about love before, often around this time of year.)

Many religions teach that love is a gift from God, perhaps the greatest of all such gifts; indeed, some even say “God is love” (though I confess I have never been entirely sure what that sentence is intended to mean). But if there is no God, what is love? Does it still have meaning?

I believe that it does.

Yes, there is a cynical account of love often associated with atheism, which is that it is “just a chemical reaction” or “just an evolved behavior”. (An easy way to look out for this sort of cynical account is to look for the word “just”.)

Well, if love is a chemical reaction, so is consciousness—indeed the two seem very deeply related. I suppose a being can be conscious without being capable of love (do psychopaths qualify?), but I certainly do not think a being can be capable of love without being conscious.

Indeed, I contend that once you really internalize the Basic Fact of Cognitive Science, “just a chemical reaction” strikes you as an utterly trivial claim: What isn’t a chemical reaction? That’s just a funny way of saying something exists.

What about being an evolved behavior? Yes, this is a much more insightful account of what love is, what it means—what it’s for, even. It evolved to make us find mates, protect offspring, and cooperate in groups.

And I can hear the response coming: “Is that all?” “Is it just that?” (There’s that “just” again.)

So let me try phrasing it another way:

Love is what makes us human.

If there is one thing that human beings are better at than anything in the known universe, one thing that most absolutely characterizes who and what we are, it is love.

Intelligence? Rationality? Reasoning? Oh, sure, for the first half-million years of our existence, we were definitely on top; but now, I think computers have got us beat on those. (I guess it’s hard to say for sure if Claude is truly intelligent, but I can tell you this: Wolfram Alpha is a lot better at calculus than I’ll ever be, and I will never win a game of Go against AlphaZero.)

Strength? Ridiculous! By megafauna standards—even ape standards—we’re pathetic. Speed? Not terrible, but of course the cheetahs and peregrine falcons have us beat. Endurance? We’re near the top, but so are several other species—including horses, which we’ve made good use of. Durability? Also surprisingly good—we’re tougher than we look—but we still hold no candles to a pachyderm. (You need special guns to kill an elephant, because most standard bullets barely pierce their skin. And standard bullets were, more or less by construction, designed to kill humans.) We do throw exceptionally well, so if you’d like, you can say that the essence of humanity is javelin-throwing—or perhaps baseball.

But no, I think it is love that sets us apart.

Not that other animals are incapable of love; far from it. Almost all mammals and birds express love to their offspring and often their partners; I would not even be sure that reptiles, fish, or amphibians are incapable of love, though their behavior is less consistently affectionate and I am thus less certain about it. (Especially when fish eat their own offspring!) In fact, I might even be prepared to say that bees feel love for their sisters and their mother (the queen). And if insects can feel it, then our world is absolutely teeming with love.

But what sets humans apart, even from other mammals, is the scale at which we are able to love. We are able to love a city, a nation, a culture. We are even able to love ideas.

I do not think this is just a metaphor: (There’s that “just” again!) I would as surely die for democracy as I would to save the life of my spouse. That love is real. It is meaningful. It is important.

Humans feel love for other humans they have never met who live thousands of miles away from them. They will even willingly accept harm to themselves to benefit those others (e.g. by donating to international charities); one can argue that most people do not do this enough, but people do actually do it, and it is difficult to explain why they would were it not for genuine feelings of caring toward people they have never met and most likely never will.

And without this, all of what we know as “human civilization” quite simply could not exist. Without our love for our countrymen, for our culture, for our shared ethical and political principles, we could not sustain these grand nation-states that span the world.

Yes, even despite our often fierce disagreements, there must be a core of solidarity between at least enough people to sustain a nation. Even authoritarian governments cannot sustain themselves when the entire population stops loving them—in fact, they seem to fail at the hands of a sufficiently well-organized four percent. (Honestly, perhaps the worst part about fascist states is that many of their people do love them, all too deeply!)

More than that, without love, we could never have created institutions like science, art, and journalism that slowly but surely accumulate knowledge that is shared with the whole of humanity. The march of progress has been slower and more fitful than I think anyone would like; but it is real, nonetheless, and in the long run humanity’s trajectory still seems to be toward a brighter future—and it is love that makes it so.

It is sometimes said that you should stop caring what other people think—but caring what other people think is what makes us human. Sure, there are bad forms of social pressure; but a person who literally does not care how their actions make other people think and feel is what we call a psychopath. Part of what it means to love someone is to care a great deal what they think. And part of what makes a good person is to have the capacity to love as much as possible.

Love binds us together not only as families, but as nations, and—hopefully, one day—it could bind humanity or even all sentient life as one united whole. Morality is a deep and complicated subject, but if you must start somewhere very simple in understanding it, you could do much worse than to start with love.

It is often said that God is what binds cultures, nations, and humanity together. With this in mind, perhaps I am prepared to assent to “God is love” after all, but let me clarify what I would mean by it:

Love does for us what people thought they needed God for.

