Month: August 2023

Why are political speeches so vacuous?

PNRJ cognitive science, heuristics and biases, politics, public policy, tribal paradigm , , , , , , , , , ,

Aug 27 JDN 2460184

In last week’s post I talked about how posters for shows at the Fringe seem to be attention-grabbing but almost utterly devoid of useful information.

This brings to mind another sort of content that also fits that description: political speeches.

While there are some exceptions—including in fact some of the greatest political speeches ever made, such as Martin Luther King’s “I have a dream” or Dwight Eisenhower’s “Cross of Iron”—on the whole, most political speeches seem to be incredibly vacuous.

Each country probably has its own unique flavor of vacuousness, but in the US they talk about motherhood, and apple pie, and American exceptionalism. “I love my great country, we are an amazing country, I’m so proud to live here” is basically the extent of the information conveyed within what could well be a full hour-long oration.

This raises a question: Why? Why don’t political speeches typically contain useful information?

It’s not that there’s no useful information to be conveyed: There are all sorts of things that people would like to know about a political candidate, including how honest they are, how competent they are, and the whole range of policies they intend to support or oppose on a variety of issues.

But most of what you’d like to know about a candidate actually comes in one of two varieties: Cheap talk, or controversy.

Cheap talk is the part related to being honest and competent. Basically every voter wants candidates who are honest and competent, and we know all too well that not all candidates qualify. The problem is, how do they show that they are honest and competent? They could simply assert it, but that’s basically meaningless—anybody could assert it. In fact, Donald Trump is the candidate who leaps to mind as the most eager to frequently assert his own honesty and competence, and also the most successful candidate in at least my lifetime who seems to utterly and totally lack anything resembling these qualities.

So unless you are clever enough to find ways to demonstrate your honesty and competence, you’re really not accomplishing anything by asserting it. Most people simply won’t believe you, and they’re right not to. So it doesn’t make much sense to spend a lot of effort trying to make such assertions.

Alternatively, you could try to talk about policy, say what you would like to do regarding climate change, the budget, or the military, or the healthcare system, or any of dozens of other political questions. That would absolutely be useful information for voters, and it isn’t just cheap talk, because different candidates and voters do intend different things and voters would like to know which ones are which.

The problem, then, is that it’s controversial. Not everyone is going to agree with your particular take on any given political issue—even within your own party there is bound to be substantial disagreement.

If enough voters were sufficiently rational about this, and could coolly evaluate a candidate’s policies, accepting the pros and cons, then it would still make sense to deliver this information. I for one would rather vote for someone I know agrees with me 90% of the time than someone who won’t even tell me what they intend to do while in office.

But in fact most voters are not sufficiently rational about this. Voters react much more strongly to negative information than positive information: A candidate you agree with 9 times out of 10 can still make you utterly outraged by their stance on issue number 10. This is a specific form of the more general phenomenon of negativity bias: Psychologically, people just react a lot more strongly to bad things than to good things. Negativity bias has strong effects on how people vote, especially young people.

Rather than a cool-headed, rational assessment of pros and cons, most voters base their decision on deal-breakers: “I could never vote for a Republican” or “I could never vote for someone who wants to cut the military”. Only after they’ve excluded a large portion of candidates based on these heuristics do they even try to look closer at the detailed differences between candidates.

This means that, if you are a candidate, your best option is to avoid offering any deal-breakers. You want to say things that almost nobody will strongly disagree with—because any strong disagreement could be someone’s deal-breaker and thereby hurt your poll numbers.

And what’s the best way to not say anything that will offend or annoy anyone? Not say anything at all. Campaign managers basically need to Mirandize their candidates: You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in the court of public opinion.

But in fact you can’t literally remain silent—when running for office, you are expected to make a lot of speeches. So you do the next best thing: You say a lot of words, but convey very little meaning. You say things like “America is great” and “I love apple pie” and “Moms are heroes” that, while utterly vapid, are very unlikely to make anyone particularly angry at you or be any voter’s deal-breaker.

And then we get into a Nash equilibrium where everyone is talking like this, nobody is saying anything, and political speeches become entirely devoid of useful content.

What can we as voters do about this? Individually, perhaps nothing. Collectively, literally everything.

