Surviving in an ad-supported world

Apr 21 JDN 2460423

Advertising is as old as money—perhaps even older. Scams have likewise been a part of human society since time immemorial.

But I think it’s fair to say that recently, since the dawn of the Internet at least, both advertising and scams have been proliferating, far beyond what they used to be.

We live in an ad-supported world.

News sites are full of ads. Search engines are full of ads. Even shopping sites are full of ads now; we literally came here planning to buy something, but that wasn’t good enough for you; you want us to also buy something else. Most of the ads are for legitimate products; but some are for scams. (And then there’s multi-level marketing, which is somewhere in between: technically not a scam.)

We’re so accustomed to getting spam emails, phone calls, and texts full of ads and scams that we just accept it as a part of our lives. But these are not something people had to live with even 50 years ago. This is a new, fresh Hell we have wrought for ourselves as a civilization.

AI promises to make this problem even worse. AI still isn’t very good at doing anything particularly useful; you can’t actually trust it to drive a truck or diagnose an X-ray. (There are people working on this sort of thing, but they haven’t yet succeeded.) But it’s already pretty good at making spam texts and phone calls. It’s already pretty good at catfishing people. AI isn’t smart enough to really help us, but it is smart enough to hurt us, especially those of us who are most vulnerable.

I think that this causes a great deal more damage to our society than is commonly understood.

It’s not just that ads are annoying (though they are), or that they undermine our attention span (though they do), or that they exploit the vulnerable (though they do).

I believe that an ad-supported world is a world where trust goes to die.

When the vast majority of your interactions with other people involve those people trying to get your money, some of them by outright fraud—but none of them really honestly—you have no choice but to ratchet down your sense of trust. It begins to feel as this financial transactions are the only form of interaction there is in the world.

But in fact most people can be trusted, and should be trusted—you are missing out on a great deal of what makes life worth living if you do not know how to trust.

The question is whom you trust. You should trust people you know, people you interact with personally and directly. Even strangers are more trustworthy than any corporation will ever be. And never are corporations more dishonest than when they are sending out ads.


The more the world fills with ads, the less room it has for trust.

Is there any way to stem this tide? Or are we simply doomed to live in the cyberpunk dystopia our forebears warned about, where everything is for sale and all available real estate is used for advertising?

Ads and scams only exist because they are profitable; so our goal should be to make them no longer profitable.

Here is one very simple piece of financial advice that will help protect you. Indeed, I believe it can protect so well, that if everyone followed it consistently, we would stem the tide.

Only give money to people you have sought out yourself.

Only buy things you already knew you wanted.

Yes, of course you must buy things. We live in a capitalist society. You can’t survive without buying things. But this is how buying things should work:

You check your fridge and see you are out of milk. So you put “milk” on your grocery list, you go to the grocery store, you find some milk that looks good, and you buy it.

Or, your car is getting old and expensive to maintain, and you decide you need a new one. You run the numbers on your income and expenses, and come up with a budget for a new car. You go to the dealership, they help you pick out a car that fits your needs and your budget, and you buy it.

Your tennis shoes are getting frayed, and it’s time to replace them. You go online and search for “tennis shoes”, looking up sizes and styles until you find a pair that suits you. You order that pair.

You should be the one to decide that you need a thing, and then you should go out looking for it.

It’s okay to get help searching, or even listen to some sales pitches, as long as the whole thing was your idea from the start.

But if someone calls you, texts you, or emails you, asking for your money for something?

Don’t give them a cent.

Just don’t. Don’t do it. Even if it sounds like a good product. Even if it is a good product. If the product they are selling sounds so great that you decide you actually want to buy it, go look for it on your own. Shop around. If you can, go out of your way to buy it from a competing company.

Your attention is valuable. Don’t reward them for stealing it.

This applies to donations, too. Donation asks aren’t as awful as ads, let alone scams, but they are pretty obnoxious, and they only send those things out because people respond to them. If we all stopped responding, they’d stop sending.

Yes, you absolutely should give money to charity. But you should seek out the charities to donate to. You should use trusted sources (like GiveWell and Charity Navigator) to vet them for their reliability, transparency, and cost-effectiveness.

If you just receive junk mail asking you for donations, feel free to take out any little gifts they gave you (it’s often return address labels, for some reason), and then recycle the rest.

Don’t give to the ones who ask for it. Give to the ones who will use it the best.

Reward the charities that do good, not the charities that advertise well.

This is the rule to follow:

If someone contacts you—if they initiate the contact—refuse to give them any money. Ever.

Does this rule seem too strict? It is quite strict, in fact. It requires you to pass up many seemingly-appealing opportunities, and the more ads there are, the more opportunities you’ll need to pass up.

There may even be a few exceptions; no great harm befalls us if we buy Girl Scout cookies or donate to the ASPCA because the former knocked on our doors and the latter showed us TV ads. (Then again, you could just donate to feminist and animal rights charities without any ads or sales pitches.)

But in general, we live in a society that is absolutely inundated with people accosting us and trying to take our money, and they’re only ever going to stop trying to get our money if we stop giving it to them. They will not stop it out of the goodness of their hearts—no, not even the charities, who at least do have some goodness in their hearts. (And certainly not the scammers, who have none.)

They will only stop if it stops working.

So we need to make it stop working. We need to draw this line.

Trust the people around you, who have earned it. Do not trust anyone who seeks you out asking for money.

Telemarketing calls? Hang up. Spam emails? Delete. Junk mail? Recycle. TV ads? Mute and ignore.

And then, perhaps, future generations won’t have to live in an ad-supported world.

Empathy is not enough

Jan 14 JDN 2460325

A review of Against Empathy by Paul Bloom

The title Against Empathy is clearly intentionally provocative, to the point of being obnoxious: How can you be against empathy? But the book really does largely hew toward the conclusion that empathy, far from being an unalloyed good as we may imagine it to be, is overall harmful and detrimental to society.

Bloom defines empathy narrowly, but sensibly, as the capacity to feel other people’s emotions automatically—to feel hurt when you see someone hurt, afraid when you see someone afraid. He argues surprisingly well that this capacity isn’t really such a great thing after all, because it often makes us help small numbers of people who are like us rather than large numbers of people who are different from us.

But something about the book rubs me the wrong way all throughout, and I think I finally put my finger on it:

If empathy is bad… compared to what?

Compared to some theoretical ideal of perfect compassion where we love all sentient beings in the universe equally and act only according to maxims that would yield the greatest benefit for all, okay, maybe empathy is bad.

But that is an impossible ideal. No human being has ever approached it. Even our greatest humanitarians are not like that.

Indeed, one thing has clearly characterized the very best human beings, and that is empathy. Every one of them has been highly empathetic.

The case for empathy gets even stronger if you consider the other extreme: What are human beings like when they lack empathy? Why, those people are psychopaths, and they are responsible for the majority of violent crimes and nearly all the most terrible atrocities.

Empirically, if you look at humans as we actually are, it really seems like this function is monotonic: More empathy makes people behave better. Less empathy makes them behave worse.

Yet Bloom does have a point, nevertheless.

There are real-world cases where empathy seems to have done more harm than good.

I think his best examples come from analysis of charitable donations. Most people barely give anything to charity, which we might think of as a lack of empathy. But a lot of people do give to a great deal to charity—yet the charities they give to and the gifts they give are often woefully inefficient.

Let’s even set aside cases like the Salvation Army, where the charity is actively detrimental to society due to the distortions of ideology. The Salvation Army is in fact trying to do good—they’re just starting from a fundamentally evil outlook on the universe. (And if that sounds harsh to you? Take a look at what they say about people like me.)

No, let’s consider charities that are well-intentioned, and not blinded by fanatical ideology, who really are trying to work toward good things. Most of them are just… really bad at it.

The most cost-effective charities, like the ones GiveWell gives top ratings to, can save a life for about $3,000-5,000, or about $150 to $250 per QALY.

But a typical charity is far, far less efficient than that. It’s difficult to get good figures on it, but I think it would be generous to say that a typical charity is as efficient as the standard cost-effectiveness threshold used in US healthcare, which is $50,000 per QALY. That’s already two hundred times less efficient.

And many charities appear to be even below that, where their marginal dollars don’t really seem to have any appreciable benefit in terms of QALY. Maybe $1 million per QALY—spend enough, and they’d get a QALY eventually.

Other times, people give gifts to good charities, but the gifts they give are useless—the Red Cross is frequently inundated with clothing and toys that it has absolutely no use for. (Please, please, I implore you: Give them money. They can buy what they need. And they know what they need a lot better than you do.)

Why do people give to charities that don’t really seem to accomplish anything? Because they see ads that tug on their heartstrings, or get solicited donations directly by people on the street or door-to-door canvassers. In other words, empathy.

Why do people give clothing and toys to the Red Cross after a disaster, instead of just writing a check or sending a credit card payment? Because they can see those crying faces in their minds, and they know that if they were a crying child, they’d want a toy to comfort them, not some boring, useless check. In other words, empathy.

Empathy is what you’re feeling when you see those Sarah McLachlan ads with sad puppies in them, designed to make you want to give money to the ASPCA.

Now, I’m not saying you shouldn’t give to the ASPCA. Actually animal welfare advocacy is one of those issues where cost-effectiveness is really hard to assess—like political donations, and for much the same reason. If we actually managed to tilt policy so that factory farming were banned, the direct impact on billions of animals spared that suffering—while indubitably enormous—might actually be less important, morally, than the impact on public health and climate change from people eating less meat. I don’t know what multiplier to apply to a cow’s suffering to convert her QALY into mine. But I do know that the world currently eats far too much meat, and it’s cooking the planet along with the cows. Meat accounts for 60% of food-related greenhouse gases, and 35% of all greenhouse gases.

But I am saying that if you give to the ASPCA, it should be because you support their advocacy against factory farming—not because you saw pictures of very sad puppies.

And empathy, unfortunately, doesn’t really work that way.

When you get right down to it, what Paul Bloom is really opposing is scope neglect, which is something I’ve written about before.

We just aren’t capable of genuinely feeling the pain of a million people, or a thousand, or probably even a hundred. (Maybe we can do a hundred; that’s under our Dunbar number, after all.) So when confronted with global problems that affect millions of people, our empathy system just kind of overloads and shuts down.

ERROR: OVERFLOW IN EMPATHY SYSTEM. ABORT, RETRY, IGNORE?

