post-scarcity

What would a world without poverty look like?

PNRJ core principles, critique of neoclassical economics, development economics, education, ethics, futurism, inequality, public policy , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Mar 22 JDN 2461122

In my previous post I reflected on the ways that conventional measures of poverty seem inadequate—and that a richer understanding of poverty suggests that it is far more ubiquitous than such measures suggest.

In this post, I will ask: Given this richer understanding of poverty, what would a world without poverty look like? Is it something we can realistically hope to achieve?

In techno-utopian circles (looking at you again, Scott Alexander), it is common to speak of “post-scarcity”: A world where there is no poverty because resources are effectively unlimited.

I don’t think that’s possible.

Not for humans as we know them. Perhaps in a future where greed is a recognized and treatable psychiatric disorder, we could genuinely have an economy where people really just take whatever they want and it works out because nobody wants an unreasonable amount.

But the fact that there are people with hundreds of billions of dollars tells me that among humans as we know them, some people’s greed is just literally insatiable. Give them a moon and they’ll demand a planet; give them a planet and they’ll demand a solar system. Whatever they are getting out of more wealth (status? power? the dopamine hit of number go up?), they’re never going to stop getting it from even more wealth, no matter how much we give them. For if they were going to stop at a reasonable amount, they would have stopped four orders of magnitude ago.

So let’s try to imagine what a world would look like if it really had no poverty, but not by somehow producing such staggering amounts of wealth that everyone could literally take whatever they want.

I think the key is that it would require all basic material needs to be met.

Everyone would have, at minimum:

  • Clean air to breathe
  • Clean water to drink
  • Nutritious food to eat
  • Shelter from the elements
  • Security against theft and violence
  • Personal liberty and political representation
  • A basic education
  • A basic standard of healthcare

(I will note that these resonate quite closely with the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights.)

Some of these needs can probably never be completely satisfied—there is an inherent tension between liberty and security which requires us to balance them against each other. A society with zero crime is a horrific totalitarian police state; a society with complete liberty is an equally horrific Hobbesian nightmare. But we have achieved, in most of the First World at least, a reasonable standard of security along with a great deal of liberty, and preserving that balance should be of a very high priority.

Even clean air and water would be difficult to satisfy perfectly: even if we pivot our whole economy to solar, wind, and nuclear power (as we very definitely should be doing!), some amount of pollution is probably necessary just to have a functioning industrial society. So we need to establish reasonable standards for what amounts of pollution exposure are safe, and effective mechanisms for ensuring that people are not exposed to pollution outside those standards—we have largely done the former, but seriously fail at the latter.

But probably the most difficult needs to satisfy are actually difficult to even define.

Just what constitutes a basic standard of education, and a basic standard of healthcare?

These seem like moving targets.

Let’s start with education:

Someone who is illiterate and can barely add two numbers together would be considered to have very poor education today, but would be considered completely average among peasants in the Middle Ages. Someone like me with a PhD has education well beyond what anyone had in the Middle Ages: While Oxford was already graduating doctors in the 12th century, those doctors didn’t have to write dissertations, and didn’t know nearly as much about the world as you must to earn a modern PhD. (Most of the mathematics required to get an economics PhD specifically literally had not been invented.)

So it’s conceivable that educational standards will continue to rise over time, especially if we are able to radically improve learning via new technologies. In the most extreme case, if everyone can just download knowledge like in The Matrix, then it wouldn’t be unreasonable to expect the average person to know as much as a typical PhD today in dozens of fields.

Suppose that such technology did exist. Would it be fair to consider someone poor if they didn’t have access to it?

Yes, I think it would.

Because if it’s really cheap and easy to give breathtakingly vast knowledge on a variety of subjects to anyone instantly, then letting some people have that while others do not puts those others at a severe disadvantage in life. If you must know how to solve partial differential equations to get a job, then someone who only made it through high school algebra isn’t going to be able to find jobs.

So I think what we’re really concerned about here is inequality: The education of a rich person should not be too much better than the education of a poor person, lest “meritocracy” simply reinforce the same generational inequality it was supposed to eliminate.

Now consider healthcare:

This, too, has radically improved over time. Indeed, I’m not really sure it’s fair to call Medieval doctors doctors at all; they lacked basic knowledge of human physiology and their intervention was as likely to hurt patients as to help them. Surgeons certainly existed: They knew how to amputate a gangrenous limb or suture a wound. (They did so without antiseptic, let alone anaesthetic!) But should you come to them with a fever or a headache, they would likely do you as much harm as good.