Productivity by itself does not eliminate poverty

PNRJ core principles, development economics, ethics, inequality, market failure , , , , , , ,

Jan 25 JDN 2461066

Scott Alexander has a techno-utopian vision:

Between the vast ocean of total annihilation and the vast continent of infinite post-scarcity, there is, I admit, a tiny shoreline of possibilities that end in oligarch capture. Even if you end up there, you’ll be fine. Dario Amodei has taken the Giving What We Can Pledge (#43 here) to give 10% of his wealth to the less fortunate; your worst-case scenario is owning a terraformed moon in one of his galaxies. Now you can stop worrying about the permanent underclass and focus on more important things.

I agree that total annihilation is a very serious risk, though fortunately I believe it is not the most likely outcome. But it seems pretty weird to me to posit that the most likely outcome is “infinite post-scarcity” when oligarch capture is what we already have.

(Regarding Alexander’s specific example: Dario Amidei has $3.7 billion. If he were to give away 10% of that, it would be $370 million, which would be good, but hardly usher in a radical utopia. The assumption seems to be that he would be one of the prevailing trillionaire oligarchs, and I don’t see how we can know that would be the case. Even if AI succeeds in general, that doesn’t mean that every company that makes AI succeeds. (Video games succeeded, but who buys Atari anymore?) Also, it seems especially wide-eyed to imagine that one man would ever own entire galaxies. We probably won’t even ever be able to reach other galaxies!)

People with this sort of utopian vision seem to imagine that all we need to do is make more stuff, and then magically it will all be distributed in such a way that everyone gets to have enough.

If Alexander were writing 200 years ago, I could even understand why he’d think that; there genuinely wasn’t enough stuff to go around, and it would have made sense to think that all we needed to do was solve that problem, and then the other problems would be easy.

But we no longer live in that world.

There is enough stuff to go around—at the very least this is true of all highly-developed countries, and it’s honestly pretty much true of the world as a whole. The problem is very much that it isn’t going around.

Elon Musk’s net wealth is now estimated at over $780 billion. Seven hundred and eighty billion dollars. He could give $90 to every person in the world (all 8.3 billion of us). He could buy a home (median price $400,000—way higher than it was just a few years ago) for every homeless person in America (about 750,000 people) and still have half his wealth left over. He could give $900 to every single person of the 831 million people who live below the world extreme poverty threshold—thus eliminating extreme poverty in the world for a year. (And quite possibly longer, as all those people are likely to be more productive now that they are well-fed.) He has chosen to do none of these things, because he wants to see number go up.

That’s just one man. If you add up all the wealth of all the world’s billionaires—just billionaires, so we’re not even counting people with $50 million or $100 million or $500 million—it totals over $16 trillion. This is enough to not simply end extreme poverty for a year, but to establish a fund that would end it forever.

And don’t tell me that they can’t really do this because it’s all tied up in stocks and not liquid. UNICEF happily accepts donations in stock. Giving UNICEF $10 trillion in stocks absolutely would permanently end extreme poverty worldwide. And they could donate those stocks today. They are choosing not to.

I still think that AI is a bubble that’s going to burst and trigger a financial crisis. But there is some chance that AI actually does become a revolutionary new technology that radically increases productivity. (In fact, I think this will happen, eventually. I just think we’re a paradigm or two away from that, and LLMs are largely a dead end.)

But even if that happens, unless we have had radical changes in our economy and society, it will not usher in a new utopian era of plenty for all.

How do I know this? Because if that were what the powers that be wanted to happen, they would have already started doing it. The super-rich are now so absurdly wealthy that they could easily effect great reductions in poverty at home and abroad while costing themselves basically nothing in terms of real standard of living, but they are choosing not to do that. And our governments could be taxing them more and using those funds to help people, and they are by and large choosing not to do that either.

The notion seems to be similar to “trickle-down economics”: Once the rich get rich enough, they’ll finally realize that money can’t buy happiness and start giving away their vast wealth to help people. But if that didn’t happen at $100 million, or $1 billion, or $10 billion, or $100 billion, I see no reason to think that it will happen at $1 trillion or $10 trillion or even $100 trillion.

The confidence game

PNRJ core principles, ethics, heuristics and biases, personal, politics , , , , , , , , , , ,

Dec 14 JDN 2461024

Our society rewards confidence. Indeed, it seems to do so without limit: The more confident you are, the more successful you will be, the more prestige you will gain, the more power you will have, the more money you will make. It doesn’t seem to matter whether your confidence is justified; there is no punishment for overconfidence and no reward for humility.

If you doubt this, I give you Exhibit A: President Donald Trump.