But when confronted with one suffering person—or five, or ten, or twenty—we can actually feel empathy for them. We can look at their crying face and we may share their tears.

Charities know this; that’s why Sarah McLachlan does those ASPCA ads. And if that makes people donate to good causes, that’s a good thing. (If it makes them donate to the Salvation Army, that’s a different story.)

The problem is, it really doesn’t tell us what causes are best to donate to. Almost any cause is going to alleviate some suffering of someone, somewhere; but there’s an enormous difference between $250 per QALY, $50,000per QALY, and $1 million per QALY. Your $50 donation would add either two and a half months, eight hours, or just over 26 minutes of joy to someone else’s life, respectively. (In the latter case, it may literally be better—morally—for you to go out to lunch or buy a video game.)

To really know the best places to give to, you simply can’t rely on your feelings of empathy toward the victims. You need to do research—you need to do math. (Or someone does, anyway; you can also trust GiveWell to do it for you.)

Paul Bloom is right about this. Empathy doesn’t solve this problem. Empathy is not enough.

But where I think he loses me is in suggesting that we don’t need empathy at all—that we could somehow simply dispense with it. His offer is to replace it with an even-handed, universal-minded utilitarian compassion, a caring for all beings in the universe that values all their interests evenly.

That sounds awfully appealing—other than the fact that it’s obviously impossible.

Maybe it’s something we can all aspire to. Maybe it’s something we as a civilization can someday change ourselves to become capable of feeling, in some distant transhuman future. Maybe even, sometimes, at our very best moments, we can even approximate it.

But as a realistic guide for how most people should live their lives? It’s a non-starter.

In the real world, people with little or no empathy are terrible. They don’t replace it with compassion; they replace it with selfishness, greed, and impulsivity.

Indeed, in the real world, empathy and compassion seem to go hand-in-hand: The greatest humanitarians do seem like they better approximate that universal caring (though of course they never truly achieve it). But they are also invariably people of extremely high empathy.

And so, Dr. Bloom, I offer you a new title, perhaps not as catchy or striking—perhaps it would even have sold fewer books. But I think it captures the correct part of your thesis much better:

Empathy is not enough.

Time and How to Use It

Nov 5 JDN 2460254

A review of Four Thousand Weeks by Oliver Burkeman

The central message of Four Thousand Weeks: Time and How to Use It seems so obvious in hindsight it’s difficult to understand why it feels so new and unfamiliar. It’s a much-needed reaction to the obsessive culture of “efficiency” and “productivity” that dominates the self-help genre. Its core message is remarkable simple:

You don’t have time to do everything you want, so stop trying.

I actually think Burkeman understands the problem incorrectly. He argues repeatedly that it is our mortality which makes our lives precious—that it is because we only get four thousand weeks of life that we must use our time well. But this strikes me as just yet more making excuses for the dragon.

Our lives would not be less precious if we lived a thousand years or a million. Indeed, our time would hardly be any less scarce! You still can’t read every book ever written if you live a million years—for every one of those million years, another 500,000 books will be published. You could visit every one of the 10,000 cities in the world, surely; but if you spend a week in each one, by the time you get back to Paris for a second visit, centuries will have passed—I must imagine you’ll have missed quite a bit of change in that time. (And this assumes that our population remains the same—do we really think it would, if humans could live a million years?)

Even a truly immortal being that will live until the end of time needs to decide where to be at 7 PM this Saturday.

Yet Burkeman does grasp—and I fear that too many of us do not—that our time is precious, and when we try to do everything that seems worth doing, we end up failing to prioritize what really matters most.

What do most of us spend most of our lives doing? Whatever our bosses tell us to do. Aside from sleeping, the activity that human beings spend the largest chunk of their lives on is working.

This has made us tremendously, mind-bogglingly productive—our real GDP per capita is four times what it was in just 1950, and about eight times what it was in the 1920s. Projecting back further than that is a bit dicier, but assuming even 1% annual growth, it should be about twenty times what it was at the dawn of the Industrial Revolution. We could surely live better than medieval peasants did by working only a few hours per week; yet in fact on average we work more hours than they did—by some estimates, nearly twice as much. Rather than getting the same wealth for 5% of the work, or twice the wealth for 10%, we chose to get 40 times the wealth for twice the work.

It would be one thing if all this wealth and productivity actually seemed to make us happy. But does it?

Our physical health is excellent: We are tall, we live long lives—we are smarter, even, than people of the not-so-distant past. We have largely conquered disease as the ancients knew it. Even a ‘catastrophic’ global pandemic today kills a smaller share of the population than would die in a typical year from disease in ancient times. Even many of our most common physical ailments, such as obesity, heart disease, and diabetes, are more symptoms of abundance than poverty. Our higher rates of dementia and cancer are largely consequences of living longer lives—most medieval peasants simply didn’t make it long enough to get Alzheimer’s. I wonder sometimes how ancient people dealt with other common ailments such as migraine and sleep apnea; but my guess is that they basically just didn’t—since treatment was impossible, they learned to live with it. Maybe they consoled themselves with whatever placebo treatments the healers of their local culture offered.

Yet our mental health seems to be no better than ever—and depending on how you measure it, may actually be getting worse over time. Some of the measured increase is surely due to more sensitive diagnosis; but some of it may be a genuine increase—especially as a result of the COVID pandemic. I wasn’t able to find any good estimates of rates of depression or anxiety disorders in ancient or medieval times, so I guess I really can’t say whether this is a problem that’s getting worse. But it sure doesn’t seem to be getting better. We clearly have not solved the problem of depression the way we have solved the problem of infectious disease.

Burkeman doesn’t tell us to all quit our jobs and stop working. But he does suggest that if you are particularly unhappy at your current job (as I am), you may want to quit it and begin searching for something else (as I have). He reminds us that we often get stuck in a particular pattern and underestimate the possibilities that may be available to us.

And he has advice for those who want to stay in their current jobs, too: Do less. Don’t take on everything that is asked of you. Don’t work yourself to the bone. The rewards for working harder are far smaller than our society will tell you, and the costs of burning out are far higher. Do the work that is genuinely most important, and let the rest go.

Unlike most self-help books, Four Thousand Weeks offers very little in the way of practical advice. It’s more like a philosophical treatise, exhorting you to adopt a whole new outlook on time and how you use it. But he does offer a little bit of advice, near the end of the book, in “Ten Tools for Embracing Your Finitude” and “Five Questions”.

The ten tools are as follows:


Adopt a ‘fixed volume’ approach to productivity. Limit the number of tasks on your to-do list. Set aside a particular amount of time for productive work, and work only during that time.

I am relatively good at this one; I work only during certain hours on weekdays, and I resist the urge to work other times.

Serialize, serialize, serialize. Do one major project at a time.

I am terrible at this one; I constantly flit between different projects, leaving most of them unfinished indefinitely. But I’m not entirely convinced I’d do better trying to focus on one in particular. I switch projects because I get stalled on the current one, not because I’m anxious about not doing the others. Unless I can find a better way to break those stalls, switching projects still gets more done than staying stuck on the same one.

Decide in advance what to fail at. Prioritize your life and accept that some things will fail.

We all, inevitably, fail to achieve everything we want to. What Burkeman is telling us to do is choose in advance which achievements we will fail at. Ask yourself: How much do you really care about keeping the kitchen clean and the lawn mowed? If you’re doing these things to satisfy other people’s expectations but you don’t truly care about them yourself, maybe you should just accept that people will frown upon you for your messy kitchen and overgrown lawn.

Focus on what you’ve already completed, not just on what’s left to complete. Make a ‘done list’ of tasks you have completed today—even small ones like “brushed teeth” and “made breakfast”—to remind yourself that you do in fact accomplish things.

I may try this one for awhile. It feels a bit hokey to congratulate yourself on making breakfast—but when you are severely depressed, even small tasks like that can in fact feel like an ordeal.

Consolidate your caring. Be generous and kind, but pick your battles.

I’m not very good at this one either. Spending less time on social media has helped; I am no longer bombarded quite so constantly by worthy causes and global crises. Yet I still have a vague sense that I am not doing enough, that I should be giving more of myself to help others. For me this is partly colored by a feeling that I have failed to build a career that would have both allowed me to have direct impact on some issues and also made enough money to afford large donations.

Embrace boring and single-purpose technology. Downgrade your technology to reduce distraction.

I don’t do this one, but I also don’t see it as particularly good advice. Maybe taking Facebook and (the-platform-formerly-known-as-) Twitter off your phone home screen is a good idea. But the reason you go to social media isn’t that they are so easy to access. It’s that you are expected to, and that you try to use them to fill some kind of need in your life—though it’s unclear they ever actually fill it.

Seek out novelty in the mundane. Cultivate awareness and appreciation of the ordinary things around you.

This one is basically a stripped-down meditation technique. It does work, but it’s also a lot harder to do than most people seem to think. It is especially hard to do when you are severely depressed. One technique I’ve learned from therapy that is surprisingly helpful is to replace “I have to” with “I get to” whenever you can: You don’t have to scoop cat litter, you get to because you have an adorable cat. You don’t have to catch the bus to work, you get to because you have a job. You don’t have to make breakfast for your family, you get to because you have a loving family.

Be a ‘researcher’ in relationships. Cultivate curiosity rather than anxiety or judgment.

Human beings are tremendously varied and often unpredictable. If you worry about whether or not people will do what you want, you’ll be constantly worried. And I have certainly been there. It can help to try to take a stance of detachment, where you concern yourself less with getting the right outcome and more with learning about the people you are with. I think this can be taken too far—you can become totally detached from relationships, or you could put yourself in danger by failing to pass judgment on obviously harmful behaviors—but in moderation, it’s surprisingly powerful. The first time I ever enjoyed going to a nightclub, (at my therapist’s suggestion) I went as a social scientist, tasked with observing and cataloguing the behavior around me. I still didn’t feel fully integrated into the environment (and the music was still too damn loud!), but for once, I wasn’t anxious and miserable.

Cultivate instantaneous generosity. If you feel like doing something good for someone, just do it.

I’m honestly not sure whether this one is good advice. I used to follow it much more than I do now. Interacting with the Effective Altruism community taught me to temper these impulses, and instead of giving to every random charity or homeless person that asks for money, instead concentrate my donations into a few highly cost-effective charities. Objectively, concentrating donations in this way produces a larger positive impact on the world. But subjectively, it doesn’t feel as good, it makes people sad, and sometimes it can make you feel like a very callous person. Maybe there’s a balance to be had here: Give a little when the impulse strikes, but save up most of it for the really important donations.