So we could imagine a world of Star Trek medicine, where you lie in a bed, get scanned for a few moments, and the doctor immediately knows what’s wrong with you and what kind of painless injection to give you to fix it.

Once again, we must ask: If you don’t have that, are you poor?

And again, I’m going to say yes.

If the technology exists to heal people this effortlessly, and some people get access to it while others do not, the latter are being allowed to suffer when their suffering could be easily alleviated.

But now we must consider: what if the technology exists, but it’s too expensive to use routinely?

Most technologies are like this when they are first invented. Over time, the technology improves (and the patents expire!) and they become cheaper and more widely available.

Unlike education, healthcare doesn’t usually impose large advantages on those who receive it—though it can, especially in a society where disabilities are not adequately accommodated.

So I think I’m prepared to allow “early adopters” of new medical technology, people who are rich enough to pay for advanced treatments before they are available to everyone—within certain limits. If some new treatment grants radically higher productivity or lifespan, then in fact I think we have a moral obligation to wait until it can be universally shared before we give it to anyone—precisely because of the risk of reinforcing generational inequality.

Once again, in our effort to define poverty, we end up returning to inequality: The rich should not be allowed to be too much healthier than the poor.

This definitely makes education and healthcare more complicated than the others.

While we can pretty clearly define how much food and water a human being needs to live, and we could provide it to everyone, and then nobody would be poor in terms of food or water.

But making nobody poor in terms of education and healthcare requires meeting a standard that may in fact increase over time, and it is no contradiction to imagine that someone living in the 31st century could be receiving better healthcare than I ever will and yet is still not receiving adequate healthcare based on the technology available.

Furthermore, that person demanding better healthcare is not being ungrateful or envious—they are quite reasonably demanding that society fairly allocate healthcare so that there aren’t some people who live in eternal youth while other people still die of old age.

Are they richer than I am? In some sense, perhaps. We could stipulate that in every material way they are better off than I am now. But there’s a treatment that could extend their life by centuries, and nobody’s giving it to them, because they can’t afford it—and that’s wrong. That makes them poor, and it makes their society unfair and unjust. It isn’t just a question of how many QALY they have; it’s also a question of what it would cost to give them a lot more.

But with all that said, I do believe that a world without poverty is possible.

In fact, I believe that technologically we could already provide that world, if we had the political will to do so. Maybe we don’t quite have the economic output to support it worldwide, but even that is not as far off as most people seem to think.

Providing an adequate standard of food and water, for example, we could already do with existing food supplies. It would cost about one-eighth of Elon Musk’s wealth per year, meaning that, with good stock returns (as he most certainly gets), he could very likely afford it by himself!

Clean air for all would be harder, but we are moving the right direction now that solar power is so cheap.

Universal liberty and security would require radical shifts in government in dozens of countries, so that one seems especially unlikely to happen any time soon—yet it is very definitely possible, and by construction only requires political change.

Universal education and healthcare would be very expensive, and most countries are too poor to really provide them on their own. They are not simply poor in money, but poor in skills: There aren’t enough doctors and teachers, and so we would need to use the ones we have to train up a new generation, and perhaps a new generation after that, before the world’s needs would really be met. (Fortunately, there are people trying to do this. But they don’t have enough resources to really achieve these goals.) So this is not a technological limitation, but it is an economic one; it will probably be at least another generation before we can solve this one.

What about universal shelter? Now there’s the rub. Even in prosperous First World countries, housing shortages and skyrocketing prices are keeping homeownership out of reach for tens of millions of people, and leaving hundreds of thousands outright homeless. We clearly do have the technology to produce enough homes, especially if we are prepared to build at high density; but the economic cost of doing so would be substantial, and our policymakers don’t seem at all willing to actually pay it. I think as long as housing is viewed as an asset one invests in rather than a good that one needs, this will continue to be the case.

The problem isn’t that we don’t have enough stuff. It’s that we are not sharing it properly.

Productivity can cope with laziness, but not greed

PNRJ core principles, critique of neoclassical economics, ethics, futurism, inequality , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Oct 8 JDN 2460226

At least since Star Trek, it has been a popular vision of utopia: post-scarcity, an economy where goods are so abundant that there is no need for money or any kind of incentive to work, and people can just do what they want and have whatever they want.

