Nash equilibrium

The Fringe: An overwhelming embarrassment of riches

PNRJ current events, market failure , , , , , , , , , ,

Aug 20 JDN 2460177

As I write this, Edinburgh is currently in the middle of The Fringe: It’s often described as an “arts and culture festival”, but mainly it consists of a huge number of theatre and comedy performances that go on across the city in hundreds of venues all month long. It’s an “open access festival”, which basically means that it’s half a dozen different festivals that all run independently and are loosely coordinated with one another.

There is truly an embarrassment of riches in the sheer number and variety of performances going on. There’s no way I could ever go to all of them, or even half of them, even though most of them are going on every single day, all month long

It would be tremendously helpful to get good information about which performances are likely to suit my tastes, so I’d know which ones to attend. For once, advertising actually has a genuinely useful function to serve!

And yet, the ads for performances plastered across the city are almost completely useless. They tell you virtually nothing about the content or even style of the various shows. You are bombarded with hundreds of posters for hundreds of performances as you walk through the city, and almost none of them tell you anything useful that would help you decide which shows you want to attend.

Here’s what they look like; imagine this plastered on every bus shelter and spare bit of wall in the city, as well as plenty of specially-built structures explicitly for the purpose:

What I want to ask today is: Why are these posters so uninformative?

I think there are two forces at work here which may explain this phenomenon.

The first is about comedy: Most of these shows are comedy shows, and it’s very hard to explain to someone what is funny about a joke. In fact, most jokes aren’t even funny once they have been explained. Comedy seems to be closely tied to surprise: If you know exactly what they are going to say, it isn’t funny anymore. So it is inherently difficult to explain what’s good about a comedy show without making it actually less funny for those attending.

Yet this is not a complete explanation. For there are some things you could explain about comedy shows without ruining them. You could give it a general genre: political satire, slapstick, alternative, dark comedy, blue comedy, burlesque, cringe, insult, sitcom, parody, surreal, and so on. That would at least tell you something—I tend to like satire and parody, dark and blue are hit-or-miss, surreal leaves me cold, and I can’t stand cringe. And some of the posters do this—yet a remarkable number do not. I often find myself staring at a particular poster, poring over its details, trying to get some inkling of what kind of comedy I could expect from this performer.

To fully explain this, we need something more: And that, I believe, is provided by economic theory.

Consider for a moment that comedy is varied and largely subjective: What one person finds hilarious, another finds boring, and yet another finds outrageously offensive. And whether or not you find a particular routine funny can be hard to predict—even for you.

But consider that money is quite the opposite: Everyone wants it, everyone always wants more of it, and people pretty much want it for the same reasons.

So when you offer to pay money for comedy, you are offering something fundamentally fungible and objective in exchange for something almost totally individual and subjective. You are giving what everyone wants in exchange for something that only some people want and you yourself may or may not want—and may have no way of knowing whether you want until you have it.

I believe it is in the interests of the performers to keep you in the dark in this way. They don’t want to resolve your ignorance too thoroughly. Their goal is not to find the market niche of people who would most enjoy their comedy. Their goal is to get as many people as possible to show up to their shows. Even if someone absolutely hates their show, if they bought tickets, that’s a win. And even any negative reviews or word-of-mouth they might try to give the comedian is probably still a win—comedians are one profession for which there really may be no such thing as bad publicity.

In other words, even these relatively helpful advertisements aren’t actually designed to inform you. They are, as all advertisements are, designed to get you to buy something. And the way to get you to do that is twofold:

First, get your attention. That’s vital. And it’s quite difficult in such a saturated environment. As a result, all of the posters are quite eye-catching and often bizarre. They use loud colors and striking images, and the whole city is filled with them. It actually becomes exhausting to look at them all; but this is the Nash equilibrium, because there is an arms race between different performers to look more interesting and exciting than all the rest.