Practice doing nothing.

This one is perhaps the most subversive, the most opposed to all standard self-help advice. Do nothing? Just rest? How can you say such a thing, when you just reminded us that we have only four thousand weeks to live? Yet this is in fact the advice most of us need to hear. We burn ourselves out because we forget how to rest.

I am also terrible at this one. I tend to get most anxious when I have between 15 and 45 minutes of free time before an activity, because 45 minutes doesn’t feel long enough to do anything, and 15 minutes feels too long to do nothing. Logically this doesn’t really make sense: Either you have time to do something, or you don’t. But it can be hard to find good ways to fill that sort of interval, because it requires the emotional overhead of starting and stopping a task.

Then, there are the five questions:

Where in your life or work are you currently pursuing comfort, when what’s called for is a little discomfort?

It seems odd to recommend discomfort as a goal, but I think what Burkeman is getting at is that we tend to get stuck in the comfortable and familiar, even when we would be better off reaching out and exploring into the unknown. I know that for me, finally deciding to quit this job was very uncomfortable; it required taking a big risk and going outside the familiar and expected. But I am now convinced it was the right decision.

Are you holding yourself to, and judging yourself by, standards of productivity or performance that are impossible to meet?

In a word? Yes. I’m sure I am. But this one is also slipperier than it may seem—for how do we really know what’s possible? And possible for whom? If you see someone else who seems to be living the life you think you want, is it just an illusion? Are they really suffering as badly as you? Or do they perhaps have advantages you don’t, which made it possible for them, but not for you? When people say they work 60 hours per week and you can barely manage 20, are they lying? Are you truly not investing enough effort? Or do you suffer from ailments they don’t, which make it impossible for you to commit those same hours?

In what ways have you yet to accept the fact that you are who you are, not the person you think you ought to be?

I think most of us have a lot of ways that we fail to accept ourselves: physically, socially, psychologically. We are never the perfect beings we aspire to be. And constantly aspiring to an impossible ideal will surely drain you. But I also fear that self-acceptance could be a dangerous thing: What if it makes us stop striving to improve? What if we could be better than we are, but we don’t bother? Would you want a murderous psychopath to practice self-acceptance? (Then again, do they already, whether we want them to or not?) How are we to know which flaws in ourselves should be accepted, and which repaired?

In which areas of your life are you still holding back until you feel like you know what you’re doing?

This one cut me very deep. I have several areas of my life where this accusation would be apt, and one in particular where I am plainly guilty as charged: Parenting. In a same-sex marriage, offspring don’t emerge automatically without intervention. If we want to have kids, we must do a great deal of work to secure adoption. And it has been much easier—safer, more comfortable—to simply put off that work, avoid the risk. I told myself we’d adopt once I finished grad school; but then I only got a temporary job, so I put it off again, saying we’d adopt once I found stability in my career. But what if I never find that stability? What if the rest of my career is always this precarious? What if I can always find some excuse to delay? The pain of never fulfilling that lifelong dream of parenthood might continue to gnaw at me forever.

How would you spend your days differently if you didn’t care so much about seeing your actions reach fruition?

This one is frankly useless. I hate it. It’s like when people say “What would you do if you knew you’d die tomorrow?” Obviously, you wouldn’t go to work, you wouldn’t pay your bills, you wouldn’t clean your bathroom. You might devote yourself single-mindedly to a single creative task you hoped to make a legacy, or gather your family and friends to share one last day of love, or throw yourself into meaningless hedonistic pleasure. Those might even be things worth doing, on occasion. But you can’t do them every day. If you knew you were about to die, you absolutely would not live in any kind of sustainable way.

Similarly, if I didn’t care about seeing my actions reach fruition, I would continue to write stories and never worry about publishing them. I would make little stabs at research when I got curious, then once it starts getting difficult or boring, give up and never bother writing the paper. I would continue flitting between a dozen random projects at once and never finish any of them. I might well feel happier—at least until it all came crashing down—but I would get absolutely nothing done.

Above all, I would never apply for any jobs, because applying for jobs is absolutely not about enjoying the journey. If you know for a fact that you won’t get an offer, you’re an idiot to bother applying. That is a task that is only worth doing if I believe that it will yield results—and indeed, a big part of why it’s so hard to bring myself to do it is that I have a hard time maintaining that belief.

If you read the surrounding context, Burkeman actually seems to intend something quite different than the actual question he wrote. He suggests devoting more time to big, long-term projects that require whole communities to complete. He likens this to laying bricks in a cathedral that we will never see finished.

I do think there is wisdom in this. But it isn’t a simple matter of not caring about results. Indeed, if you don’t care at all about whether the cathedral will stand, you won’t bother laying the bricks correctly. In some sense Burkeman is actually asking us to do the opposite: To care more about results, but specifically results that we may never live to see. Maybe he really intends to emphasize the word see—you care about your actions reaching fruition, but not whether or not you’ll ever see it.

Yet this, I am quite certain, is not my problem. When a psychiatrist once asked me, “What do you really want most in life?” I gave a very thoughtful answer: “To be remembered in a thousand years for my contribution to humanity.” (His response was glib: “You can’t control that.”) I still stand by that answer: If I could have whatever I want, no limits at all, three wishes from an all-powerful genie, two of them would be to solve some of the world’s greatest problems, and the third would be for the chance to live my life in a way that I knew would be forever remembered.

But I am slowly coming to realize that maybe I should abandon that answer. That psychiatrist’s answer was far too glib (he was in fact not a very good fit for me; I quickly switched to a different psychiatrist), but maybe it wasn’t fundamentally wrong. It may be impossible to predict, let alone control, whether our lives have that kind of lasting impact—and, almost by construction, most lives can’t.

Perhaps, indeed, I am too worried about whether the cathedral will stand. I only have a few bricks to lay myself, and while I can lay them the best I can, that ultimately will not be what decides the fate of the cathedral. A fire, or an earthquake, or simply some other bricklayer’s incompetence, could bring about its destruction—and there is nothing at all I can do to prevent that.

This post is already getting too long, so I should try to bring it to a close.

As the adage goes, perhaps if I had more time, I’d make it shorter.

How much should we give of ourselves?

Jul 23 JDN 2460149

This is a question I’ve written about before, but it’s a very important one—perhaps the most important question I deal with on this blog—so today I’d like to come back to it from a slightly different angle.

Suppose you could sacrifice all the happiness in the rest of your life, making your own existence barely worth living, in exchange for saving the lives of 100 people you will never meet.

  1. Would it be good for you do so?
  2. Should you do so?
  3. Are you a bad person if you don’t?
  4. Are all of the above really the same question?

Think carefully about your answer. It may be tempting to say “yes”. It feels righteous to say “yes”.

But in fact this is not hypothetical. It is the actual situation you are in.

This GiveWell article is entitled “Why is it so expensive to save a life?” but that’s incredibly weird, because the actual figure they give is astonishingly, mind-bogglingly, frankly disgustingly cheap: It costs about $4500 to save one human life. I don’t know how you can possibly find that expensive. I don’t understand how anyone can think, “Saving this person’s life might max out a credit card or two; boy, that sure seems expensive!

The standard for healthcare policy in the US is that something is worth doing if it is able to save one quality-adjusted life year for less than $50,000. That’s one year for ten times as much. Even accounting for the shorter lifespans and worse lives in poor countries, saving someone from a poor country for $4500 is at least one hundred times as cost-effective as that.

To put it another way, if you are a typical middle-class person in the First World, with an after-tax income of about $25,000 per year, and you were to donate 90% of that after-tax income to high-impact charities, you could be expected to save 5 lives every year. Over the course of a 30-year career, that’s 150 lives saved.

You would of course be utterly miserable for those 30 years, having given away all the money you could possibly have used for any kind of entertainment or enjoyment, not to mention living in the cheapest possible housing—maybe even a tent in a homeless camp—and eating the cheapest possible food. But you could do it, and you would in fact be expected to save over 100 lives by doing so.

So let me ask you again:

  1. Would it be good for you do so?
  2. Should you do so?
  3. Are you a bad person if you don’t?
  4. Are all of the above really the same question?

Peter Singer often writes as though the answer to all these questions is “yes”. But even he doesn’t actually live that way. He gives a great deal to charity, mind you; no one seems to know exactly how much, but estimates range from at least 10% to up to 50% of his income. My general impression is that he gives about 10% of his ordinary income and more like 50% of big prizes he receives (which are in fact quite numerous). Over the course of his life he has certainly donated at least a couple million dollars. Yet he clearly could give more than he does: He lives a comfortable, upper-middle-class life.

Peter Singer’s original argument for his view, from his essay “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”, is actually astonishingly weak. It involves imagining a scenario where a child is drowning in a lake and you could go save them, but only at the cost of ruining your expensive suit.

Obviously, you should save the child. We all agree on that. You are in fact a terrible person if you wouldn’t save the child.

But Singer tries to generalize this into a principle that requires us to donate all most of our income to international charities, and that just doesn’t follow.

First of all, that suit is not worth $4500. Not if you’re a middle-class person. That’s a damn Armani. No one who isn’t a millionaire wears suits like that.

Second, in the imagined scenario, you’re the only one who can help the kid. All I have to do is change that one thing and already the answer is different: If right next to you there is a trained, certified lifeguard, they should save the kid, not you. And if there are a hundred other people at the lake, and none of them is saving the kid… probably there’s a good reason for that? (It could be bystander effect, but actually that’s much weaker than a lot of people think.) The responsibility doesn’t uniquely fall upon you.

Third, the drowning child is a one-off, emergency scenario that almost certainly will never happen to you, and if it does ever happen, will almost certainly only happen once. But donation is something you could always do, and you could do over and over and over again, until you have depleted all your savings and run up massive debts.

Fourth, in the hypothetical scenario, there is only one child. What if there were ten—or a hundred—or a thousand? What if you couldn’t possibly save them all by yourself? Should you keep going out there and saving children until you become exhausted and you yourself drown? Even if there is a lifeguard and a hundred other bystanders right there doing nothing?

And finally, in the drowning child scenario, you are right there. This isn’t some faceless stranger thousands of miles away. You can actually see that child in front of you. Peter Singer thinks that doesn’t matter—actually his central point seems to be that it doesn’t matter. But I think it does.

