Reasonableness and public goods games

Apr 1 JDN 2458210

There’s a very common economics experiment called a public goods game, often used to study cooperation and altruistic behavior. I’m actually planning on running a variant of such an experiment for my second-year paper.

The game is quite simple, which is part of why it is used so frequently: You are placed into a group of people (usually about four), and given a little bit of money (say $10). Then you are offered a choice: You can keep the money, or you can donate some of it to a group fund. Money in the group fund will be multiplied by some factor (usually about two) and then redistributed evenly to everyone in the group. So for example if you donate $5, that will become $10, split four ways, so you’ll get back $2.50.

Donating more to the group will benefit everyone else, but at a cost to yourself. The game is usually set up so that the best outcome for everyone is if everyone donates the maximum amount, but the best outcome for you, holding everyone else’s choices constant, is to donate nothing and keep it all.

Yet it is a very robust finding that most people do neither of those things. There’s still a good deal of uncertainty surrounding what motivates people to donate what they do, but certain patterns that have emerged:

  1. Most people donate something, but hardly anyone donates everything.
  2. Increasing the multiplier tends to smoothly increase how much people donate.
  3. The number of people in the group isn’t very important, though very small groups (e.g. 2) behave differently from very large groups (e.g. 50).
  4. Letting people talk to each other tends to increase the rate of donations.
  5. Repetition of the game, or experience from previous games, tends to result in decreasing donation over time.
  6. Economists donate less than other people.

Number 6 is unfortunate, but easy to explain: Indoctrination into game theory and neoclassical economics has taught economists that selfish behavior is efficient and optimal, so they behave selfishly.

Number 3 is also fairly easy to explain: Very small groups allow opportunities for punishment and coordination that don’t exist in large groups. Think about how you would respond when faced with 2 defectors in a group of 4 as opposed to 10 defectors in a group of 50. You could punish the 2 by giving less next round; but punishing the 10 would end up punishing 40 others who had contributed like they were supposed to.

Number 4 is a very interesting finding. Game theory says that communication shouldn’t matter, because there is a unique Nash equilibrium: Donate nothing. All the promises in the world can’t change what is the optimal response in the game. But in fact, human beings don’t like to break their promises, and so when you get a bunch of people together and they all agree to donate, most of them will carry through on that agreement most of the time.

Number 5 is on the frontier of research right now. There are various theoretical accounts for why it might occur, but none of the models proposed so far have much predictive power.

But my focus today will be on findings 1 and 2.

If you’re not familiar with the underlying game theory, finding 2 may seem obvious to you: Well, of course if you increase the payoff for donating, people will donate more! It’s precisely that sense of obviousness which I am going to appeal to in a moment.

In fact, the game theory makes a very sharp prediction: For N players, if the multiplier is less than N, you should always contribute nothing. Only if the multiplier becomes larger than N should you donate—and at that point you should donate everything. The game theory prediction is not a smooth increase; it’s all-or-nothing. The only time game theory predicts intermediate amounts is on the knife-edge at exactly equal to N, where each player would be indifferent between donating and not donating.

But it feels reasonable that increasing the multiplier should increase donation, doesn’t it? It’s a “safer bet” in some sense to donate $1 if the payoff to everyone is $3 and the payoff to yourself is $0.75 than if the payoff to everyone is $1.04 and the payoff to yourself is $0.26. The cost-benefit analysis comes out better: In the former case, you can gain up to $2 if everyone donates, but would only lose $0.25 if you donate alone; but in the latter case, you would only gain $0.04 if everyone donates, and would lose $0.74 if you donate alone.

I think this notion of “reasonableness” is a deep principle that underlies a great deal of human thought. This is something that is sorely lacking from artificial intelligence: The same AI that tells you the precise width of the English Channel to the nearest foot may also tell you that the Earth is 14 feet in diameter, because the former was in its database and the latter wasn’t. Yes, WATSON may have won on Jeopardy, but it (he?) also made a nonsensical response to the Final Jeopardy question.

Human beings like to “sanity-check” our results against prior knowledge, making sure that everything fits together. And, of particular note for public goods games, human beings like to “hedge our bets”; we don’t like to over-commit to a single belief in the face of uncertainty.