It certainly does sound nice. But is it actually feasible? I’ve written about this before.

I’ve been reading some more books set in post-scarcity utopias, including Ursula K. Le Guin (who is a legend) and Cory Doctorow (who is merely pretty good). And it struck me that while there is one major problem of post-scarcity that they seem to have good solutions for, there is another one that they really don’t. (To their credit, neither author totally ignores it; they just don’t seem to see it as an insurmountable obstacle.)

The first major problem is laziness.

A lot of people assume that the reason we couldn’t achieve a post-scarcity utopia is that once your standard of living is no longer tied to your work, people would just stop working. I think this assumption rests on both an overly cynical view of human nature and an overly pessimistic view of technological progress.

Let’s do a thought experiment. If you didn’t get paid, and just had the choice to work or not, for whatever hours you wished, motivated only by the esteem of your peers, your contribution to society, and the joy of a job well done, how much would you work?

I contend it’s not zero. At least for most people, work does provide some intrinsic satisfaction. It’s also probably not as much as you are currently working; otherwise you wouldn’t insist on getting paid. Those are our lower and upper bounds.

Is it 80% of your current work? Perhaps not. What about 50%? Still too high? 20% seems plausible, but maybe you think that’s still too high. Surely it’s at least 10%. Surely you would be willing to work at least a few hours per week at a job you’re good at that you find personally fulfilling. My guess is that it would actually be more than that, because once people were free of the stress and pressure of working for a living, they would be more likely to find careers that truly brought them deep satisfaction and joy.

But okay, to be conservative, let’s estimate that people are only willing to work 10% as much under a system where labor is fully optional and there is no such thing as a wage. What kind of standard of living could we achieve?

Well, at the current level of technology and capital in the United States, per-capita GDP at purchasing power parity is about $80,000. 10% of that is $8,000. This may not sound like a lot, but it’s about how people currently live in Venezuela. India is slightly better, Ghana is slightly worse. This would feel poor to most Americans today, but it’s objectively a better standard of living than most humans have had throughout history, and not much worse than the world average today.

If per-capita GDP growth continues at its current rate of about 1.5% per year for another century, that $80,000 would become $320,000, 10% of which is $32,000—that would put us at the standard of living of present-day Bulgaria, or what the United States was like in the distant past of [checks notes] 1980. That wouldn’t even feel poor. In fact if literally everyone had this standard of living, nearly as many Americans today would be richer as would be poorer, since the current median personal income is only a bit higher than that.

Thus, the utopian authors are right about this one: Laziness is a solvable problem. We may not quite have it solved yet, but it’s on the ropes; a few more major breakthroughs in productivity-enhancing technology and we’ll basically be there.

In fact, on a small scale, this sort of utopian communist anarchy already works, and has for centuries. There are little places, all around the world, where people gather together and live and work in a sustainable, basically self-sufficient way without being motivated by wages or salaries, indeed often without owning any private property at all.

We call these places monasteries.

Granted, life in a monastery clearly isn’t for everyone: I certainly wouldn’t want to live a life of celibacy and constant religious observance. But the long-standing traditions of monastic life in several very different world religions does prove that it’s possible for human beings to live and even flourish in the absence of a profit motive.

Yet the fact that monastic life is so strict turns out to be no coincidence: In a sense, it had to be for the whole scheme to work. I’ll get back to that in a moment.

The second major problem with a post-scarcity utopia is greed.

This is the one that I think is the real barrier. It may not be totally insurmountable, but thus far I have yet to hear any good proposals that would seriously tackle it.

The issue with laziness is that we don’t really want to work as much as we do. But since we do actually want to work a little bit, the question is simply how to make as much as we currently do while working only as much as we want to. Hence, to deal with laziness, all we need to do is be more efficient. That’s something we are shockingly good at; the overall productivity of our labor is now something like 100 times what it was at the dawn of the Industrial Revolution, and still growing all the time.

Greed is different. The issue with greed is that, no matter how much we have, we always want more.

Some people are clearly greedier than others. In fact, I’m even willing to bet that most people’s greed could be kept in check by a society that provided for everyone’s basic needs for free. Yeah, maybe sometimes you’d fantasize about living in a gigantic mansion or going into outer space; but most of the time, most of us could actually be pretty happy as long as we had a roof over our heads and food on our tables. I know that in my own case, my grandest ambitions largely involve fighting global poverty—so if that became a solved problem, my life’s ambition would be basically fulfilled, and I wouldn’t mind so much retiring to a life of simple comfort.