Singer writes:

It makes no moral difference whether the person I can help is a neighbor’s child ten yards away from me or a Bengali whose name I shall never know, ten thousand miles away.

That’s clearly wrong, isn’t it? Relationships mean nothing? Community means nothing? There is no moral value whatsoever to helping people close to us rather than random strangers on the other side of the planet?

One answer might be to say that the answer to question 4 is “no”. You aren’t a bad person for not doing everything you should, and even though something would be good if you did it, that doesn’t necessarily mean you should do it.

Perhaps some things are above and beyond the call of duty: Good, perhaps even heroic, if you’re willing to do them, but not something we are all obliged to do. The formal term for this is supererogatory. While I think that overall utilitarianism is basically correct and has done great things for human society, one thing I think most utilitarians miss is that they seem to deny that supererogatory actions exist.

Even then, I’m not entirely sure it is good to be this altruistic.

Someone who really believed that we owe as much to random strangers as we do to our friends and family would never show up to any birthday parties, because any time spent at a birthday party would be more efficiently spent earning-to-give to some high-impact charity. They would never visit their family on Christmas, because plane tickets are expensive and airplanes burn a lot of carbon.

They also wouldn’t concern themselves with whether their job is satisfying or even not totally miserable; they would only care whether the total positive impact they can have on the world is positive, either directly through their work or by raising as much money as possible and donating it all to charity.

They would rest only the minimum amount they require to remain functional, eat only the barest minimum of nutritious food, and otherwise work, work, work, constantly, all the time. If their body was capable of doing the work, they would continue doing the work. For there is not a moment to waste when lives are on the line!

A world full of people like that would be horrible. We would all live our entire lives in miserable drudgery trying to maximize the amount we can donate to faceless strangers on the other side of the planet. There would be no joy or friendship in that world, only endless, endless toil.

When I bring this up in the Effective Altruism community, I’ve heard people try to argue otherwise, basically saying that we would never need everyone to devote themselves to the cause at this level, because we’d soon solve all the big problems and be able to go back to enjoying our lives. I think that’s probably true—but it also kind of misses the point.

Yes, if everyone gave their fair share, that fair share wouldn’t have to be terribly large. But we know for a fact that most people are not giving their fair share. So what now? What should we actually do? Do you really want to live in a world where the morally best people are miserable all the time sacrificing themselves at the altar of altruism?

Yes, clearly, most people don’t do enough. In fact, most people give basically nothing to high-impact charities. We should be trying to fix that. But if I am already giving far more than my fair share, far more than I would have to give if everyone else were pitching in as they should—isn’t there some point at which I’m allowed to stop? Do I have to give everything I can or else I’m a monster?

The conclusion that we ought to make ourselves utterly miserable in order to save distant strangers feels deeply unsettling. It feels even worse if we say that we ought to do so, and worse still if we feel we are bad people if we don’t.

One solution would be to say that we owe absolutely nothing to these distant strangers. Yet that clearly goes too far in the opposite direction. There are so many problems in this world that could be fixed if more people cared just a little bit about strangers on the other side of the planet. Poverty, hunger, war, climate change… if everyone in the world (or really even just everyone in power) cared even 1% as much about random strangers as they do about themselves, all these would be solved.

Should you donate to charity? Yes! You absolutely should. Please, I beseech you, give some reasonable amount to charity—perhaps 5% of your income, or if you can’t manage that, maybe 1%.

Should you make changes in your life to make the world better? Yes! Small ones. Eat less meat. Take public transit instead of driving. Recycle. Vote.

But I can’t ask you to give 90% of your income and spend your entire life trying to optimize your positive impact. Even if it worked, it would be utter madness, and the world would be terrible if all the good people tried to do that.

I feel quite strongly that this is the right approach: Give something. Your fair share, or perhaps even a bit more, because you know not everyone will.

Yet it’s surprisingly hard to come up with a moral theory on which this is the right answer.

It’s much easier to develop a theory on which we owe absolutely nothing: egoism, or any deontology on which charity is not an obligation. And of course Singer-style utilitarianism says that we owe virtually everything: As long as QALYs can be purchased cheaper by GiveWell than by spending on yourself, you should continue donating to GiveWell.

I think part of the problem is that we have developed all these moral theories as if we were isolated beings, who act in a world that is simply beyond our control. It’s much like the assumption of perfect competition in economics: I am but one producer among thousands, so whatever I do won’t affect the price.

But what we really needed was a moral theory that could work for a whole society. Something that would still make sense if everyone did it—or better yet, still make sense if half the people did it, or 10%, or 5%. The theory cannot depend upon the assumption that you are the only one following it. It cannot simply “hold constant” the rest of society.

I have come to realize that the Effective Altruism movement, while probably mostly good for the world as a whole, has actually been quite harmful to the mental health of many of its followers, including myself. It has made us feel guilty for not doing enough, pressured us to burn ourselves out working ever harder to save the world. Because we do not give our last dollar to charity, we are told that we are murderers.

But there are real murderers in this world. While you were beating yourself up over not donating enough, Vladmir Putin was continuing his invasion of Ukraine, ExxonMobil was expanding its offshore drilling, Daesh was carrying out hundreds of terrorist attacks, Qanon was deluding millions of people, and the human trafficking industry was making $150 billion per year.

In other words, by simply doing nothing you are considerably better than the real monsters responsible for most of the world’s horror.

In fact, those starving children in Africa that you’re sending money to help? They wouldn’t need it, were it not for centuries of colonial imperialism followed by a series of corrupt and/or incompetent governments ruled mainly by psychopaths.

Indeed the best way to save those people, in the long run, would be to fix their governments—as has been done in places like Namibia and Botswana. According to the World Development Indicators, the proportion of people living below the UN extreme poverty line (currently $2.15 per day at purchasing power parity) has fallen from 36% to 16% in Namibia since 2003, and from 42% to 15% in Botswana since 1984. Compare this to some countries that haven’t had good governments over that time: In Cote d’Ivoire the same poverty rate was 8% in 1985 but is 11% today (and was actually as high as 33% in 2015), while in Congo it remains at 35%. Then there are countries that are trying, but just started out so poor it’s a long way to go: Burkina Faso’s extreme poverty rate has fallen from 82% in 1994 to 30% today.

In other words, if you’re feeling bad about not giving enough, remember this: if everyone in the world were as good as you, you wouldn’t need to give a cent.

Of course, simply feeling good about yourself for not being a psychopath doesn’t accomplish very much either. Somehow we have to find a balance: Motivate people enough so that they do something, get them to do their share; but don’t pressure them to sacrifice themselves at the altar of altruism.

I think part of the problem here—and not just here—is that the people who most need to change are the ones least likely to listen. The kind of person who reads Peter Singer is already probably in the top 10% of most altruistic people, and really doesn’t need much more than a slight nudge to be doing their fair share. And meanwhile the really terrible people in the world have probably never picked up an ethics book in their lives, or if they have, they ignored everything it said.

I don’t quite know what to do about that. But I hope I can least convince you—and myself—to take some of the pressure off when it feels like we’re not doing enough.

Voting Your Dollars

May 28 JDN 2460093

It’s no secret that Americans don’t like to pay taxes. It’s almost a founding principle of our country, really, going all the way back to the Boston Tea Party. This is likely part of why the US has one of the lowest tax-to-GDP ratios in the First World; our taxes are barely half what they pay in Scandinavia. And this in turn surely contributes to our ongoing budget issues and our stingy social welfare spending. (Speaking of budget issues: As of this writing, the debt ceiling debacle is still unresolved.)

Why don’t Americans like to pay taxes? Why does no one really like to pay taxes (though some seem more willing than others)?

It surely has something to do with the fact that taxes are so coercive: You have to pay them, you get no choice. And you also have very little choice as to how that money is used; yes, you can vote for politicians who will in theory at some point enact budgets that might possibly reflect the priorities they expressed in their campaigns—but the actual budget invariably ends up quite far removed from the campaign promises you could vote based on.

What if we could give you more choice? We can’t let people choose how much to pay—then most people would choose to pay less and we’d be in even more trouble. (If you want to pay more than you’re required to, the IRS will actually let you right now. You can just refuse your refund.) But perhaps we could let people choose where the money goes?

I call this program Vote Your Dollars. I would initially limit it to a small fraction of the budget, tied to a tax increase: Say, raise taxes enough to increase revenue by 5% and use that 5% for the program.

Under Vote Your Dollars, on your tax return, you are given a survey, asking you how you want to divide up your additional money toward various categories. I think they should be fairly broad categories, such as ‘healthcare’, ‘social security’, ‘anti-poverty programs’, ‘defense’, ‘foreign aid’. If we make them too specific, it would be more work for the voters and also more likely to lead to foolish allocations. We want them to basically reflect a voter’s priorities, rather than ask them to make detailed economic management decisions. Most voters are not qualified to properly allocate a budget; the goal here is to get people to weight how much they care about different programs.

As only a small portion of the budget, Vote Your Dollars would initially have very little real fiscal impact. Money is fungible, so any funds that were expected to go somewhere else than where voters put them could easily be reallocated as needed. But I suspect that most voters would fail to appreciate this effect, and thus actually feel like they have more control than they really do. (If voters understood fungibility and inframarginal transfers, they’d never have supported food stamps over just giving poor people cash.)

Moreover, it would still provide useful information, namely: What happens when voters are given this power? Do they make decisions that seem to make sense and reflect their interests and beliefs? Does the resulting budget actually seem like one that could be viable? Could it even be better than what we currently have in some ways?

I suspect that the result would be better than most economists and political scientists imagine. There seems to be a general sense that voters are too foolish or apathetic to usefully participate in politics, which of course would raise the very big question: Why does democracy work?

I don’t think that most voters would choose a perfect budget; indeed, I already said I wouldn’t trust them with the fine details of how to allocate the funds. But I do think most people have at least some reasonable idea of how important they think healthcare is relative to defense, and it would be good to at least gather that information in a more direct way.

If it goes well and Vote Your Dollars seems to result in reasonable budgets even for that extra 5%, we could start expanding it to a larger portion of the overall budget. Try 10% for the next election, then 15% for the next. There should always be some part that remains outside direct voter control, because voters would almost certainly underspend on certain categories (such as administration and national debt payments) and likely overspend on others.