I think this is what best explains findings 1 and 2. We don’t donate everything, because that requires committing totally to the belief that contributing is always better. We also don’t donate nothing, because that requires committing totally to the belief that contributing is always worse.

And of course we donate more as the payoffs to donating more increase; that also just seems reasonable. If something is better, you do more of it!

These choices could be modeled formally by assigning some sort of probability distribution over other’s choices, but in a rather unconventional way. We can’t simply assume that other people will randomly choose some decision and then optimize accordingly—that just gives you back the game theory prediction. We have to assume that our behavior and the behavior of others is in some sense correlated; if we decide to donate, we reason that others are more likely to donate as well.

Stated like that, this sounds irrational; some economists have taken to calling it “magical thinking”. Yet, as I always like to point out to such economists: On average, people who do that make more money in the games. Economists playing other economists always make very little money in these games, because they turn on each other immediately. So who is “irrational” now?

Indeed, if you ask people to predict how others will behave in these games, they generally do better than the game theory prediction: They say, correctly, that some people will give nothing, most will give something, and hardly any will give everything. The same “reasonableness” that they use to motivate their own decisions, they also accurately apply to forecasting the decisions of others.

Of course, to say that something is “reasonable” may be ultimately to say that it conforms to our heuristics well. To really have a theory, I need to specify exactly what those heuristics are.

“Don’t put all your eggs in one basket” seems to be one, but it’s probably not the only one that matters; my guess is that there are circumstances in which people would actually choose all-or-nothing, like if we said that the multiplier was 0.5 (so everyone giving to the group would make everyone worse off) or 10 (so that giving to the group makes you and everyone else way better off).

“Higher payoffs are better” is probably one as well, but precisely formulating that is actually surprisingly difficult. Higher payoffs for you? For the group? Conditional on what? Do you hold others’ behavior constant, or assume it is somehow affected by your own choices?

And of course, the theory wouldn’t be much good if it only worked on public goods games (though even that would be a substantial advance at this point). We want a theory that explains a broad class of human behavior; we can start with simple economics experiments, but ultimately we want to extend it to real-world choices.

What is the processing power of the human brain?

JDN 2457485

Futurists have been predicting that AI will “surpass humans” any day now for something like 50 years. Eventually they’ll be right, but it will be more or less purely by chance, since they’ve been making the same prediction longer than I’ve been alive. (Similarity, whenever someone projects the date at which immortality will be invented, it always seems to coincide with just slightly before the end of the author’s projected life expectancy.) Any technology that is “20 years away” will be so indefinitely.

There are a lot of reasons why this prediction keeps failing so miserably. One is an apparent failure to grasp the limitations of exponential growth. I actually think the most important is that a lot of AI fans don’t seem to understand how human cognition actually works—that it is primarily social cognition, where most of the processing has already been done and given to us as cached results, some of them derived centuries before we were born. We are smart enough to run a civilization with airplanes and the Internet not because any individual human is so much smarter than any other animal, but because all humans together are—and other animals haven’t quite figured out how to unite their cognition in the same way. We’re about 3 times smarter than any other animal as individuals—and several billion times smarter when we put our heads together.

A third reason is that even if you have sufficient computing power, that is surprisingly unimportant; what you really need are good heuristics to make use of your computing power efficiently. Any nontrivial problem is too complex to brute-force by any conceivable computer, so simply increasing computing power without improving your heuristics will get you nowhere. Conversely, if you have really good heuristics like the human brain does, you don’t even need all that much computing power. A chess grandmaster was once asked how many moves ahead he can see on the board, and he replied: “I only see one move ahead. The right one.” In cognitive science terms, people asked him how much computing power he was using, expecting him to say something far beyond normal human capacity, and he replied that he was using hardly any—it was all baked into the heuristics he had learned from years of training and practice.

Making an AI capable of human thought—a true artificial person—will require a level of computing power we can already reach (as long as we use huge supercomputers), but that is like having the right material. To really create the being we will need to embed the proper heuristics. We are trying to make David, and we have finally mined enough marble—now all we need is Michelangelo.