If we could somehow shift the equilibrium so that candidates who are brave enough to make substantive, controversial claims get rewarded for it—even when we don’t entirely agree with them—while those who continue to recite insipid nonsense are punished, then candidates will absolutely change how they speak.

But this would require a lot of people to change, more or less all at once. A sufficiently large critical mass of voters would need to be willing to support candidates specifically because they made detailed policy proposals, even if we didn’t particularly like those policy proposals.

Obviously, if their policy proposals were terrible, we’d have good reason to reject them; but for this to work, we need to be willing to support a lot of things that are just… kind of okay. Because it’s vanishingly unlikely that the first candidates who are brave enough to say what they intend will also be ones whose intentions we entirely agree with. We need to set some kind of threshold of minimum agreement, and reward anyone who exceeds it. We need to ask ourselves if our deal-breakers really need to be deal-breakers.

The Fringe: An overwhelming embarrassment of riches

PNRJ current events, market failure , , , , , , , , , ,

Aug 20 JDN 2460177

As I write this, Edinburgh is currently in the middle of The Fringe: It’s often described as an “arts and culture festival”, but mainly it consists of a huge number of theatre and comedy performances that go on across the city in hundreds of venues all month long. It’s an “open access festival”, which basically means that it’s half a dozen different festivals that all run independently and are loosely coordinated with one another.

There is truly an embarrassment of riches in the sheer number and variety of performances going on. There’s no way I could ever go to all of them, or even half of them, even though most of them are going on every single day, all month long

It would be tremendously helpful to get good information about which performances are likely to suit my tastes, so I’d know which ones to attend. For once, advertising actually has a genuinely useful function to serve!

And yet, the ads for performances plastered across the city are almost completely useless. They tell you virtually nothing about the content or even style of the various shows. You are bombarded with hundreds of posters for hundreds of performances as you walk through the city, and almost none of them tell you anything useful that would help you decide which shows you want to attend.

Here’s what they look like; imagine this plastered on every bus shelter and spare bit of wall in the city, as well as plenty of specially-built structures explicitly for the purpose:

What I want to ask today is: Why are these posters so uninformative?

I think there are two forces at work here which may explain this phenomenon.

The first is about comedy: Most of these shows are comedy shows, and it’s very hard to explain to someone what is funny about a joke. In fact, most jokes aren’t even funny once they have been explained. Comedy seems to be closely tied to surprise: If you know exactly what they are going to say, it isn’t funny anymore. So it is inherently difficult to explain what’s good about a comedy show without making it actually less funny for those attending.

Yet this is not a complete explanation. For there are some things you could explain about comedy shows without ruining them. You could give it a general genre: political satire, slapstick, alternative, dark comedy, blue comedy, burlesque, cringe, insult, sitcom, parody, surreal, and so on. That would at least tell you something—I tend to like satire and parody, dark and blue are hit-or-miss, surreal leaves me cold, and I can’t stand cringe. And some of the posters do this—yet a remarkable number do not. I often find myself staring at a particular poster, poring over its details, trying to get some inkling of what kind of comedy I could expect from this performer.

To fully explain this, we need something more: And that, I believe, is provided by economic theory.

Consider for a moment that comedy is varied and largely subjective: What one person finds hilarious, another finds boring, and yet another finds outrageously offensive. And whether or not you find a particular routine funny can be hard to predict—even for you.

But consider that money is quite the opposite: Everyone wants it, everyone always wants more of it, and people pretty much want it for the same reasons.

So when you offer to pay money for comedy, you are offering something fundamentally fungible and objective in exchange for something almost totally individual and subjective. You are giving what everyone wants in exchange for something that only some people want and you yourself may or may not want—and may have no way of knowing whether you want until you have it.

I believe it is in the interests of the performers to keep you in the dark in this way. They don’t want to resolve your ignorance too thoroughly. Their goal is not to find the market niche of people who would most enjoy their comedy. Their goal is to get as many people as possible to show up to their shows. Even if someone absolutely hates their show, if they bought tickets, that’s a win. And even any negative reviews or word-of-mouth they might try to give the comedian is probably still a win—comedians are one profession for which there really may be no such thing as bad publicity.