Second, convince you to go. But let’s be clear about this: It is not necessary to make you absolutely certain that this show is one you’ll enjoy. It is merely to tip the balance of probability, make you reasonably confident that it is likely to be one you’ll enjoy. Given the subjectivity and unpredictability of comedy, any attendee knows that they are likely to end up with a few duds. That risk effectively gets priced in: You accept that one £10 ticket may be wasted, in exchange for buying another £10 ticket that you’d have gladly paid £20 for.

If the posters tried to give more details about what the shows were about, there would be two costs to this: One, it might make the posters less eye-catching and interesting in the first place. And two, it might (perhaps correctly!) convince some customers that this flavor of comedy really wasn’t for them, making them decide not to buy a ticket. The task when designing such a poster, then, is to make one that conveys enough that people are willing to take the chance on it—but not too much so that you might scare some potential audience members away.

I think that this has implications which go beyond comedy. In fact, I think that something quite similar is going on with political speeches. But I’ll save that one for another post.

Why are political speeches so vacuous?

PNRJ cognitive science, heuristics and biases, politics, public policy, tribal paradigm , , , , , , , , , ,

Aug 27 JDN 2460184

In last week’s post I talked about how posters for shows at the Fringe seem to be attention-grabbing but almost utterly devoid of useful information.

This brings to mind another sort of content that also fits that description: political speeches.

While there are some exceptions—including in fact some of the greatest political speeches ever made, such as Martin Luther King’s “I have a dream” or Dwight Eisenhower’s “Cross of Iron”—on the whole, most political speeches seem to be incredibly vacuous.

Each country probably has its own unique flavor of vacuousness, but in the US they talk about motherhood, and apple pie, and American exceptionalism. “I love my great country, we are an amazing country, I’m so proud to live here” is basically the extent of the information conveyed within what could well be a full hour-long oration.

This raises a question: Why? Why don’t political speeches typically contain useful information?

It’s not that there’s no useful information to be conveyed: There are all sorts of things that people would like to know about a political candidate, including how honest they are, how competent they are, and the whole range of policies they intend to support or oppose on a variety of issues.

But most of what you’d like to know about a candidate actually comes in one of two varieties: Cheap talk, or controversy.

Cheap talk is the part related to being honest and competent. Basically every voter wants candidates who are honest and competent, and we know all too well that not all candidates qualify. The problem is, how do they show that they are honest and competent? They could simply assert it, but that’s basically meaningless—anybody could assert it. In fact, Donald Trump is the candidate who leaps to mind as the most eager to frequently assert his own honesty and competence, and also the most successful candidate in at least my lifetime who seems to utterly and totally lack anything resembling these qualities.

So unless you are clever enough to find ways to demonstrate your honesty and competence, you’re really not accomplishing anything by asserting it. Most people simply won’t believe you, and they’re right not to. So it doesn’t make much sense to spend a lot of effort trying to make such assertions.

Alternatively, you could try to talk about policy, say what you would like to do regarding climate change, the budget, or the military, or the healthcare system, or any of dozens of other political questions. That would absolutely be useful information for voters, and it isn’t just cheap talk, because different candidates and voters do intend different things and voters would like to know which ones are which.

The problem, then, is that it’s controversial. Not everyone is going to agree with your particular take on any given political issue—even within your own party there is bound to be substantial disagreement.

If enough voters were sufficiently rational about this, and could coolly evaluate a candidate’s policies, accepting the pros and cons, then it would still make sense to deliver this information. I for one would rather vote for someone I know agrees with me 90% of the time than someone who won’t even tell me what they intend to do while in office.

But in fact most voters are not sufficiently rational about this. Voters react much more strongly to negative information than positive information: A candidate you agree with 9 times out of 10 can still make you utterly outraged by their stance on issue number 10. This is a specific form of the more general phenomenon of negativity bias: Psychologically, people just react a lot more strongly to bad things than to good things. Negativity bias has strong effects on how people vote, especially young people.

Rather than a cool-headed, rational assessment of pros and cons, most voters base their decision on deal-breakers: “I could never vote for a Republican” or “I could never vote for someone who wants to cut the military”. Only after they’ve excluded a large portion of candidates based on these heuristics do they even try to look closer at the detailed differences between candidates.