But another reason why so many futurists have failed in their projections is that they have wildly underestimated the computing power of the human brain. Reading 1980s cyberpunk is hilarious in hindsight; Neuromancer actually quite accurately projected the number of megabytes that would flow through the Internet at any given moment, but somehow thought that a few hundred megaflops would be enough to copy human consciousness. The processing power of the human brain is actually on the order of a few petaflops. So, you know, Gibson was only off by a factor of a few million.

We can now match petaflops—the world’s fastest supercomputer is actually about 30 petaflops. Of course, it cost half a month of China’s GDP to build, and requires 24 megawatts to run and cool, which is about the output of a mid-sized solar power station. The human brain consumes only about 400 kcal per day, which is about 20 watts—roughly the consumption of a typical CFL lightbulb. Even if you count the rest of the human body as necessary to run the human brain (which I guess is sort of true), we’re still clocking in at about 100 watts—so even though supercomputers can now process at the same speed, our brains are almost a million times as energy-efficient.

How do I know it’s a few petaflops?

Earlier this year a study was published showing that a conservative lower bound for the total capacity of human memory is about 4 bits per synapse, where previously some scientists thought that each synapse might carry only 1 bit (I’ve always suspected it was more like 10 myself).

So then we need to figure out how many synapses we have… which turns out to be really difficult actually. They are in a constant state of flux, growing, shrinking, and moving all the time; and when we die they fade away almost immediately (reason #3 I’m skeptical of cryonics). We know that we have about 100 billion neurons, and each one can have anywhere between 100 and 15,000 synapses with other neurons. The average seems to be something like 5,000 (but highly skewed in a power-law distribution), so that’s about 500 trillion synapses. If each one is carrying 4 bits to be as conservative as possible, that’s a total storage capacity of about 2 quadrillion bits, which is about 0.2 petabytes.

Of course, that’s assuming that our brains store information the same way as a computer—every bit flipped independently, each bit stored forever. Not even close. Human memory is constantly compressing and decompressing data, using a compression scheme that’s lossy enough that we not only forget things, we can systematically misremember and even be implanted with false memories. That may seem like a bad thing, and in a sense it is; but if the compression scheme is that lossy, it must be because it’s also that efficient—that our brains are compressing away the vast majority of the data to make room for more. Our best lossy compression algorithms for video are about 100:1; but the human brain is clearly much better than that. Our core data format for long-term memory appears to be narrative; more or less we store everything not as audio or video (that’s short-term memory, and quite literally so), but as stories.

How much compression can you get by storing things as narrative? Think about The Lord of the Rings. The extended edition of the films runs to 6 discs of movie (9 discs of other stuff), where a Blu-Ray disc can store about 50 GB. So that’s 300 GB. Compressed into narrative form, we have the books (which, if you’ve read them, are clearly not optimally compressed—no, we do not need five paragraphs about the trees, and I’m gonna say it, Tom Bombadil is totally superfluous and Peter Jackson was right to remove him), which run about 500,000 words altogether. If the average word is 10 letters (normally it’s less than that, but this is Tolkien we’re talking about), each word will take up about 10 bytes (because in ASCII or Unicode a letter is a byte). So altogether the total content of the entire trilogy, compressed into narrative, can be stored in about 5 million bytes, that is, 5 MB. So the compression from HD video to narrative takes us all the way from 300 GB to 5 MB, which is a factor of 60,000. Sixty thousand. I believe that this is the proper order of magnitude for the compression capability of the human brain.

Even more interesting is the fact that the human brain is almost certainly in some sense holographic storage; damage to a small part of your brain does not produce highly selective memory loss as if you had some bad sectors of your hard drive, but rather an overall degradation of your total memory processing as if you in some sense stored everything everywhere—that is, holographically. How exactly this is accomplished by the brain is still very much an open question; it’s probably not literally a hologram in the quantum sense, but it definitely seems to function like a hologram. (Although… if the human brain is a quantum computer that would explain an awful lot—it especially helps with the binding problem. The problem is explaining how a biological system at 37 C can possibly maintain the necessary quantum coherences.) The data storage capacity of holograms is substantially larger than what can be achieved by conventional means—and furthermore has similar properties to human memory in that you can more or less always add more, but then what you had before gradually gets degraded. Since neural nets are much closer to the actual mechanics of the brain as we know them, understanding human memory will probably involve finding ways to simulate holographic storage with neural nets.