This would allow us to increase taxes—which we clearly must do, because we need to improve government services, but we don’t want to go further into debt—while giving voters more choice, and thus making taxes feel less coercive. Being forced to pay a certain amount each year might not sting as much if you get to say where a significant portion of that money goes.

To give voters even more control over their money, I think I would also include a provision whereby you can deduct the full amount of your charitable contributions to certain high-impact charities (we would need to come up with a good list, but clear examples include UNICEF, Oxfam, and GiveWell) from your tax payment. Currently, you deduct charitable contributions from your income, which means you don’t pay taxes on those donations; but you still end up with less money after donating than you did before. If we let you deduct the full amount, then you would have the same amount after donating, and effectively the government would pay the full cost of your donation. Presumably this would lead to people donating a great deal; this might hurt tax revenues, but its overall positive impact on the world would be so large that it is obviously worth it. By the time we have given enough to UNICEF to meaningfully impact the US federal budget, we have ended world hunger.

Of course, it’s very unlikely that anything like Vote Your Dollars would ever be implemented. There are already ways we could make paying taxes less painful that we haven’t done—such as sending you a bill, as they do in Denmark, rather than making you file a tax form. And we could already increase revenue with very little real cost by simply expanding the IRS and auditing rich people more. These simple, obvious reforms have been repeatedly obstructed by powerful lobbies, who personally benefit from the current system even though it’s obviously a bad system. I guess I can’t think of anyone in particular who would want to lobby against Vote Your Dollars, but I feel like Republicans might just because they want taxes to hurt as much as possible so that they have an excuse to cut spending.

But still, I thought I’d put the idea out there.

Charity shouldn’t end at home

It so happens that this week’s post will go live on Christmas Day. I always try to do some kind of holiday-themed post around this time of year, because not only Christmas, but a dozen other holidays from various religions all fall around this time of year. The winter solstice seems to be a very popular time for holidays, and has been since antiquity: The Romans were celebrating Saturnalia 2000 years ago. Most of our ‘Christmas’ traditions are actually derived from Yuletide.

These holidays certainly mean many different things to different people, but charity and generosity are themes that are very common across a lot of them. Gift-giving has been part of the season since at least Saturnalia and remains as vital as ever today. Most of those gifts are given to our friends and loved ones, but a substantial fraction of people also give to strangers in the form of charitable donations: November and December have the highest rates of donation to charity in the US and the UK, with about 35-40% of people donating during this season. (Of course this is complicated by the fact that December 31 is often the day with the most donations, probably from people trying to finish out their tax year with a larger deduction.)

My goal today is to make you one of those donors. There is a common saying, often attributed to the Bible but not actually present in it: “Charity begins at home”.

Perhaps this is so. There’s certainly something questionable about the Effective Altruism strategy of “earning to give” if it involves abusing and exploiting the people around you in order to make more money that you then donate to worthy causes. Certainly we should be kind and compassionate to those around us, and it makes sense for us to prioritize those close to us over strangers we have never met. But while charity may begin at home, it must not end at home.

There are so many global problems that could benefit from additional donations. While global poverty has been rapidly declining in the early 21st century, this is largely because of the efforts of donors and nonprofit organizations. Official Development Assitance has been roughly constant since the 1970s at 0.3% of GNI among First World countries—well below international targets set decades ago. Total development aid is around $160 billion per year, while private donations from the United States alone are over $480 billion. Moreover, 9% of the world’s population still lives in extreme poverty, and this rate has actually slightly increased the last few years due to COVID.

There are plenty of other worthy causes you could give to aside from poverty eradication, from issues that have been with us since the dawn of human civilization (the Humane Society International for domestic animal welfare, the World Wildlife Federation for wildlife conservation) to exotic fat-tail sci-fi risks that are only emerging in our own lifetimes (the Machine Intelligence Research Institute for AI safety, the International Federation of Biosafety Associations for biosecurity, the Union of Concerned Scientists for climate change and nuclear safety). You could fight poverty directly through organizations like UNICEF or GiveDirectly, fight neglected diseases through the Schistomoniasis Control Initiative or the Against Malaria Foundation, or entrust an organization like GiveWell to optimize your donations for you, sending them where they think they are needed most. You could give to political causes supporting civil liberties (the American Civil Liberties Union) or protecting the rights of people of color (the North American Association of Colored People) or LGBT people (the Human Rights Campaign).

I could spent a lot of time and effort trying to figure out the optimal way to divide up your donations and give them to causes such as this—and then convincing you that it’s really the right one. (And there is even a time and place for that, because seemingly-small differences can matter a lot in this.) But instead I think I’m just going to ask you to pick something. Give something to an international charity with a good track record.

I think we worry far too much about what is the best way to give—especially people in the Effective Altruism community, of which I’m sort of a marginal member—when the biggest thing the world really needs right now is just more people giving more. It’s true, there are lots of worthless or even counter-productive charities out there: Please, please do not give to the Salvation Army. (And think twice before donating to your own church; if you want to support your own community, okay, go ahead. But if you want to make the world better, there are much better places to put your money.)

But above all, give something. Or if you already give, give more. Most people don’t give at all, and most people who give don’t give enough.

Hypocrisy is underrated

Sep 12 JDN 2459470

Hypocrisy isn’t a good thing, but it isn’t nearly as bad as most people seem to think. Often accusing someone of hypocrisy is taken as a knock-down argument for everything they are saying, and this is just utterly wrong. Someone can be a hypocrite and still be mostly right.

Often people are accused of hypocrisy when they are not being hypocritical; for instance the right wing seems to think that “They want higher taxes on the rich, but they are rich!” is hypocrisy, when in fact it’s simply altruism. (If they had wanted the rich guillotined, that would be hypocrisy. Maybe the problem is that the right wing can’t tell the difference?) Even worse, “They live under capitalism but they want to overthrow capitalism!” is not even close to hypocrisy—let alone why, how would someone overthrow a system they weren’t living under? (There are many things wrong with Marxists, but that is not one of them.)

But in fact I intend something stronger: Hypocrisy itself just isn’t that bad.


There are currently two classes of Republican politicians with regard to the COVID vaccines: Those who are consistent in their principles and don’t get the vaccines, and those who are hypocrites and get the vaccines while telling their constituents not to. Of the two, who is better? The hypocrites. At least they are doing the right thing even as they say things that are very, very wrong.

There are really four cases to consider. The principles you believe in could be right, or they could be wrong. And you could follow those principles, or you could be a hypocrite. Each of these two factors is independent.

If your principles are right and you are consistent, that’s the best case; if your principles are right and you are a hypocrite, that’s worse.

But if your principles are wrong and you are consistent, that’s the worst case; if your principles are wrong and you are a hypocrite, that’s better.

In fact I think for most things the ordering goes like this: Consistent Right > Hypocritical Wrong > Hypocritical Right > Consistent Wrong. Your behavior counts for more than your principles—so if you’re going to be a hypocrite, it’s better for your good actions to not match your bad principles.

Obviously if we could get people to believe good moral principles and then follow them, that would be best. And we should in fact be working to achieve that.

But if you know that someone’s moral principles are wrong, it doesn’t accomplish anything to accuse them of being a hypocrite. If it’s true, that’s a good thing.

Here’s a pretty clear example for you: Anyone who says that the Bible is infallible but doesn’t want gay people stoned to death is a hypocrite. The Bible is quite clear on this matter; Leviticus 20:13 really doesn’t leave much room for interpretation. By this standard, most Christians are hypocrites—and thank goodness for that. I owe my life to the hypocrisy of millions.

Of course if I could convince them that the Bible isn’t infallible—perhaps by pointing out all the things it says that contradict their most deeply-held moral and factual beliefs—that would be even better. But the last thing I want to do is make their behavior more consistent with their belief that the Bible is infallible; that would turn them into fanatical monsters. The Spanish Inquisition was very consistent in behaving according to the belief that the Bible is infallible.

Here’s another example: Anyone who thinks that cruelty to cats and dogs is wrong but is willing to buy factory-farmed beef and ham is a hypocrite. Any principle that would tell you that it’s wrong to kick a dog or cat would tell you that the way cows and pigs are treated in CAFOs is utterly unconscionable. But if you are really unwilling to give up eating meat and you can’t find or afford free-range beef, it still would be bad for you to start kicking dogs in a display of your moral consistency.

And one more example for good measure: The leaders of any country who resist human rights violations abroad but tolerate them at home are hypocrites. Obviously the best thing to do would be to fight human rights violations everywhere. But perhaps for whatever reason you are unwilling or unable to do this—one disturbing truth is that many human rights violations at home (such as draconian border policies) are often popular with your local constituents. Human-rights violations abroad are also often more severe—detaining children at the border is one thing, a full-scale genocide is quite another. So, for good reasons or bad, you may decide to focus your efforts on resisting human rights violations abroad rather than at home; this would make you a hypocrite. But it would still make you much better than a more consistent leader who simply ignores all human rights violations wherever they may occur.

In fact, there are cases in which it may be optimal for you to knowingly be a hypocrite. If you have two sets of competing moral beliefs, and you don’t know which is true but you know that as a whole they are inconsistent, your best option is to apply each set of beliefs in the domain for which you are most confident that it is correct, while searching for more information that might allow you to correct your beliefs and reconcile the inconsistency. If you are self-aware about this, you will know that you are behaving in a hypocritical way—but you will still behave better than you would if you picked the wrong beliefs and stuck to them dogmatically. In fact, given a reasonable level of risk aversion, you’ll be better off being a hypocrite than you would by picking one set of beliefs arbitrarily (say, at the flip of a coin). At least then you avoid the worst-case scenario of being the most wrong.

There is yet another factor to take into consideration. Sometimes following your own principles is hard.

Considerable ink has been spilled on the concept of akrasia, or “weakness of will”, in which we judge that A is better than B yet still find ourselves doing B. Philosophers continue to debate to this day whether this really happens. As a behavioral economist, I observe it routinely, perhaps even daily. In fact, I observe it in myself.

I think the philosophers’ mistake is to presume that there is one simple, well-defined “you” that makes all observations and judgments and takes actions. Our brains are much more complicated than that. There are many “you”s inside your brain, each with its own capacities, desires, and judgments. Yes, there is some important sense in which they are all somehow unified into a single consciousness—by a mechanism which still eludes our understanding. But it doesn’t take esoteric cognitive science to see that there are many minds inside you: Haven’t you ever felt an urge to do something you knew you shouldn’t do? Haven’t you ever succumbed to such an urge—drank the drink, eaten the dessert, bought the shoes, slept with the stranger—when it seemed so enticing but you knew it wasn’t really the right choice?