In other words, even these relatively helpful advertisements aren’t actually designed to inform you. They are, as all advertisements are, designed to get you to buy something. And the way to get you to do that is twofold:

First, get your attention. That’s vital. And it’s quite difficult in such a saturated environment. As a result, all of the posters are quite eye-catching and often bizarre. They use loud colors and striking images, and the whole city is filled with them. It actually becomes exhausting to look at them all; but this is the Nash equilibrium, because there is an arms race between different performers to look more interesting and exciting than all the rest.

Second, convince you to go. But let’s be clear about this: It is not necessary to make you absolutely certain that this show is one you’ll enjoy. It is merely to tip the balance of probability, make you reasonably confident that it is likely to be one you’ll enjoy. Given the subjectivity and unpredictability of comedy, any attendee knows that they are likely to end up with a few duds. That risk effectively gets priced in: You accept that one £10 ticket may be wasted, in exchange for buying another £10 ticket that you’d have gladly paid £20 for.

If the posters tried to give more details about what the shows were about, there would be two costs to this: One, it might make the posters less eye-catching and interesting in the first place. And two, it might (perhaps correctly!) convince some customers that this flavor of comedy really wasn’t for them, making them decide not to buy a ticket. The task when designing such a poster, then, is to make one that conveys enough that people are willing to take the chance on it—but not too much so that you might scare some potential audience members away.

I think that this has implications which go beyond comedy. In fact, I think that something quite similar is going on with political speeches. But I’ll save that one for another post.

The unsung success of Bidenomics

PNRJ core principles, current events, macroeconomics, politics, public policy , , , , , , , , , ,

Aug 13 JDN 2460170

I’m glad to see that the Biden administration is finally talking about “Bidenomics”. We tend to give too much credit or blame for economic performance to the President—particularly relative to Congress—but there are many important ways in which a Presidential administration can shift the priorities of public policy in particular directions, and Biden has clearly done that.

The economic benefits for people of color seem to have been particularly large. The unemployment gap between White and Black workers in the US is now only 2.7 percentage points, while just a few years ago it was over 4pp and at the worst of the Great Recession it surpassed 7pp. During lockdown, unemployment for Black people hit nearly 17%; it is now less than 6%.

The (misnamed, but we’re stuck with it) Inflation Reduction Act in particular has been an utter triumph.

In the past year, real private investment in manufacturing structures (essentially, new factories) has risen from $56 billion to $87 billion—an over 50% increase, which puts it the highest it has been since the turn of the century. The Inflation Reduction Act appears to be largely responsible for this change.

Not many people seem to know this, but the US has also been on the right track with regard to carbon emissions: Per-capita carbon emissions in the US have been trending downward since about 2000, and are now lower than they were in the 1950s. The Inflation Reduction act now looks poised to double down on that progress, as it has been forecasted to reduce our emissions all the way down to 40% below their early-2000s peak.

Somehow, this success doesn’t seem to be getting across. The majority of Americans incorrectly believe that we are in a downturn. Biden’s approval rating is still only 40%, barely higher than Trump’s was. When it comes to political beliefs, most American voters appear to be utterly impervious to facts.

Most Americans do correctly believe that inflation is still a bit high (though many seem to think it’s higher than it is); this is weird, seeing as inflation is normally high when the economy is growing rapidly, and gets too low when we are in a recession. This seems to be Halo Effect, rather than any genuine understanding of macroeconomics: downturns are bad and inflation is bad, so they must go together—when in fact, quite the opposite is the case.

People generally feel better about their own prospects than they do about the economy as a whole:

Sixty-four percent of Americans say the economy is worse off compared to 2020, while seventy-three percent of Americans say the economy is worse off compared to five years ago. About two in five of Americans say they feel worse off from five years ago generally (38%) and a similar number say they feel worse off compared to 2020 (37%).

(Did you really have to write out ‘seventy-three percent’? I hate that convention. 73% is so much clearer and quicker to read.)

I don’t know what the Biden administration should do about this. Trying to sell themselves harder might backfire. (And I’m pretty much the last person in the world you should ask for advice about selling yourself.) But they’ve been doing really great work for the US economy… and people haven’t noticed. Thousands of factories are being built, millions of people are getting jobs, and the collective response has been… “meh”.