With these facts in mind, the amount of information we can usefully take in and store is probably not 0.2 petabytes—it’s probably more like 10 exabytes. The human brain can probably hold just about as much as the NSA’s National Cybersecurity Initiative Data Center in Utah, which is itself more or less designed to contain the Internet. (The NSA is at once awesome and terrifying.)

But okay, maybe that’s not fair if we’re comparing human brains to computers; even if you can compress all your data by a factor of 100,000, that isn’t the same thing as having 100,000 times as much storage.

So let’s use that smaller figure, 0.2 petabytes. That’s how much we can store; how much can we process?

The next thing to understand is that our processing architecture is fundamentally difference from that of computers.

Computers generally have far more storage than they have processing power, because they are bottlenecked through a CPU that can only process 1 thing at once (okay, like 8 things at once with a hyperthreaded quad-core; as you’ll see in a moment this is a trivial difference). So it’s typical for a new computer these days to have processing power in gigaflops (It’s usually reported in gigahertz, but that’s kind of silly; hertz just tells you clock cycles, while what you really wanted to know is calculations—and that you get from flops. They’re generally pretty comparable numbers though.), while they have storage in terabytes—meaning that it would take about 1000 seconds (about 17 minutes) for the computer to process everything in its entire storage once. In fact it would take a good deal longer than that, because there are further bottlenecks in terms of memory access, especially from hard-disk drives (RAM and solid-state drives are faster, but would still slow it down to a couple of hours).

The human brain, by contrast, integrates processing and memory into the same system. There is no clear distinction between “memory synapses” and “processing synapses”, and no single CPU bottleneck that everything has to go through. There is however something like a “clock cycle” as it turns out; synaptic firings are synchronized across several different “rhythms”, the fastest of which is about 30 Hz. No, not 30 GHz, not 30 MHz, not even 30 kHz; 30 hertz. Compared to the blazing speed of billions of cycles per second that goes on in our computers, the 30 cycles per second our brains are capable of may seem bafflingly slow. (Even more bafflingly slow is the speed of nerve conduction, which is not limited by the speed of light as you might expect, but is actually less than the speed of sound. When you trigger the knee-jerk reflex doctors often test, it takes about a tenth of a second for the reflex to happen—not because your body is waiting for anything, but because it simply takes that long for the signal to travel to your spinal cord and back.)

The reason we can function at all is because of our much more efficient architecture; instead of passing everything through a single bottleneck, we do all of our processing in parallel. All of those 100 billion neurons with 500 trillion synapses storing 2 quadrillion bits work simultaneously. So whereas a computer does 8 things at a time, 3 billion times per second, a human brain does 2 quadrillion things at a time, 30 times per second. Provided that the tasks can be fully parallelized (vision, yes; arithmetic, no), a human brain can therefore process 60 quadrillion bits per second—which turns out to be just over 6 petaflops, somewhere around 6,000,000,000,000,000 calculations per second.

So, like I said, a few petaflops.

The real Existential Risk we should be concerned about

JDN 2457458

There is a rather large subgroup within the rationalist community (loosely defined because organizing freethinkers is like herding cats) that focuses on existential risks, also called global catastrophic risks. Prominent examples include Nick Bostrom and Eliezer Yudkowsky.

Their stated goal in life is to save humanity from destruction. And when you put it that way, it sounds pretty darn important. How can you disagree with wanting to save humanity from destruction?

Well, there are actually people who do (the Voluntary Human Extinction movement), but they are profoundly silly. It should be obvious to anyone with even a basic moral compass that saving humanity from destruction is a good thing.

It’s not the goal of fighting existential risk that bothers me. It’s the approach. Specifically, they almost all seem to focus on exotic existential risks, vivid and compelling existential risks that are the stuff of great science fiction stories. In particular, they have a rather odd obsession with AI.

Maybe it’s the overlap with Singularitarians, and their inability to understand that exponentials are not arbitrarily fast; if you just keep projecting the growth in computing power as growing forever, surely eventually we’ll have a computer powerful enough to solve all the world’s problems, right? Well, yeah, I guess… if we can actually maintain the progress that long, which we almost certainly can’t, and if the problems turn out to be computationally tractable at all (the fastest possible computer that could fit inside the observable universe could not brute-force solve the game of Go, though a heuristic AI did just beat one of the world’s best players), and/or if we find really good heuristic methods of narrowing down the solution space… but that’s an awful lot of “if”s.