This means that, if you are a candidate, your best option is to avoid offering any deal-breakers. You want to say things that almost nobody will strongly disagree with—because any strong disagreement could be someone’s deal-breaker and thereby hurt your poll numbers.

And what’s the best way to not say anything that will offend or annoy anyone? Not say anything at all. Campaign managers basically need to Mirandize their candidates: You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in the court of public opinion.

But in fact you can’t literally remain silent—when running for office, you are expected to make a lot of speeches. So you do the next best thing: You say a lot of words, but convey very little meaning. You say things like “America is great” and “I love apple pie” and “Moms are heroes” that, while utterly vapid, are very unlikely to make anyone particularly angry at you or be any voter’s deal-breaker.

And then we get into a Nash equilibrium where everyone is talking like this, nobody is saying anything, and political speeches become entirely devoid of useful content.

What can we as voters do about this? Individually, perhaps nothing. Collectively, literally everything.

If we could somehow shift the equilibrium so that candidates who are brave enough to make substantive, controversial claims get rewarded for it—even when we don’t entirely agree with them—while those who continue to recite insipid nonsense are punished, then candidates will absolutely change how they speak.

But this would require a lot of people to change, more or less all at once. A sufficiently large critical mass of voters would need to be willing to support candidates specifically because they made detailed policy proposals, even if we didn’t particularly like those policy proposals.

Obviously, if their policy proposals were terrible, we’d have good reason to reject them; but for this to work, we need to be willing to support a lot of things that are just… kind of okay. Because it’s vanishingly unlikely that the first candidates who are brave enough to say what they intend will also be ones whose intentions we entirely agree with. We need to set some kind of threshold of minimum agreement, and reward anyone who exceeds it. We need to ask ourselves if our deal-breakers really need to be deal-breakers.

Labor history in the making

PNRJ current events, inequality, market failure, politics, public policy , , , , , ,

Oct 24 JDN 2459512

To say that these are not ordinary times would be a grave understatement. I don’t need to tell you all the ways that this interminable pandemic has changed the lives of people all around the world.

But one in particular is of notice to economists: Labor in the United States is fighting back.

Quit rates are at historic highs. Over 100,000 workers in a variety of industries are simultaneously on strike, ranging from farmworkers to nurses and freelance writers to university lecturers.

After decades of quiescence to ever-worsening working conditions, it seems that finally American workers are mad as hell and not gonna take it anymore.

It’s about time, frankly. The real question is why it took this long. Working conditions in the US have been systematically worse than the rest of the First World since at least the 1980s. It was substantially easier to get the leave I needed to attend my own wedding—in the US—after starting work in the UK than it would have been at the same kind of job in the US, because UK law requires employers to grant leave from the day they start work, while US federal law and the law in many states doesn’t require leave at all for anyone—not even people who are sick or recently gave birth.

So, why did it happen now? What changed? The pandemic threw our lives into turmoil, that much is true. But it didn’t fundamentally change the power imbalance between workers and employers. Why was that enough?

I think I know why. The shock from the pandemic didn’t have to be enough to actually change people’s minds about striking—it merely had to be enough to convince people that others would show up. It wasn’t the first-order intention “I want to strike” that changed; it was the second-order belief “Other people want to strike too”.

For a labor strike is a coordination game par excellence. If 1 person strikes, they get fired and replaced. If 2 or 3 or 10 strike, most likely the same thing. But if 10,000 strike? If 100,000 strike? Suddenly corporations have no choice but to give in.

The most important question on your mind when you are deciding whether or not to strike is not, “Do I hate my job?” but “Will my co-workers have my back?”.

Coordination games exhibit a very fascinating—and still not well-understood—phenomenon known as Schelling points. People will typically latch onto certain seemingly-arbitrary features of their choices, and do so well enough that simply having such a focal point can radically increase the level of successful coordination.