Against deontology

PNRJ core principles, ethics, tribal paradigm , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Aug 6 JDN 2460163

In last week’s post I argued against average utilitarianism, basically on the grounds that it devalues the lives of anyone who isn’t of above average happiness. But you might be tempted to take these as arguments against utilitarianism in general, and that is not my intention.

In fact I believe that utilitarianism is basically correct, though it needs some particular nuances that are often lost in various presentations of it.

Its leading rival is deontology, which is really a broad class of moral theories, some a lot better than others.

What characterizes deontology as a class is that it uses rules, rather than consequences; an act is just right or wrong regardless of its consequences—or even its expected consequences.

There are certain aspects of this which are quite appealing: In fact, I do think that rules have an important role to play in ethics, and as such I am basically a rule utilitarian. Actually trying to foresee all possible consequences of every action we might take is an absurd demand far beyond the capacity of us mere mortals, and so in practice we have no choice but to develop heuristic rules that can guide us.

But deontology says that these are no mere heuristics: They are in fact the core of ethics itself. Under deontology, wrong actions are wrong even if you know for certain that their consequences will be good.

Kantian ethics is one of the most well-developed deontological theories, and I am quite sympathetic to Kantian ethics In fact I used to consider myself one of its adherents, but I now consider that view a mistaken one.

Let’s first dispense with the views of Kant himself, which are obviously wrong. Kant explicitly said that lying is always, always, always wrong, and even when presented with obvious examples where you could tell a small lie to someone obviously evil in order to save many innocent lives, he stuck to his guns and insisted that lying is always wrong.

This is a bit anachronistic, but I think this example will be more vivid for modern readers, and it absolutely is consistent with what Kant wrote about the actual scenarios he was presented with:

You are living in Germany in 1945. You have sheltered a family of Jews in your attic to keep them safe from the Holocaust. Nazi soldiers have arrived at your door, and ask you: “Are there any Jews in this house?” Do you tell the truth?

I think it’s utterly, agonizingly obvious that you should not tell the truth. Exactly what you should do is less obvious: Do you simply lie and hope they buy it? Do you devise a clever ruse? Do you try to distract them in some way? Do you send them on a wild goose chase elsewhere? If you could overpower them and kill them, should you? What if you aren’t sure you can; should you still try? But one thing is clear: You don’t hand over the Jewish family to the Nazis.

Yet when presented with similar examples, Kant insisted that lying is always wrong. He had a theory to back it up, his Categorical Imperative: “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.”

And, so his argument goes: Since it would be obviously incoherent to say that everyone should always lie, lying is wrong, and you’re never allowed to do it. He actually bites that bullet the size of a Howitzer round.

Modern deontologists—even though who consider themselves Kantians—are more sophisticated than this. They realize that you could make a rule like “Never lie, except to save the life of an innocent person.” or “Never lie, except to stop a great evil.” Either of these would be quite adequate to solve this particular dilemma. And it’s absolutely possible to will that these would be universal laws, in the sense that they would apply to anyone. ‘Universal’ doesn’t have to mean ‘applies equally to all possible circumstances’.

There are also a couple of things that deontology does very well, which are worth preserving. One of them is supererogation: The idea that some acts are above and beyond the call of duty, that something can be good without being obligatory.

This is something most forms of utilitarianism are notoriously bad at. They show us a spectrum of worlds from the best to the worst, and tell us to make things better. But there’s nowhere we are allowed to stop, unless we somehow manage to make it all the way to the best possible world.

I find this kind of moral demand very tempting, which often leads me to feel a tremendous burden of guilt. I always know that I could be doing more than I do. I’ve written several posts about this in the past, in the hopes of fighting off this temptation in myself and others. (I am not entirely sure how well I’ve succeeded.)

Deontology does much better in this regard: Here are some rules. Follow them.

Many of the rules are in fact very good rules that most people successfully follow their entire lives: Don’t murder. Don’t rape. Don’t commit robbery. Don’t rule a nation tyrannically. Don’t commit war crimes.

Others are oft more honored in the breach than the observance: Don’t lie. Don’t be rude. Don’t be selfish. Be brave. Be generous. But a well-developed deontology can even deal with this, by saying that some rules are more important than others, and thus some sins are more forgivable than others.