But AI isn’t what we need to worry about in terms of saving humanity from destruction. Nor is it asteroid impacts; NASA has been doing a good job watching for asteroids lately, and estimates the current risk of a serious impact (by which I mean something like a city-destroyer or global climate shock, not even a global killer) at around 1/10,000 per year. Alien invasion is right out; we can’t even find clear evidence of bacteria on Mars, and the skies are so empty of voices it has been called a paradox. Gamma ray bursts could kill us, and we aren’t sure about the probability of that (we think it’s small?), but much like brain aneurysms, there really isn’t a whole lot we can do to prevent them.

There is one thing that we really need to worry about destroying humanity, and one other thing that could potentially get close over a much longer timescale. The long-range threat is ecological collapse; as global climate change gets worse and the oceans become more acidic and the aquifers are drained, we could eventually reach the point where humanity cannot survive on Earth, or at least where our population collapses so severely that civilization as we know it is destroyed. This might not seem like such a threat, since we would see this coming decades or centuries in advance—but we are seeing it coming decades or centuries in advance, and yet we can’t seem to get the world’s policymakers to wake up and do something about it. So that’s clearly the second-most important existential risk.

But the most important existential risk, by far, no question, is nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons are the only foreseeable, preventable means by which humanity could be destroyed in the next twenty minutes.

Yes, that is approximately the time it takes an ICBM to hit its target after launch. There are almost 4,000 ICBMs currently deployed, mostly by the US and Russia. Once we include submarine-launched missiles and bombers, the total number of global nuclear weapons is over 15,000. I apologize for terrifying you by saying that these weapons could be deployed in a moment’s notice to wipe out most of human civilization within half an hour, followed by a global ecological collapse and fallout that would endanger the future of the entire human race—but it’s the truth. If you’re not terrified, you’re not paying attention.

I’ve intentionally linked the Union of Concerned Scientists as one of those sources. Now they are people who understand existential risk. They don’t talk about AI and asteroids and aliens (how alliterative). They talk about climate change and nuclear weapons.

We must stop this. We must get rid of these weapons. Next to that, literally nothing else matters.

“What if we’re conquered by tyrants?” It won’t matter. “What if there is a genocide?” It won’t matter. “What if there is a global economic collapse?” None of these things will matter, if the human race wipes itself out with nuclear weapons.

To speak like an economist for a moment, the utility of a global nuclear war must be set at negative infinity. Any detectable reduction in the probability of that event must be considered worth paying any cost to achieve. I don’t care if it costs $20 trillion and results in us being taken over by genocidal fascists—we are talking about the destruction of humanity. We can spend $20 trillion (actually the US as a whole does every 14 months!). We can survive genocidal fascists. We cannot survive nuclear war.

The good news is, we shouldn’t actually have to pay that sort of cost. All we have to do is dismantle our nuclear arsenal, and get other countries—particularly Russia—to dismantle theirs. In the long run, we will increase our wealth as our efforts are no longer wasted maintaining doomsday machines.

The main challenge is actually a matter of game theory. The surprisingly-sophisticated 1990s cartoon show the Animaniacs basically got it right when they sang: “We’d beat our swords into liverwurst / Down by the East Riverside / But no one wants to be the first!”

The thinking, anyway, is that this is basically a Prisoner’s Dilemma. If the US disarms and Russia doesn’t, Russia can destroy the US. Conversely, if Russia disarms and the US doesn’t, the US can destroy Russia. If neither disarms, we’re left where we are. Whether or not the other country disarms, you’re always better off not disarming. So neither country disarms.

But I contend that it is not, in fact, a Prisoner’s Dilemma. It could be a Stag Hunt; if that’s the case, then only multilateral disarmament makes sense, because the best outcome is if we both disarm, but the worst outcome is if we disarm and they don’t. Once we expect them to disarm, we have no temptation to renege on the deal ourselves; but if we think there’s a good chance they won’t, we might not want to either. Stag Hunts have two stable Nash equilibria; one is where both arm, the other where both disarm.