I believe that the pandemic shock was just such a Schelling point. It didn’t change most people’s working conditions all that much: though I can see why nurses in particular would be upset, it’s not clear to me that being a university lecturer is much worse now than it was a year ago. But what the pandemic did do was change everyone’s working conditions, all at once. It was a sudden shock toward work dissatisfaction that applied to almost the entire workforce.

Thus, many people who were previously on the fence about striking were driven over the edge—and then this in turn made others willing to take the leap as well, suddenly confident that they would not be acting alone.

Another important feature of the pandemic shock was that it took away a lot of what people had left to lose. Consider the two following games.

Game A: You and 100 other people each separately, without communicating, decide to choose X or Y. If you all choose X, you each get $20. But if even one of you chooses Y, then everyone who chooses Y gets $1 but everyone who chooses X gets nothing.

Game B: Same as the above, except that if anyone chooses Y, everyone who chooses Y also gets nothing.

Game A is tricky, isn’t it? You want to choose X, and you’d be best off if everyone did. But can you really trust 100 other people to all choose X? Maybe you should take the safe bet and choose Y—but then, they’re thinking the same way.


Game B, on the other hand, is painfully easy: Choose X. Obviously choose X. There’s no downside, and potentially a big upside.

In terms of game theory, both games have the same two Nash equilibria: All-X and All-Y. But in the second game, I made all-X also a weak dominant strategy equilibrium, and that made all the difference.

We could run these games in the lab, and I’m pretty sure I know what we’d find: In game A, most people choose X, but some people don’t, and if you repeat the game more and more people choose Y. But in game B, almost everyone chooses X and keeps on choosing X. Maybe they don’t get unanimity every time, but they probably do get it most of the time—because why wouldn’t you choose X? (These are testable hypotheses! I could in fact run this experiment! Maybe I should?)

It’s hard to say at this point how effective these strikes will be. Surely there will be some concessions won—there are far too many workers striking for them all to get absolutely nothing. But it remains uncertain whether the concessions will be small, token changes just to break up the strikes, or serious, substantive restructuring of how work is done in the United States.

If the latter sounds overly optimistic, consider that this is basically what happened in the New Deal. Those massive—and massively successful—reforms were not generated out of nowhere; they were the result of the economic crisis of the Great Depression and substantial pressure by organized labor. We may yet see a second New Deal (a Green New Deal?) in the 2020s if labor organizations can continue putting the pressure on.

The most important thing in making such a grand effort possible is believing that it’s possible—only if enough people believe it can happen will enough people take the risk and put in the effort to make it happen. Apathy and cynicism are the most powerful weapons of the status quo.


We are witnessing history in the making. Let’s make it in the right direction.

The Race to the Bottom is not inevitable

PNRJ development economics, ethics, inequality, macroeconomics, market failure, public policy , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Jul 19 JDN 2459050

The race to the bottom is a common result of competition, between firms, between states, or even between countries. One firm finds a way to cut corners and reduce costs, then lowers their price to undercut others; then soon every firm is cutting those same corners. Or one country decides to weaken their regulations in order to attraction more business; then soon every other country has to weaken their regulations as well.

Let’s first consider individual firms. Suppose that you run a business, and you are an upstanding, ethical person. You want to treat your employees, your customers, and your community well. You have high labor standards, you exceed the requirements of environmental regulations, and you make a high-quality product at a reasonable price for a moderate profit.

Then, a competitor appears. The owner of this company is not so ethical. They exploit their workers, perhaps even stealing their wages. They flaunt environmental regulations. They make shoddy products. All of this allows them to make their products for a lower price than yours.

Suppose that most customers can’t tell the difference between your product and theirs. What will happen? They will stop buying yours, because it’s more expensive. What do you do then?

You could simply go out of business. But that doesn’t really solve anything. Probably you’ll be forced to lower your standards. You’ll treat your workers worse, pollute more, reduce product quality. You may not do so as much as the other company, but you’ll have to do it some in order to get the price down low enough to still compete. And your profits will be lower than theirs as a result.