But is everyone like that? This is what anarchists don’t seem to understand. In order for anarchy to work, you need everyone to fit into that society. Most of us or even nearly all of us just won’t cut it.

Ammon Hennecy famously declared: “An anarchist is someone who doesn’t need a cop to make him behave.” But this is wrong. An anarchist is someone who thinks that no one needs a cop to make him behave. And while I am the former, I am not the latter.

Perhaps the problem is that anarchists don’t realize that not everyone is as good as they are. They implicitly apply their own mentality to everyone else, and assume that the only reason anyone ever cheats, steals, or kills is because their circumstances are desperate.

Don’t get me wrong: A lot of crime—perhaps even most crime—is committed by people who are desperate. Improving overall economic circumstances does in fact greatly reduce crime. But there is also a substantial proportion of crime—especially the most serious crimes—which is committed by people who aren’t particularly desperate, they are simply psychopaths. They aren’t victims of circumstance. They’re just evil. And society needs a way to deal with them.

If you set up a society so that anyone can just take whatever they want, there will be some people who take much more than their share. If you have no system of enforcement whatsoever, there’s nothing to stop a psychopath from just taking everything he can get his hands on. And then it really doesn’t matter how productive or efficient you are; whatever you make will simply get taken by whoever is greediest—or whoever is strongest.

In order to avoid that, you need to either set up a system that stops people from taking more than their share, or you need to find a way to exclude people like that from your society entirely.

This brings us back to monasteries. Why are they so strict? Why are the only places where utopian anarchism seems to flourish also places where people have to wear a uniform, swear vows, carry out complex rituals, and continually pledge their fealty to an authority? (Note, by the way, that I’ve also just described life in the military, which also has a lot in common with life in a monastery—and for much the same reasons.)

It’s a selection mechanism. Probably no one consciously thinks of it this way—indeed, it seems to be important to how monasteries work that people are not consciously weighing the costs and benefits of all these rituals. This is probably something that memetically evolved over centuries, rather than anything that was consciously designed. But functionally, that’s what it does: You only get to be part of a monastic community if you are willing to pay the enormous cost of following all these strict rules.

That makes it a form of costly signaling. Psychopaths are, in general, more prone to impulsiveness and short-term thinking. They are therefore less willing than others to bear the immediate cost of donning a uniform and following a ritual in order to get the long-term gains of living in a utopian community. This excludes psychopaths from ever entering the community, and thus protects against their predation.

Even celibacy may be a feature rather than a bug: Psychopaths are also prone to promiscuity. (And indeed, utopian communes that practice free love seem to have a much worse track record of being hijacked by psychopaths than monasteries that require celibacy!)

Of course, lots of people who aren’t psychopaths aren’t willing to pay those costs either—like I said, I’m not. So the selection mechanism is in a sense overly strict: It excludes people who would support the community just fine, but aren’t willing to pay the cost. But in the long run, this turns out to be less harmful than being too permissive and letting your community get hijacked and destroyed by psychopaths.

Yet if our goal is to make a whole society that achieves post-scarcity utopia, we can’t afford to be so strict. We already know that most people aren’t willing to become monks or nuns.

That means that we need a selection mechanism which is more reliable—more precisely, one with higher specificity.

I mentioned this in a previous post in the context of testing for viruses, but it bears repeating. Sensitivity and specificity are two complementary measures of a test’s accuracy. The sensitivity of a test is how likely it is to show positive if the truth is positive. The specificity of a test is how likely it is to show negative if the truth is negative.

As a test of psychopathy, monastic strictness has very high sensitivity: If you are a psychopath, there’s a very high chance it will weed you out. But it has quite low specificity: Even if you’re not a psychopath, there’s still a very high chance you won’t want to become a monk.

For a utopian society to work, we need something that’s more specific, something that won’t exclude a lot of people who don’t deserve to be excluded. But it still needs to have much the same sensitivity, because letting psychopaths into your utopia is a very easy way to let that utopia destroy itself. We do not yet have such a test, nor any clear idea how we might create one.

And that, my friends, is why we can’t have nice things. At least, not yet.