But in fact, I think it may be simply the trivial game.

There aren’t actually that many possible symmetric two-player nonzero-sum games (basically it’s a question of ordering 4 possibilities, and it’s symmetric, so 12 possible games), and one that we never talk about (because it’s sort of boring) is the trivial game: If I do the right thing and you do the right thing, we’re both better off. If you do the wrong thing and I do the right thing, I’m better off. If we both do the wrong thing, we’re both worse off. So, obviously, we both do the right thing, because we’d be idiots not to. Formally, we say that cooperation is a strictly dominant strategy. There’s no dilemma, no paradox; the self-interested strategy is the optimal strategy. (I find it kind of amusing that laissez-faire economics basically amounts to assuming that all real-world games are the trivial game.)

That is, I don’t think the US would actually benefit from nuking Russia, even if we could do so without retaliation. Likewise, I don’t think Russia would actually benefit from nuking the US. One of the things we’ve discovered—the hardest way possible—through human history is that working together is often better for everyone than fighting. Russia could nuke NATO, and thereby destroy all of their largest trading partners, or they could continue trading with us. Even if they are despicable psychopaths who think nothing of committing mass murder (Putin might be, but surely there are people under his command who aren’t?), it’s simply not in Russia’s best interest to nuke the US and Europe. Likewise, it is not in our best interest to nuke them.

Nuclear war is a strange game: The only winning move is not to play.

So I say, let’s stop playing. Yes, let’s unilaterally disarm, the thing that so many policy analysts are terrified of because they’re so convinced we’re in a Prisoner’s Dilemma or a Stag Hunt. “What’s to stop them from destroying us, if we make it impossible for us to destroy them!?” I dunno, maybe basic human decency, or failing that, rationality?

Several other countries have already done this—South Africa unilaterally disarmed, and nobody nuked them. Japan refused to build nuclear weapons in the first place—and I think it says something that they’re the only people to ever have them used against them.

Our conventional military is plenty large enough to defend us against all realistic threats, and could even be repurposed to defend against nuclear threats as well, by a method I call credible targeted conventional response. Instead of building ever-larger nuclear arsenals to threaten devastation in the world’s most terrifying penis-measuring contest, you deploy covert operatives (perhaps Navy SEALS in submarines, or double agents, or these days even stealth drones) around the world, with the standing order that if they have reason to believe a country initiated a nuclear attack, they will stop at nothing to hunt down and kill the specific people responsible for that attack. Not the country they came from; not the city they live in; those specific people. If a leader is enough of a psychopath to be willing to kill 300 million people in another country, he’s probably enough of a psychopath to be willing to lose 150 million people in his own country. He likely has a secret underground bunker that would allow him to survive, at least if humanity as a whole does. So you should be threatening the one thing he does care about—himself. You make sure he knows that if he pushes that button, you’ll find that bunker, drop in from helicopters, and shoot him in the face.

The “targeted conventional response” should be clear by now—you use non-nuclear means to respond, and you target the particular leaders responsible—but let me say a bit more about the “credible” part. The threat of mutually-assured destruction is actually not a credible one. It’s not what we call in game theory a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. If you know that Russia has launched 1500 ICBMs to destroy every city in America, you actually have no reason at all to retaliate with your own 1500 ICBMs, and the most important reason imaginable not to. Your people are dead either way; you can’t save them. You lose. The only question now is whether you risk taking the rest of humanity down with you. If you have even the most basic human decency, you will not push that button. You will not “retaliate” in useless vengeance that could wipe out human civilization. Thus, your threat is a bluff—it is not credible.

But if your response is targeted and conventional, it suddenly becomes credible. It’s exactly reversed; you now have every reason to retaliate, and no reason not to. Your covert operation teams aren’t being asked to destroy humanity; they’re being tasked with finding and executing the greatest mass murderer in history. They don’t have some horrific moral dilemma to resolve; they have the opportunity to become the world’s greatest heroes. Indeed, they’d very likely have the whole world (or what’s left of it) on their side; even the population of the attacking country would rise up in revolt and the double agents could use the revolt as cover. Now you have no reason to even hesitate; your threat is completely credible. The only question is whether you can actually pull it off, and if we committed the full resources of the United States military to preparing for this possibility, I see no reason to doubt that we could. If a US President can be assassinated by a lone maniac (and yes, that is actually what happened), then the world’s finest covert operations teams can assassinate whatever leader pushed that button.