Far better would be for the government to step in and punish that other business for breaking the rules—or if what they’re doing is technically legal, change the rules so that it’s not anymore. Then you could continue to produce high-quality products with fair labor standards and good environmental sustainability.

But there are some problems with this. First, consider this from the point of view of a regulator, who is being lobbied by both companies. Your company asks for higher standards to improve product quality while protecting workers and the environment. But theirs claims that these higher standards will push them out of business. Who will they believe?

In fact, it may be worse than that: Suppose we’ve already settled into an equilibrium where all the firms have low standards. In that case, all the lobbyists will be saying that regulations need to be kept weak, lest the whole industry fail.

But in fact there’s no reason to think that stricter regulations would actually destroy the whole industry. Firm owners are used to thinking in terms of fixed competitors: They act in response to what competitors do. And in many cases it’s actually true that if just one firm tried to raise their standards, they would be outcompeted and go out of business. This does not mean that if all firms were forced to raise their standards, the industry would collapse. In fact, it’s much more likely that stricter regulations would only moderately reduce output and profits, if imposed consistently across the whole industry.

To see why, let’s consider a very simple model, a Bertrand competition game. There are two firms, A and B. Each can either use process H, producing a product of high quality with high labor standards and good sustainability, or use process L, producing a product of low quality with low labor standards and poor sustainability. Process H costs $100 per unit, process L costs $50 per unit. Customers can’t tell the difference, so they will buy whichever product is offered at the lowest price. Let’s say you are in charge of firm A. You choose which process to use, and set your price. At the same time, firm B chooses a process and sets their price.

Suppose choose to use process H. The lowest possible price you could charge to still make a profit would be a price of $101 (ignoring cents; let’s say customers also ignore them, which might be true!).

But firm B could choose process L, and then set a price of $100. They can charge just one dollar less than you charge for their product, but their cost is only $50, so now they are making a large profit—and you get nothing.

So you are forced to lower your standards, in order to match their price. You could try to undercut them at a price of $100, but in the long run that’s a bad idea, since eventually you’ll both be driven to charging a price of 51 and making only a very small profit. And there’s a way to stop them from undercutting you, which is to offer a price-matching guarantee; you can tell your customers that if they see a lower price from firm B than what you’re offering, you’ll match it for them. Then firm B has no incentive to try to undercut you, and you can maintain a stable equilibrium at a price of $100. You have been forced to used process L even though you know it is worse, because any attempt to unilaterally deviate from that industry norm would result in your company going bankrupt.

But now suppose the government comes in and mandates that all firms use process H, and they really enforce this rule so that no firm wants to try to break it. Then you’d want to raise the price, but you wouldn’t necessarily have to raise it all that much. Even $101 would be enough to ensure some profit, and you could even maintain your current profits by raising the price up to $150. In reality the result would probably be somewhere in between those two, depending on the elasticity of demand; so perhaps you end up charging $125 and make half the profit you did before.

Even though the new regulation raised costs all the way up to the current price, they did not result in collapsing the industry; because the rule was enforced uniformly, all firms were able to raise their standards and also raise their prices. This is what we should typically expect to happen; so any time someone claims that a new regulation will “destroy the industry” we should be very skeptical of that claim. (It’s not impossible; for instance, a regulation mandating that all fast food workers be paid $200 per hour would surely collapse the fast food industry. But it’s very unlikely that anyone would seriously propose a regulation like that.)

So as long as you have a strong government in place, you can escape the race to the bottom. But then we must consider international competition: What if other countries have weaker regulations, and so firms want to move their production to those other countries?

Well, a small country may actually be forced to lower their standards in order to compete. I’m not sure there’s much that Taiwan or Singapore could do to enforce higher labor standards. If Taiwan decided to tighten all their labor regulations, firms might just move their production to Indonesia or Vietnam. Then again, monthly incomes in Taiwan, once adjusted for currency exchange rates, are considerably higher than those in Vietnam. Indeed, wages in Taiwan aren’t much lower than wages in the US. So apparently Taiwan has some power to control their own labor standards—perhaps due to their highly educated population and strong industrial infrastructure.