We even speak of being “of two minds” when we are ambivalent about something, and I think there is literal truth in this. The neural networks in your brain are forming coalitions, and arguing between them over which course of action you ought to take. Eventually one coalition will prevail, and your action will be taken; but afterward your reflective mind need not always agree that the coalition which won the vote was the one that deserved to.

The evolutionary reason for this is simple: We’re a kludge. We weren’t designed from the top down for optimal efficiency. We were the product of hundreds of millions of years of subtle tinkering, adding a bit here, removing a bit there, layering the mammalian, reflective cerebral cortex over the reptilian, emotional limbic system over the ancient, involuntary autonomic system. Combine this with the fact that we are built in pairs, with left and right halves of each kind of brain (and yes, they are independently functional when their connection is severed), and the wonder is that we ever agree with our own decisions.

Thus, there is a kind of hypocrisy that is not a moral indictment at all: You may genuinely and honestly agree that it is morally better to do something and still not be able to bring yourself to do it. You may know full well that it would be better to donate that money to malaria treatment rather than buy yourself that tub of ice cream—you may be on a diet and full well know that the ice cream won’t even benefit you in the long run—and still not be able to stop yourself from buying the ice cream.

Sometimes your feeling of hesitation at an altruistic act may be a useful insight; I certainly don’t think we should feel obliged to give all our income, or even all of our discretionary income, to high-impact charities. (For most people I encourage 5%. I personally try to aim for 10%. If all the middle-class and above in the First World gave even 1% we could definitely end world hunger.) But other times it may lead you astray, make you unable to resist the temptation of a delicious treat or a shiny new toy when even you know the world would be better off if you did otherwise.

Yet when following our own principles is so difficult, it’s not really much of a criticism to point out that someone has failed to do so, particularly when they themselves already recognize that they failed. The inconsistency between behavior and belief indicates that something is wrong, but it may not be any dishonesty or even anything wrong with their beliefs.

I wouldn’t go so far as to say you should stop ever calling out hypocrisy. Sometimes it is clearly useful to do so. But while hypocrisy is often the sign of a moral failing, it isn’t always—and even when it is, often as not the problem is the bad principles, not the behavior inconsistent with them.

Men and violence

Apr4 JDN 2459302

Content warning: In this post, I’m going to be talking about violence, including sexual violence. April is Sexual Assault Awareness and Prevention Month. I won’t go into any explicit detail, but I understand that discussion of such topics can still be very upsetting for many people.

After short posts for the past two weeks, get ready for a fairly long post. This is a difficult and complicated topic, and I want to make sure that I state things very clearly and with all necessary nuance.

While the overall level of violence between human societies varies tremendously, one thing is astonishingly consistent: Violence is usually committed by men.

In fact, violence is usually suffered by men as well—with the quite glaring exception of sexual violence. This is why I am particularly offended by claims like “All men benefit from male violence”; no, men who were murdered by other men did not benefit from male violence, and it is frankly appalling to say otherwise. Most men would be better off if male violence were somehow eliminated from the world. (Most women would also be much better off as well, of course.)

I therefore consider it both a matter of both moral obligation and self-interest to endeavor to reduce the amount of male violence in the world, which is almost coextensive with reducing the amount of violence in general.

On the other hand, ought implies can, and despite significant efforts I have made to seek out recommendations for concrete actions I could be taking… I haven’t been able to find very many.

The good news is that we appear to be doing something right—overall rates of violent crime have declined by nearly half since 1990. The decline in rape has been slower, only about 25% since 1990, though this is a bit misleading since the legal definition of rape has been expanded during that interval. The causes of this decline in violence are unclear: Some of the most important factors seem to be changes in policing, economic growth, and reductions in lead pollution. For whatever reason, Millennials just don’t seem to commit crimes at the same rates that Gen-X-ers or Boomers did. We are also substantially more feminist, so maybe that’s an important factor too; the truth is, we really don’t know.

But all of this still leaves me asking: What should I be doing?

When I searched for an answer to this question, a significant fraction of the answers I got from various feminist sources were some variation on “ruminate on your own complicity in male violence”. I tried it; it was painful, difficult—and basically useless. I think this is particularly bad advice for someone like me who has a history of depression.

When you ruminate on your own life, it’s easy to find mistakes; but how important were those mistakes? How harmful were they? I can’t say that I’ve never done anything in my whole life that hurt anyone emotionally (can anyone?), but I can only think of a few times I’ve harmed someone physically (mostly by accident, once in self-defense). I’ve definitely never raped or murdered anyone, and as far as I can tell I’ve never done anything that would have meaningfully contributed to anyone getting raped or murdered. If you were to somehow replace every other man in the world with a copy of me, maybe that wouldn’t immediately bring about a utopian paradise—but I’m pretty sure that rates of violence would be a lot lower. (And in this world ruled by my clones, we’d have more progressive taxes! Less military spending! A basic income! A global democratic federation! Greater investment in space travel! Hey, this sounds pretty good, actually… though inbreeding would be a definite concern.) So, okay, I’m no angel; but I don’t think it’s really fair to say that I’m complicit in something that would radically decrease if everyone behaved as I do.

The really interesting thing is, I think this is true of most men. A typical man commits less than the average amount of violence—because there is great skew in the distribution, with most men committing little or no violence and a small number of men committing lots of violence. Truly staggering amounts of violence are committed by those at the very top of the distribution—that would be mass murderers like Hitler and Stalin. It sounds strange, but if all men in the world were replaced by a typical man, the world would surely be better off. The loss of the very best men would be more than compensated by the removal of the very worst. In fact, since most men are not rapists or murderers, replacing every man in the world with the median man would automatically bring the rates of rape and murder to zero. I know that feminists don’t like to hear #NotAllMen; but it’s not even most men. Maybe the reason that the “not all men” argument keeps coming up is… it’s actually kind of true? Maybe it’s not so unreasonable for men to resent the implication that we are complicit in acts we abhor that we have never done and would never do? Maybe this whole concept that an entire sex of people, literally almost half the human race, can share responsibility for violent crimes—is wrong?

I know that most women face a nearly constant bombardment of sexual harassment, and feel pressured to remain constantly vigilant in order to protect themselves against being raped. I know that victims of sexual violence are often blamed for their victimization (though this happens in a lot of crimes, not just sex crimes). I know that #YesAllWomen is true—basically all women have been in some way harmed or threatened by sexual violence. But the fact remains that most men are already not committing sexual violence. Many people seem to confuse the fact that most women are harmed by men with the claim that most men harm women; these are not at all equivalent. As long as one man can harm many women, there don’t need to be very many harmful men for all women to be affected.

Plausible guesses would be that about 20-25% of women suffer sexual assault, committed by about 4% or 5% of men, each of whom commits an average of 4 to 6 assaults—and some of whom commit far more. If these figures are right, then 95% of men are not guilty of sexual assault. The highest plausible estimate I’ve seen is from a study which found that 11% of men had committed rape. Since it’s only one study and its sample size was pretty small, I’m actually inclined to think that this is an overestimate which got excessive attention because it was so shocking. Larger studies rarely find a number above 5%.

But even if we suppose that it’s really 11%, that leaves 89%; in what sense is 89% not “most men”? I saw some feminist sites responding to this result by saying things like “We can’t imprison 11% of men!” but, uh, we almost do already. About 9% of American men will go to prison in their lifetimes. This is probably higher than it should be—it’s definitely higher than any other country—but if those convictions were all for rape, I’d honestly have trouble seeing the problem. (In fact only about 10% of US prisoners are incarcerated for rape.) If the US were the incarceration capital of the world simply because we investigated and prosecuted rape more reliably, that would be a point of national pride, not shame. In fact, the American conservatives who don’t see the problem with our high incarceration rate probably do think that we’re mostly incarcerating people for things like rape and murder—when in fact large portions of our inmates are incarcerated for drug possession, “public order” crimes, or pretrial detention.

Even if that 11% figure is right, “If you know 10 men, one is probably a rapist” is wrong. The people you know are not a random sample. If you don’t know any men who have been to prison, then you likely don’t know any men who are rapists. 37% of prosecuted rapists have prior criminal convictions, and 60% will be convicted of another crime within 5 years. (Of course, most rapes are never even reported; but where would we get statistics on those rapists?) Rapists are not typical men. They may seem like typical men—it may be hard to tell the difference at a glance, or even after knowing someone for a long time. But the fact that narcissists and psychopaths may hide among us does not mean that all of us are complicit in the crimes of narcissists and psychopaths. If you can’t tell who is a psychopath, you may have no choice but to be wary; but telling every man to search his heart is worthless, because the only ones who will listen are the ones who aren’t psychopaths.

That, I think, is the key disagreement here: Where the standard feminist line is “any man could be a rapist, and every man should search his heart”, I believe the truth is much more like, “monsters hide among us, and we should do everything in our power to stop them”. The monsters may look like us, they may often act like us—but they are not us. Maybe there are some men who would commit rapes but can be persuaded out of it—but this is not at all the typical case. Most rapes are committed by hardened, violent criminals and all we can really do is lock them up. (And for the love of all that is good in the world, test all the rape kits!)

It may be that sexual harassment of various degrees is more spread throughout the male population; perhaps the median man indeed commits some harassment at some point in his life. But even then, I think it’s pretty clear that the really awful kinds of harassment are largely committed by a small fraction of serial offenders. Indeed, there is a strong correlation between propensity toward sexual harassment and various measures of narcissism and psychopathy. So, if most men look closely enough, maybe they can think of a few things that they do occasionally that might make women uncomfortable; okay, stop doing those things. (Hint: Do not send unsolicited dick pics. Ever. Just don’t. Anyone who wants to see your genitals will ask first.) But it isn’t going to make a huge difference in anyone’s life. As long as the serial offenders continue, women will still feel utterly bombarded.

There are other kinds of sexual violations that more men commit—being too aggressive, or persisting too much after the first rejection, or sending unsolicited sexual messages or images. I’ve had people—mostly, but not only, men—do things like that to me; but it would be obviously unfair to both these people and actual rape victims to say I’d ever been raped. I’ve been groped a few times, but it seems like quite a stretch to call it “sexual assault”. I’ve had experiences that were uncomfortable, awkward, frustrating, annoying, occasionally creepy—but never traumatic. Never violence. Teaching men (and women! There is evidence that women are not much less likely than men to commit this sort of non-violent sexual violation) not to do these things is worthwhile and valuable in itself—but it’s not going to do much to prevent rape or murder.