This is a policy that works both unilaterally and multilaterally. We could even assemble an international coalition—perhaps make the UN “peacekeepers” put their money where their mouth is and train the finest special operatives in the history of the world tasked with actually keeping the peace.

Let’s not wait for someone else to save humanity from destruction. Let’s be the first.

The power of exponential growth

JDN 2457390

There’s a famous riddle: If the water in a lakebed doubles in volume every day, and the lakebed started filling on January 1, and is half full on June 17, when will it be full?

The answer is of course June 18—if it doubles every day, it will go from half full to full in a single day.

But most people assume that half the work takes about half the time, so they usually give answers in December. Others try to correct, but don’t go far enough, and say something like October.

Human brains are programmed to understand linear processes. We expect things to come in direct proportion: If you work twice as hard, you expect to get twice as much done. If you study twice as long, you expect to learn twice as much. If you pay twice as much, you expect to get twice as much stuff.

We tend to apply this same intuition to situations where it does not belong, processes that are not actually linear but exponential. As a result, when we extrapolate the slow growth early in the process, we wildly underestimate the total growth in the long run.

For example, suppose we have two countries. Arcadia has a GDP of $100 billion per year, and they grow at 4% per year. Berkland has a GDP of $200 billion, and they grow at 2% per year. Assuming that they maintain these growth rates, how long will it take for Arcadia’s GDP to exceed Berkland’s?

If we do this intuitively, we might sort of guess that at 4% you’d add 100% in 25 years, and at 2% you’d add 100% in 50 years; so it should be something like 75 years, because then Arcadia will have added $300 million while Berkland added $200 million. You might even just fudge the numbers in your head and say “about a century”.

In fact, it is only 35 years. You could solve this exactly by setting (100)(1.04^x) = (200)(1.02^x); but I have an intuitive method that I think may help you to estimate exponential processes in the future.

Divide the percentage into 69. (For some numbers it’s easier to use 70 or 72; remember, these are just to be approximate. The exact figure is 100*ln(2) = 69.3147… and then it wouldn’t be the percentage p but 100*ln(1+p/100); try plotting those and you’ll see why using p works.) This is the time it will take to double.

So at 4%, Arcadia will double in about 17.5 years, quadrupling in 35 years. At 2%, Berkland will double in about 35 years. Thus, in 35 years, Arcadia will quadruple and Berkland will double, so their GDPs will be equal.

Economics is full of exponential processes: Compound interest is exponential, and over moderately long periods GDP and population both tend to grow exponentially. (In fact they grow logistically, which is similar to exponential until it gets very large and begins to slow down. If you smooth out our recessions, you can get a sense that since the 1940s, US GDP growth has slowed down from about 4% per year to about 2% per year.) It is therefore quite important to understand how exponential growth works.

Let’s try another one. If one account has $1 million, growing at 5% per year, and another has $1,000, growing at 10% per year, how long will it take for the second account to have more money in it?

69/5 is about 14, so the first account doubles in 14 years. 69/10 is about 7, so the second account doubles in 7 years. A factor of 1000 is about 10 doublings (2^10 = 1024), so the second account needs to have doubled 10 times more than the first account. Since it doubles twice as often, this means that it must have doubled 20 times while the other doubled 10 times. Therefore, it will take about 140 years.

In fact, it takes 141—so our quick approximation is actually remarkably good.

This example is instructive in another way; 141 years is a pretty long time, isn’t it? You can’t just assume that exponential growth is “as fast as you want it to be”. Once people realize that exponential growth is very fast, they often overcorrect, assuming that exponential growth automatically means growth that is absurdly—or arbitrarily—fast. (XKCD made a similar point in this comic.)