However, a large country like the US or China absolutely has more power than that. If the US wants to enforce stricter labor standards, they can simply impose tariffs on countries that don’t. Actually there are many free-trade rules in place precisely to reduce that power, because it can be easily abused in the service of protectionism.

Perhaps these rules go too far; while I agree with the concern about protectionism, I definitely think we should be doing more to enforce penalties for forced labor, for instance. But this is not the result of too little international governance—if anything it is the result of too much. Our free trade agreements are astonishingly binding, even on the most powerful countries (China has successfully sued the United States under WTO rules!). I wish only that our human rights charters were anywhere near as well enforced.

This means that the race to the bottom is not the inevitable result of competition between firms or even between countries. When it occurs, it is the result of particular policy regimes nationally or internationally. We can make better rules.

The first step may be to stop listening to the people who say that any change will “destroy the industry” because they are unable (or unwilling?) to understand how uniformly-imposed rules differ from unilateral deviations from industry norms.

The game theory of holidays

PNRJ cognitive science, core principles , , , , , , , ,

Dec 25, JDN 2457748

When this post goes live, it will be Christmas; so I felt I should make the topic somehow involve the subject of Christmas, or holidays in general.

I decided I would pull back for as much perspective as possible, and ask this question: Why do we have holidays in the first place?

All human cultures have holidays, but not the same ones. Cultures with a lot of mutual contact will tend to synchronize their holidays temporally, but still often preserve wildly different rituals on those same holidays. Yes, we celebrate “Christmas” in both the US and in Austria; but I think they are baffled by the Elf on the Shelf and I know that I find the Krampus bizarre and terrifying.

Most cultures from temperate climates have some sort of celebration around the winter solstice, probably because this is an ecologically important time for us. Our food production is about to get much, much lower, so we’d better make sure we have sufficient quantities stored. (In an era of globalization and processed food that lasts for months, this is less important, of course.) But they aren’t the same celebration, and they generally aren’t exactly on the solstice.

What is a holiday, anyway? We all get off work, we visit our families, and we go through a series of ritualized actions with some sort of symbolic cultural meaning. Why do we do this?

First, why not work all year round? Wouldn’t that be more efficient? Well, no, because human beings are subject to exhaustion. We need to rest at least sometimes.

Well, why not simply have each person rest whenever they need to? Well, how do we know they need to? Do we just take their word for it? People might exaggerate their need for rest in order to shirk their duties and free-ride on the work of others.

It would help if we could have pre-scheduled rest times, to remove individual discretion.

Should we have these at the same time for everyone, or at different times for each person?

Well, from the perspective of efficiency, different times for each person would probably make the most sense. We could trade off work in shifts that way, and ensure production keeps moving. So why don’t we do that?
Well, now we get to the game theory part. Do you want to be the only one who gets today off? Or do you want other people to get today off as well?

You probably want other people to be off work today as well, at least your family and friends so that you can spend time with them. In fact, this is probably more important to you than having any particular day off.

We can write this as a normal-form game. Suppose we have four days to choose from, 1 through 4, and two people, who can each decide which day to take off, or they can not take a day off at all. They each get a payoff of 1 if they take the same day off, 0 if they take different days off, and -1 if they don’t take a day off at all. This is our resulting payoff matrix:

1 2 3 4 None
1 1/1 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/-1
2 0/0 1/1 0/0 0/0 0/-1
3 0/0 0/0 1/1 0/0 0/-1
4 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/1 0/-1
None -1/0 -1/0 -1/0 -1/0 -1/-1

 

It’s pretty obvious that each person will take some day off. But which day? How do they decide that?
This is what we call a coordination game; there are many possible equilibria to choose from, and the payoffs are highest if people can somehow coordinate their behavior.