Thus, whatever responsibility men have in reducing sexual violence, it isn’t simply to stop; you can’t stop doing what you already aren’t doing.

After pushing through all that noise, at last I found a feminist site making a more concrete suggestion: They recommended that I read a book by Jackson Katz on the subject entitled The Macho Paradox: Why Some Men Hurt Women and How All Men Can Help.

First of all, I must say I can’t remember any other time I’ve read a book that was so poorly titled. The only mention of the phrase “macho paradox” is a brief preface that was added to the most recent edition explaining what the term was meant to mean; it occurs nowhere else in the book. And in all its nearly 300 pages, the book has almost nothing that seriously addresses either the motivations underlying sexual violence or concrete actions that most men could take in order to reduce it.

As far as concrete actions (“How all men can help”), the clearest, most consistent advice the book seems to offer that would apply to most men is “stop consuming pornography” (something like 90% of men and 60% of women regularly consume porn), when in fact there is a strong negative correlation between consumption of pornography and real-world sexual violence. (Perhaps Millennials are less likely to commit rape and murder because we are so into porn and video games!) This advice is literally worse than nothing.

The sex industry exists on a continuum from the adult-only but otherwise innocuous (smutty drawings and erotic novels), through the legal but often problematic (mainstream porn, stripping), to the usually illegal but defensible (consensual sex work), all the way to the utterly horrific and appalling (the sexual exploitation of children). I am well aware that there are many deep problems with the mainstream porn industry, but I confess I’ve never quite seen how these problems are specific to porn rather than endemic to media or even capitalism more generally. Particularly with regard to the above-board sex industry in places like Nevada or the Netherlands, it’s not obvious to me that a prostitute is more exploited than a coal miner, a sweatshop worker, or a sharecropper—indeed, given the choice between those four careers, I’d without hesitation choose to be a prostitute in Amsterdam. Many sex workers resent the paternalistic insistence by anti-porn feminists that their work is inherently degrading and exploitative. Overall, sex workers report job satisfaction not statistically different than the average for all jobs. There are a multitude of misleading statistics often reported about the sex industry that often make matters seem far worse than they are.

Katz (all-too) vividly describes the depiction of various violent or degrading sex acts in mainstream porn, but he seems unwilling to admit that any other forms of porn do or even could exist—and worse, like far too many anti-porn feminists, he seems to willfully elide vital distinctions, effectively equating fantasy depiction with genuine violence and consensual kinks with sexual abuse. I like to watch action movies and play FPS video games; does that mean I believe it’s okay to shoot people with machine guns? I know the sophisticated claim is that it somehow “desensitizes” us (whatever that means), but there’s not much evidence of that either. Given that porn and video games are negatively correlated with actual violence, it may in fact be that depicting the fantasy provides an outlet for such urges and helps prevent them from becoming reality. Or, it may simply be that keeping a bunch of young men at home in front of their computers keeps them from going out and getting into trouble. (Then again, homicides actually increased during the COVID pandemic—though most other forms of crime decreased.) But whatever the cause, the evidence is clear that porn and video games don’t increase actual violence—they decrease them.

At the very end of the book, Katz hints at a few other things men might be able to do, or at least certain groups of men: Challenge sexism in sports, the military, and similar male-dominated spaces (you know, if you have clout in such spaces, which I really don’t—I’m an effete liberal intellectual, a paradigmatic “soy boy”; do you think football players or soldiers are likely to listen to me?); educate boys with more positive concepts of masculinity (if you are in a position to do so, e.g. as a teacher or parent); or, the very best advice in the entire book, worth more than the rest of the book combined: Donate to charities that support survivors of sexual violence. Katz doesn’t give any specific recommendations, but here are a few for you: RAINN, NAESV and NSVRC.

Honestly, I’m more impressed by Upworthy’s bulleted list of things men can do, though they’re mostly things that conscientious men do anyway, and even if 90% of men did them, it probably wouldn’t greatly reduce actual violence.

As far as motivations (“Why some men hurt women”), the book does at least manage to avoid the mindless slogan “rape is about power, not sex” (there is considerable evidence that this slogan is false or at least greatly overstated). Still, Katz insists upon collective responsibility, attributing what are in fact typically individual crimes, committed mainly by psychopaths, motivated primarily by anger or sexual desire, to some kind of institutionalized system of patriarchal control that somehow permeates all of society. The fact that violence is ubiquitous does not imply that it is coordinated. It’s very much the same cognitive error as “murderism”.

I agree that sexism exists, is harmful, and may contribute to the prevalence of rape. I agree that there are many widespread misconceptions about rape. I also agree that reducing sexism and toxic masculinity are worthwhile endeavors in themselves, with numerous benefits for both women and men. But I’m just not convinced that reducing sexism or toxic masculinity would do very much to reduce the rates of rape or other forms of violence. In fact, despite widely reported success of campaigns like the “Don’t Be That Guy” campaign, the best empirical research on the subject suggests that such campaigns actually tend to do more harm than good. The few programs that seem to work are those that focus on bystander interventions—getting men who are not rapists to recognize rapists and stop them. Basically nothing has ever been shown to convince actual rapists; all we can do is deny them opportunities—and while bystander intervention can do that, the most reliable method is probably incarceration. Trying to change their sexist attitudes may be worse than useless.

Indeed, I am increasingly convinced that much—not all, but much—of what is called “sexism” is actually toxic expressions of heterosexuality. Why do most creepy male bosses only ever hit on their female secretaries? Well, maybe because they’re straight? This is not hard to explain. It’s a fair question why there are so many creepy male bosses, but one need not posit any particular misogyny to explain why their targets would usually be women. I guess it’s a bit hard to disentangle; if an incel hates women because he perceives them as univocally refusing to sleep with him, is that sexism? What if he’s a gay incel (yes they exist) and this drives him to hate men instead?

In fact, I happen to know of a particular gay boss who has quite a few rumors surrounding him regarding his sexual harassment of male employees. Or you could look at Kevin Spacey, who (allegedly) sexually abused teenage boys. You could tell a complicated story about how this is some kind of projection of misogynistic attitudes onto other men (perhaps for being too “femme” or something)—or you could tell a really simple story about how this man is only sexually abusive toward other men because that’s the gender of people he’s sexually attracted to. Occam’s Razor strongly favors the latter.

Indeed, what are we to make of the occasional sexual harasser who targets men and women equally? On the theory that abuse is caused by patriarchy, that seems pretty hard to explain. On the theory that abusive people sometimes happen to be bisexual, it’s not much of a mystery. (Though I would like to take a moment to debunk the stereotype of the “depraved bisexual”: Bisexuals are no more likely to commit sexual violence, but are far more likely to suffer it—more likely than either straight or gay people, independently of gender. Trans people face even higher risk; the acronym LGBT is in increasing order of danger of violence.)

Does this excuse such behavior? Absolutely not. Sexual harassment and sexual assault are definitely wrong, definitely harmful, and rightfully illegal. But when trying to explain why the victims are overwhelmingly female, the fact that roughly 90% of people are heterosexual is surely relevant. The key explanandum here is not why the victims are usually female, but rather why the perpetrators are usually male.

That, indeed, requires explanation; but such an explanation is really not so hard to come by. Why is it that, in nearly every human society, for nearly every form of violence, the vast majority of that violence is committed by men? It sure looks genetic to me.

Indeed, in anyother context aside from gender or race, we would almost certainly reject any explanation other than genetics for such a consistent pattern. Why is it that, in nearly every human society, about 10% of people are LGBT? Probably genetics. Why is it that, in near every human society, about 10% of people are left-handed? Genetics. Why, in nearly every human society, do smiles indicate happiness, children fear loud noises, and adults fear snakes? Genetics. Why, in nearly every human society, are men on average much taller and stronger than women? Genetics. Why, in nearly every human society, is about 90% of violence, including sexual violence, committed by men? Clearly, it’s patriarchy.

A massive body of scientific evidence from multiple sources shows a clear casual relationship between increased testosterone and increased aggression. The correlation is moderate, only about 0.38—but it’s definitely real. And men have a lot more testosterone than women: While testosterone varies a frankly astonishing amount between men and over time—including up to a 2-fold difference even over the same day—a typical adult man has about 250 to 950 ng/dL of blood testosterone, while a typical adult woman has only 8 to 60 ng/dL. (An adolescent boy can have as much as 1200 ng/dL!) This is a difference ranging from a minimum of 4-fold to a maximum of over 100-fold, with a typical value of about 20-fold. It would be astonishing if that didn’t have some effect on behavior.

This is of course far from a complete explanation: With a correlation of 0.38, we’ve only explained about 14% of the variance, so what’s the other 86%? Well, first of all, testosterone isn’t the only biological difference between men and women. It’s difficult to identify any particular genes with strong effects on aggression—but the same is true of height, and nobody disputes that the height difference between men and women is genetic.

Clearly societal factors do matter a great deal, or we couldn’t possibly explain why homicide rates vary between countries from less than 3 per million per year in Japan to nearly 400 per million per year in Hondurasa full 2 orders of magnitude! But gender inequality does not appear to strongly predict homicide rates. Japan is not a very feminist place (in fact, surveys suggest that, after Spain, Japan is second-worst highly-developed country for women). Sweden is quite feminist, and their homicide rate is relatively low; but it’s still 4 times as high as Japan’s. The US doesn’t strike me as much more sexist than Canada (admittedly subjective—surveys do suggest at least some difference, and in the expected direction), and yet our homicide rate is nearly 3 times as high. Also, I think it’s worth noting that while overall homicide rates vary enormously across societies, the fact that roughly 90% of homicides are committed by men does not. Through some combination of culture and policy, societies can greatly reduce the overall level of violence—but no society has yet managed to change the fact that men are more violent than women.

I would like to do a similar analysis of sexual assault rates across countries, but unfortunately I really can’t, because different countries have such different laws and different rates of reporting that the figures really aren’t comparable. Sweden infamously has a very high rate of reported sex crimes, but this is largely because they have very broad definitions of sex crimes and very high rates of reporting. The best I can really say for now is there is no obvious pattern of more feminist countries having lower rates of sex crimes. Maybe there really is such a pattern; but the data isn’t clear.