I think the worst examples of this mistake are among Singularitarians. They—correctly—note that computing power has become exponentially greater and cheaper over time, doubling about every 18 months, which has been dubbed Moore’s Law. They assume that this will continue into the indefinite future (this is already problematic; the growth rate seems to be already slowing down). And therefore they conclude there will be a sudden moment, a technological singularity, at which computers will suddenly outstrip humans in every way and bring about a new world order of artificial intelligence basically overnight. They call it a “hard takeoff”; here’s a direct quote:

But many thinkers in this field including Nick Bostrom and Eliezer Yudkowsky worry that AI won’t work like this at all. Instead there could be a “hard takeoff”, a huge subjective discontinuity in the function mapping AI research progress to intelligence as measured in ability-to-get-things-done. If on January 1 you have a toy AI as smart as a cow, one which can identify certain objects in pictures and navigate a complex environment, and on February 1 it’s proved the Riemann hypothesis and started building a ring around the sun, that was a hard takeoff.

Wait… what? For someone like me who understands exponential growth, the last part is a baffling non sequitur. If computers start half as smart as us and double every 18 months, in 18 months, they will be as smart as us. In 36 months, they will be twice as smart as us. Twice as smart as us literally means that two people working together perfectly can match them—certainly a few dozen working realistically can. We’re not in danger of total AI domination from that. With millions of people working against the AI, we should be able to keep up with it for at least another 30 years. So are you assuming that this trend is continuing or not? (Oh, and by the way, we’ve had AIs that can identify objects and navigate complex environments for a couple years now, and so far, no ringworld around the Sun.)

That same essay make a biological argument, which misunderstands human evolution in a way that is surprisingly subtle yet ultimately fundamental:

If you were to come up with a sort of objective zoological IQ based on amount of evolutionary work required to reach a certain level, complexity of brain structures, etc, you might put nematodes at 1, cows at 90, chimps at 99, homo erectus at 99.9, and modern humans at 100. The difference between 99.9 and 100 is the difference between “frequently eaten by lions” and “has to pass anti-poaching laws to prevent all lions from being wiped out”.

No, actually, what makes humans what we are is not that we are 1% smarter than chimpanzees.

First of all, we’re actually more like 200% smarter than chimpanzees, measured by encephalization quotient; they clock in at 2.49 while we hit 7.44. If you simply measure by raw volume, they have about 400 mL to our 1300 mL, so again roughly 3 times as big. But that’s relatively unimportant; with Moore’s Law, tripling only takes about 2.5 years.

But even having triple the brain power is not what makes humans different. It was a necessary condition, but not a sufficient one. Indeed, it was so insufficient that for about 200,000 years we had brains just as powerful as we do now and yet we did basically nothing in technological or economic terms—total, complete stagnation on a global scale. This is a conservative estimate of when we had brains of the same size and structure as we do today.

What makes humans what we are? Cooperation. We are what we are because we are together.
The capacity of human intelligence today is not 1300 mL of brain. It’s more like 1.3 gigaliters of brain, where a gigaliter, a billion liters, is about the volume of the Empire State Building. We have the intellectual capacity we do not because we are individually geniuses, but because we have built institutions of research and education that combine, synthesize, and share the knowledge of billions of people who came before us. Isaac Newton didn’t understand the world as well as the average third-grader in the 21st century does today. Does the third-grader have more brain? Of course not. But they absolutely do have more knowledge.

(I recently finished my first playthrough of Legacy of the Void, in which a central point concerns whether the Protoss should detach themselves from the Khala, a psychic union which combines all their knowledge and experience into one. I won’t spoil the ending, but let me say this: I can understand their hesitation, for it is basically our equivalent of the Khala—first literacy, and now the Internet—that has made us what we are. It would no doubt be the Khala that made them what they are as well.)

Is AI still dangerous? Absolutely. There are all sorts of damaging effects AI could have, culturally, economically, militarily—and some of them are already beginning to happen. I even agree with the basic conclusion of that essay that OpenAI is a bad idea because the cost of making AI available to people who will abuse it or create one that is dangerous is higher than the benefit of making AI available to everyone. But exponential growth not only isn’t the same thing as instantaneous takeoff, it isn’t even compatible with it.

The next time you encounter an example of exponential growth, try this. Don’t just fudge it in your head, don’t overcorrect and assume everything will be fast—just divide the percentage into 69 to see how long it will take to double.