If they can actually coordinate directly, it’s simple; one person should just suggest a day, and since the other one is indifferent, they have no reason not to agree to that day. From that point forward, they have coordinated on a equilibrium (a Nash equilibrium, in point of fact).

But suppose they can’t talk to each other, or suppose there aren’t two people to coordinate but dozens, or hundreds—or even thousands, once you include all the interlocking social networks. How could they find a way to coordinate on the same day?

They need something more intuitive, some “obvious” choice that they can call upon that they hope everyone else will as well. Even if they can’t communicate, as long as they can observe whether their coordination has succeeded or failed they can try to set these “obvious” choices by successive trial and error.

The result is what we call a Schelling point; players converge on this equilibrium not because there’s actually anything better about it, but because it seems obvious and they expect everyone else to think it will also seem obvious.

This is what I think is happening with holidays. Yes, we make up stories to justify them, or sometimes even have genuine reasons for them (Independence Day actually makes sense being on July 4, for instance), but the ultimate reason why we have a holiday on one day rather than other is that we had to have it some time, and this was a way of breaking the deadlock and finally setting a date.

In fact, weekends are probably a more optimal solution to this coordination problem than holidays, because human beings need rest on a fairly regular basis, not just every few months. Holiday seasons now serve more as an opportunity to have long vacations that allow travel, rather than as a rest between work days. But even those we had to originally justify as a matter of religion: Jews would not work on Saturday, Christians would not work on Sunday, so together we will not work on Saturday or Sunday. The logic here is hardly impeccable (why not make it religion-specific, for example?), but it was enough to give us a Schelling point.

This makes me wonder about what it would take to create a new holiday. How could we actually get people to celebrate Darwin Day or Sagan Day on a large scale, for example? Darwin and Sagan are both a lot more worth celebrating than most of the people who get holidays—Columbus especially leaps to mind. But even among those of us who really love Darwin and Sagan, these are sort of half-hearted celebrations that never attain the same status as Easter, much less Thanksgiving or Christmas.

I’d also like to secularize—or at least ecumenicalize—the winter solstice celebration. Christianity shouldn’t have a monopoly on what is really something like a human universal, or at least a “humans who live in temperate climates” universal. It really isn’t Christmas anyway; most of what we do is celebrating Yule, compounded by a modern expression in mass consumption that is thoroughly borne of modern capitalism. We have no reason to think Jesus was actually born in December, much less on the 25th. But that’s around the time when lots of other celebrations were going on anyway, and it’s much easier to convince people that they should change the name of their holiday than that they should stop celebrating it and start celebrating something else—I think precisely because that still preserves the Schelling point.

Creating holidays has obviously been done before—indeed it is literally the only way holidays ever come into existence. But part of their structure seems to be that the more transparent the reasons for choosing that date and those rituals, the more empty and insincere the holiday seems. Once you admit that this is an arbitrary choice meant to converge an equilibrium, it stops seeming like a good choice anymore.

Now, if we could find dates and rituals that really had good reasons behind them, we could probably escape that; but I’m not entirely sure we can. We can use Darwin’s birthday—but why not the first edition publication of On the Origin of Species? And Darwin himself is really that important, but why Sagan Day and not Einstein Day or Niels Bohr Day… and so on? The winter solstice itself is a very powerful choice; its deep astronomical and ecological significance might actually make it a strong enough attractor to defeat all contenders. But what do we do on the winter solstice celebration? What rituals best capture the feelings we are trying to express, and how do we defend those rituals against criticism and competition?

In the long run, I think what usually happens is that people just sort of start doing something, and eventually enough people are doing it that it becomes a tradition. Maybe it always feels awkward and insincere at first. Maybe you have to be prepared for it to change into something radically different as the decades roll on.

This year the winter solstice is on December 21st. I think I’ll be lighting a candle and gazing into the night sky, reflecting on our place in the universe. Unless you’re reading this on Patreon, by the time this goes live, you’ll have missed it; but you can try later, or maybe next year.

In fifty years all the cool kids will be doing it, I’m sure.