Yet if biology contributes anything to the causation of violence—and at this point I think the evidence for that is utterly overwhelming—then mainstream feminism has done the world a grave disservice by insisting upon only social and cultural causes. Maybe it’s the case that our best options for intervention are social or cultural, but that doesn’t mean we can simply ignore biology. And then again, maybe it’s not the case at all:A neurological treatment to cure psychopathy could cut almost all forms of violence in half.

I want to be completely clear that a biological cause is not a justification or an excuse: literally billions of men manage to have high testosterone levels, and experience plenty of anger and sexual desire, without ever raping or murdering anyone. The fact that men appear to be innately predisposed toward violence does not excuse actual violence, and the fact that rape is typically motivated at least in part by sexual desire is no excuse for committing rape.

In fact, I’m quite worried about the opposite: that the notion that sexual violence is always motivated by a desire to oppress and subjugate women will be used to excuse rape, because men who know that their motivation was not oppression will therefore be convinced that what they did wasn’t rape. If rape is always motivated by a desire to oppress women, and his desire was only to get laid, then clearly, what he did can’t be rape, right? The logic here actually makes sense. If we are to reject this argument—as we must—then we must reject the first premise, that all rape is motivated by a desire to oppress and subjugate women. I’m not saying that’s never a motivation—I’m simply saying we can’t assume it is always.

The truth is, I don’t know how to end violence, and sexual violence may be the most difficult form of violence to eliminate. I’m not even sure what most of us can do to make any difference at all. For now, the best thing to do is probably to donate money to organizations like RAINN, NAESV and NSVRC. Even $10 to one of these organizations will do more to help survivors of sexual violence than hours of ruminating on your own complicity—and cost you a lot less.

This is not just about selfishness

Aug 2 JDN 2459064

The Millennial term is “Karen”: someone (paradigmatically a middle-aged White woman) who is so privileged, so self-centered, and has such an extreme sense of entitlement, that they are willing to make others suffer in order to avoid the slightest inconvenience.

I recently saw a tweet (which for some reason has been impossible to find; I think I must have misremembered its precise wording, because putting that in quotes in Google yields nothing) saying that Americans are not simply selfish, we are so selfish that we would gladly let others die to avoid mildly inconveniencing ourselves. Searching Twitter for “Americans are selfish” certainly yields plenty of results.

And it is tempting to agree with this, when it seems that re-opening the economy and so many people refusing to wear masks has given us far worse outcomes from COVID-19 than most other countries.

But this can’t be the whole story. Perhaps Americans are a bit more self-centered than other cultures, because of our history of libertarian individualism. But if we were truly so selfish we’d gladly let others die to avoid inconvenience, whence the fact that we donate more to charity than any other country in the world? I don’t simply mean total amount or per-capita dollars (though both of those are also true); I mean as a fraction of GDP Americans give more to charity than any other country, and by a wide margin.

How then do we explain that so many Americans are not wearing masks?

Well, first of all, most of us are wearing masks. The narrative about people not wearing masks has been exaggerated; the majority of Americans, including the majority of Republicans, agree that wearing masks is a matter of public health rather than personal choice. There are some people who refuse to wear masks, and each one adds a little bit more risk to us all; but it’s really not the case that Americans in general are refusing to wear masks.

But I think the most important failings here come from the top down. The Trump administration has handled the pandemic in an astonishingly poor way. First, they denied that it was even a serious problem. Then, they implemented only a half-hearted response. Then, they turned masks into a culture war. Then, they resisted the economic relief package and prevented it from being as large as it needed to me. At every step of the way, they have been at best utterly incompetent and at worst guilty of depraved indifference murder.

From denying it was a problem, to responding too slowly, to disparaging mask use, to pushing to re-open the economy too soon, at every step of the way our government has made things worse. Above all, a better economic relief package—like what most other First World countries have done—would have done a great deal to reduce the harm of lockdowns, and would have made re-opening the economy far less popular.

Republican-led states have followed the President’s lead, refusing to implement even basic common-sense protections. But even Democrat-led states have suffered greatly as well. New York and California have some of the most cases, though this is surely in part because they are huge states with highly urbanized populations that get a lot of visitors and trade from other places. The trajectory of infections looks worst in Lousiana and Missouri, surely among the most conservative of states; but it also looks quite bad in New Jersey and Hawaii, which are among the most liberal.

I think what this shows us is that America lacks coordination. Despite having United in our name and E pluribus unum as our motto (“In God We Trust” was a Cold War change to spite the Soviets), what we lack most of all is unity. Viruses do not respect borders or jurisdictions. More than perhaps any other issue aside from climate change, fighting a pandemic requires a unified, coordinated response—and that is precisely what we did not have.

In some ways the pluralism of the United States can be a great strength; but this year, it was very much a weakness. And as the many crises around us continue, I fear we grow only more divided.

How we measure efficiency affects our efficiency

Jun 21 JDN 2459022

Suppose we are trying to minimize carbon emissions, and we can afford one of the two following policies to improve fuel efficiency:

  1. Policy A will replace 10,000 cars that average 25 MPG with hybrid cars that average 100 MPG.
  2. Policy B will replace 5,000 diesel trucks that average 5 MPG with turbocharged, aerodynamic diesel trucks that average 10 MPG.

Assume that both cars and trucks last about 100,000 miles (in reality this of course depends on a lot of factors), and diesel and gas pollute about the same amount per gallon (this isn’t quite true, but it’s close). Which policy should we choose?

It seems obvious: Policy A, right? 10,000 vehicles, each increasing efficiency by 75 MPG or a factor of 4, instead of 5,000 vehicles, each increasing efficiency by only 5 MPG or a factor of 2.

And yet—in fact the correct answer is definitely policy B, because the use of MPG has distorted our perception of what constitutes efficiency. We should have been using the inverse: gallons per hundred miles.

  1. Policy A will replace 10,000 cars that average 4 GPHM with cars that average 1 GPHM.
  2. Policy B will replace 5,000 trucks that average 20 GPHM with trucks that average 10 GPHM.

This means that policy A will save (10,000)(100,000/100)(4-1) = 30 million gallons, while policy B will save (5,000)(100,000/100)(20-10) = 50 million gallons.

A gallon of gasoline produces about 9 kg of CO2 when burned. This means that by choosing the right policy here, we’ll have saved 450,000 tons of CO2—or by choosing the wrong one we would only have saved 270,000.

The simple choice of which efficiency measure to use when making our judgment—GPHM versus MPG—has had a profound effect on the real impact of our choices.

Let’s try applying the same reasoning to charities. Again suppose we can choose one of two policies.

  1. Policy C will move $10 million that currently goes to local community charities which can save one QALY for $1 million to medical-research charities that can save one QALY for $50,000.
  2. Policy D will move $10 million that currently goes to direct-transfer charities which can save one QALY for $1000 to anti-malaria net charities that can save one QALY for $800.

Policy C means moving funds from charities that are almost useless ($1 million per QALY!?) to charities that meet a basic notion of cost-effectiveness (most public health agencies in the First World have a standard threshold of about $50,000 or $100,000 per QALY).

Policy D means moving funds from charities that are already highly cost-effective to other charities that are only a bit more cost-effective. It almost seems pedantic to even concern ourselves with the difference between $1000 per QALY and $800 per QALY.

It’s the same $10 million either way. So, which policy should we pick?

If the lesson you took from the MPG example is that we should always be focused on increasing the efficiency of the least efficient, you’ll get the wrong answer. The correct answer is based on actually using the right measure of efficiency.

Here, it’s not dollars per QALY we should care about; it’s QALY per million dollars.

  1. Policy C will move $10 million from charities which get 1 QALY per million dollars to charities which get 20 QALY per million dollars.
  2. Policy D will move $10 million from charities which get 1000 QALY per million dollars to charities which get 1250 QALY per million dollars.

Multiply that out, and policy C will gain (10)(20-1) = 190 QALY, while policy D will gain (10)(1250-1000) = 2500 QALY. Assuming that “saving a life” means about 50 QALY, this is the difference between saving 4 lives and saving 50 lives.

My intuition actually failed me on this one; before I actually did the math, I had assumed that it would be far more important to move funds from utterly useless charities to ones that meet a basic standard. But it turns out that it’s actually far more important to make sure that the funds being targeted at the most efficient charities are really the most efficient—even apparently tiny differences matter a great deal.

Of course, if we can move that $10 million from the useless charities to the very best charities, that’s the best of all; it would save (10)(1250-1) = 12,490 QALY. This is nearly 250 lives.

In the fuel economy example, there’s no feasible way to upgrade a semitrailer to get 100 MPG. If we could, we totally should; but nobody has any idea how to do that. Even an electric semi probably won’t be that efficient, depending on how the grid produces electricity. (Obviously if the grid were all nuclear, wind, and solar, it would be; but very few places are like that.)

But when we’re talking about charities, this is just money; it is by definition fungible. So it is absolutely feasible in an economic sense to get all the money currently going towards nearly-useless charities like churches and museums and move that money directly toward high-impact charities like anti-malaria nets and vaccines.

Then again, it may not be feasible in a practical or political sense. Someone who currently donates to their local church may simply not be motivated by the same kind of cosmopolitan humanitarianism that motivates Effective Altruism. They may care more about supporting their local community, or be motivated by genuine religious devotion. This isn’t even inherently a bad thing; nobody is a cosmopolitan in everything they do, nor should we be—we have good reasons to care more about our own friends, family, and community than we do about random strangers in foreign countries thousands of miles away. (And while I’m fairly sure Jesus himself would have been an Effective Altruist if he’d been alive today, I’m well aware that most Christians aren’t—and this doesn’t make them “false Christians”.) There might be some broader social or cultural change that could make this happen—but it’s not something any particular person can expect to accomplish.

Whereas, getting people who are already Effective Altruists giving to efficient charities to give to a slightly more efficient charity is relatively easy: Indeed, it’s basically the whole purpose for which GiveWell exists. And there are analysts working at GiveWell right now whose job it is to figure out exactly which charities yield the most QALY per dollar and publish that information. One person doing that job even slightly better can save hundreds or even thousands of lives.

Indeed, I’m seriously considering applying to be one myself—it sounds both more pleasant and more important than anything I’d be likely to get in academia.