He has nothing else going for him. He manages to epitomize almost every human vice and lack in almost every human virtue. He is ignorant, impulsive, rude, cruel, incurious, bigoted, incompetent, selfish, xenophobic, racist, and misogynist. He has no empathy, no understanding of justice, and little capacity for self-control. He cares nothing for truth and lies constantly, even to the point of pathology. He has been convicted of multiple felonies. His businesses routinely go bankrupt, and he saves his wealth mainly through fraud and lawsuits. He has publicly admitted to sexually assaulting adult women, and there is mounting evidence that he has also sexually assaulted teenage girls. He is, in short, one of the worst human beings in the world. He does not have the integrity or trustworthiness to be an assistant manager at McDonald’s, let alone President of the United States.

But he thinks he’s brilliant and competent and wise and ethical, and constantly tells everyone around him that he is—and millions of people apparently believe him.

To be fair, confidence is not the only trait that our society rewards. Sometimes it does actually reward hard work, competence, or intellect. But in fact it seems to reward these virtues less consistently than it rewards confidence. And quite frankly I’m not convinced our society rewards honesty at all; liars and frauds seem to be disproportionately represented among the successful.

This troubles me most of all because confidence is not a virtue.

There is nothing good about being confident per se. There is virtue in notbeing underconfident, because underconfidence prevents you from taking actions you should take. But there is just as much virtue in not being overconfident, because overconfidence makes you take actions you shouldn’t—and if anything, is the more dangerous of the two. Yet our culture appears utterly incapable of discerning whether confidence is justifiable—even in the most blatantly obvious cases—and instead rewards everyone all the time for being as confident as they can possibly be.

In fact, the most confident people are usually less competent than the most humble people—because when you really understand something, you also understand how much you don’t understand.

We seem totally unable to tell whether someone who thinks they are right is actually right; and so, whoever thinks they are right is assumed to be right, all the time, every time.

Some of this may even be genetic, a heuristic that perhaps made more sense in our ancient environment. Even quite young children already are more willing to trust confident answers than hesitant ones, in multiple experiments.

Studies suggest that experts are just as overconfident as anyone else, but to be frank, I think this is because you don’t get to be called an expert unless you’re overconfident; people with intellectual humility are filtered out by the brutal competition of academia before they can get tenure.

I guess this is also personal for me.

I am not a confident person. Temperamentally, I just feel deeply uncomfortable going out on a limb and asserting things when I’m not entirely certain of them. I also have something of a complex about ever being perceived as arrogant or condescending, maybe because people often seem to perceive me that way even when I am actively trying to do the opposite. A lot of people seem to take you as condescending when you simply acknowledge that you have more expertise on something than they do.

I am also apparently a poster child for Impostor Syndrome. I once went to an Impostor Syndrome with a couple dozen other people where they played a bingo game for Impostor Syndrome traits and behaviors—and won. I once went to a lecture by George Akerlof where he explained that he attributed his Nobel Prize more to luck and circumstances than any particular brilliance on his part—and I guarantee you, in the extremely unlikely event I ever win a prize like that, I’ll say the same.

Compound this with the fact that our society routinely demands confidence in situations where absolutely no one could ever justify being confident.

Consider a job interview, when they ask you: “Why are you the best candidate for this job?” I couldn’t possibly know that. No one in my position could possibly know that. I literally do not know who your other candidates are in order to compare myself to them. I can tell you why I am qualified, but that’s all I can do. I could be the best person for the job, but I have no idea if I am. It’s your job to figure that out, with all the information in front of you—and I happen to know that you’re actually terrible at it, even with all that information I don’t have access to. If I tell you I know I’m the best person for the job, I am, by construction, either wildly overconfident or lying. (And in my case, it would definitely be lying.)

In fact, if I were a hiring manager, I would probably disqualify anyone who told me they were the best person for the job—because the one thing I now know about them is that they are either overconfident or willing to lie. (But I’ll probably never be a hiring manager.)

Likewise, I’ve been often told when pitching creative work to explain why I am the best or only person who could bring this work to life, or to provide accurate forecasts of how much the work would sell if published. I almost certainly am not the best or only person who could do anything—only a handful of people on Earth could realistically say that they are, and they’ve all already won Oscars or Emmys or Nobel Prizes. Accurate sales forecasts for creative works are so difficult that even Disney Corporation, an ever-growing conglomerate media superpower with billions of dollars to throw at the problem and even more billions of dollars at stake in getting it right, still routinely puts out films that are financial failures.


They casually hand you impossible demands and then get mad at you when you say you can’t meet them. And then they go pick someone else who claims to be able to do the impossible.

There is some hope, however.

Some studies suggest that people can sometimes recognize and punish overconfidence—though, again, I don’t see how that can be reconciled with the success of Donald Trump. In this study of evaluating expert witnesses, the most confident witnesses were rated as slightly less reliable than the moderately-confident ones, but both were far above the least-confident ones.

Surprisingly simple interventions can make intellectual humility more salient to people, and make them more willing to trust people who express doubt—who are, almost without exception, the more trustworthy people.

But somehow, I think I have to learn to express confidence I don’t feel, because that’s how you succeed in our society.