Whereas a utilitarian—at least, anything but a very sophisticated utilitarian—can only say who is better and who is worse, a deontologist can say who is good enough: who has successfully discharged their moral obligations and is otherwise free to live their life as they choose. Deontology absolves us of guilt in a way that utilitarianism is very bad at.

Another good deontological principle is double-effect: Basically this says that if you are doing something that will have bad outcomes as well as good ones, it matters whether you intend the bad one and what you do to try to mitigate it. There does seem to be a morally relevant difference between a bombing that kills civilians accidentally as part of an attack on a legitimate military target, and a so-called “strategic bombing” that directly targets civilians in order to maximize casualties—even if both occur as part of a justified war. (Both happen a lot—and it may even be the case that some of the latter were justified. The Tokyo firebombing and atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were very much in the latter category.)

There are ways to capture this principle (or something very much like it) in a utilitarian framework, but like supererogation, it requires a sophisticated, nuanced approach that most utilitarians don’t seem willing or able to take.

Now that I’ve said what’s good about it, let’s talk about what’s really wrong with deontology.

Above all: How do we choose the rules?

Kant seemed to think that mere logical coherence would yield a sufficiently detailed—perhaps even unique—set of rules for all rational beings in the universe to follow. This is obviously wrong, and seems to be simply a failure of his imagination. There is literally a countably infinite space of possible ethical rules that are logically consistent. (With probability 1 any given one is utter nonsense: “Never eat cheese on Thursdays”, “Armadillos should rule the world”, and so on—but these are still logically consistent.)

If you require the rules to be simple and general enough to always apply to everyone everywhere, you can narrow the space substantially; but this is also how you get obviously wrong rules like “Never lie.”

In practice, there are two ways we actually seem to do this: Tradition and consequences.

Let’s start with tradition. (It came first historically, after all.) You can absolutely make a set of rules based on whatever your culture has handed down to you since time immemorial. You can even write them down in a book that you declare to be the absolute infallible truth of the universe—and, amazingly enough, you can get millions of people to actually buy that.

The result, of course, is what we call religion. Some of its rules are good: Thou shalt not kill. Some are flawed but reasonable: Thou shalt not steal. Thou shalt not commit adultery. Some are nonsense: Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s goods.

And some, well… some rules of tradition are the source of many of the world’s most horrific human rights violations. Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live (Exodus 22:18). If a man also lie with mankind, as he lieth with a woman, both of them have committed an abomination: they shall surely be put to death; their blood shall be upon them (Leviticus 20:13).

Tradition-based deontology has in fact been the major obstacle to moral progress throughout history. It is not a coincidence that utilitarianism began to become popular right before the abolition of slavery, and there is an even more direct casual link between utilitarianism and the advancement of rights for women and LGBT people. When the sole argument you can make for moral rules is that they are ancient (or allegedly handed down by a perfect being), you can make rules that oppress anyone you want. But when rules have to be based on bringing happiness or preventing suffering, whole classes of oppression suddenly become untenable. “God said so” can justify anything—but “Who does it hurt?” can cut through.

It is an oversimplification, but not a terribly large one, to say that the arc of moral history has been drawn by utilitarians dragging deontologists kicking and screaming into a better future.

There is a better way to make rules, and that is based on consequences. And, in practice, most people who call themselves deontologists these days do this. They develop a system of moral rules based on what would be expected to lead to the overall best outcomes.

I like this approach. In fact, I agree with this approach. But it basically amounts to abandoning deontology and surrendering to utilitarianism.

Once you admit that the fundamental justification for all moral rules is the promotion of happiness and the prevention of suffering, you are basically a rule utilitarian. Rules then become heuristics for promoting happiness, not the fundamental source of morality itself.

I suppose it could be argued that this is not a surrender but a synthesis: We are looking for the best aspects of deontology and utilitarianism. That makes a lot of sense. But I keep coming back to the dark history of traditional rules, the fact that deontologists have basically been holding back human civilization since time immemorial. If deontology wants to be taken seriously now, it needs to prove that it has broken with that dark tradition. And frankly the easiest answer to me seems to be to just give up on deontology.