Why will no one listen to economists on rent control?

Sep 22 JDN 2458750

I am on the verge of planting my face into my desk, because California just implemented a statewide program of rent control. I understand the good intentions here; it is absolutely the case that housing in California is too expensive. There are castles in Spain cheaper than condos in California. But this is not the right solution. Indeed, it will almost certainly make the problem worse. Maybe housing prices won’t be too high; instead there simply won’t be enough homes and more people will live on the street. (It’s not a coincidence that the Bay Area has both some of the world’s tightest housing regulations and one of the highest rates of homelessness.)

There is some evidence that rent control can help keep tenants in their homes—but at the cost of reducing the overall housing supply. Most of the benefits of rent control actually fall upon the upper-middle-class, not the poor.

Price controls are in general a terrible way of intervening in the economy. Price controls are basically what destroyed Venezuela. In this case the ECON 101 argument is right: Put a cap on the price of something, and you will create a shortage of that thing. Always.

California makes this worse by including all sorts of additional regulations on housing construction. Some regulations are necessary—homes need to be safe to live in—but did we really need a “right to sunlight”? How important is “the feel of the city” compared to homelessness? Not every building needs its own parking! (That, at least, the state government seems to be beginning to understand.) And yes, we should be investing heavily in solar power, and rooftops are a decent place to put those solar panels; but you should be subsidizing solar panels, not mandating them and thereby adding the cost of solar panels to the price of every new building.

Of course, we can’t simply do nothing; we need to fix this housing crisis. But there are much better ways of doing so. Again the answer is to subsidize rather than regulate.

Here are some policy options for making housing more affordable:

  1. Give every person below a certain income threshold a one-time cash payment to help them pay for a down payment or first month’s rent. Gradually phase out the payment as their income increases in the same way as the Earned Income Tax Credit.
  2. Provide a subsidy for new housing construction, with larger subsidies for buildings with smaller, more affordable apartments.
  3. Directly pay for the construction of new public housing.
  4. Relax zoning regulations to make construction less expensive.
  5. Redistribute income from the rich to the poor using progressive taxes and transfer payments. Housing crises are always and everywhere a problem of inequality.

Some of these would cost money, yes; we would probably need to raise taxes to pay for them. But rent control has costs too. We are already paying these costs, but instead of paying them in the form of taxes that can be concentrated on the rich, we pay them in the form of a housing crisis that hurts the poor most of all.

The weirdest thing about all this is that any economist would agree.

Economists can be a contentious bunch: It has been said that if you ask five economists a question, you’ll get five answers—six if one is from Harvard. Yet the consensus among economists against rent control is absolutely overwhelming. Analyses of journal articles and polls of eminent economists suggest that over 90% of economists, regardless of their other views or their political leanings, agree that rent control is a bad idea.

This is a staggering result: There are economists who think that almost all taxes and regulations are fundamentally evil and should all be removed, and economists who think that we need radical, immediate government intervention to prevent a global climate catastrophe. But they all agree that rent control is a bad idea.

Economists differ in their views about legacy college admissions, corporate antitrust, wealth taxes, corporate social responsibility, equal pay for women, income taxes, ranked-choice voting, the distributional effects of monetary policy, the relation between health and economic growth, minimum wage, and healthcare spending. They disagree about whether Christmas is a good thing! But they all agree that rent control is a bad idea.

We’re not likely to ever get a consensus much better than this in any social science. The economic case against rent control is absolutely overwhelming. Why aren’t policymakers listening to us?

I really would like to know. It’s not that economists have ignored the problem of housing affordability. We have suggested a variety of other solutions that would obviously be better than rent control—in fact, I just did, earlier in this post. Many of them would require tax money, yes—do you want to fix this problem, or not?

Maybe that’s it: Maybe policymakers don’t really care about making housing affordable. If they did, they’d be willing to bear the cost of raising taxes on millionaires in order to build more apartments and keep people from being homeless. But they want to seem like they care about making housing affordable, because they know their constituents care. So they use a policy that seems to make housing more affordable, even though it doesn’t actually work, because that policy also doesn’t affect the government budget (at least not obviously or directly—of course it still does indirectly). They want the political support of the poor, who think this will help them; and they also want the political support of the rich, who refuse to pay a cent more in taxes.

But it really makes me wonder what we as economists are even really doing: If the evidence is this clear and the consensus is this overwhelming, and policymakers still ignore us—then why even bother?

Five Spanish castles cheaper than condos in California

July 21 JDN 2458686

1. Santa Coloma: A steal at 90,000 EUR ($100,000)

Area: 600 square meters (6500 square feet)

This one is so cheap that it can undercut even affordable condos, like this 1300 square foot one in Santa Ana for $200,000. Yes, it’s technically a castle ruin, but I’m sure it could be fixed up. And I could literally afford to buy it right now.

2. Cal Basaacs: 700,000 EUR ($780,000)

Area: 600 square meters (6500 square feet)

This castle is already more expensive than most houses in the US, but it’s still cheaper than this 1650 square foot $880,000 condo in Los Angeles. And this one isn’t a ruin; it’s a fully-functional castle. It even has central air conditioning!

3. Casa Palacio Cargadores a Indias: 1.4 M EUR ($1.6 M)

This 6-bedroom castle is also a fixer-upper, and without many listed specs or even a listed area, I’d be disinclined to buy it. But it is in a very nice beachside location, and it has a lot of history behind it. And it still makes it in under this 2400 square foot condo in Beverly Hills that’s going for $2.0 million.

4. Cáceres Extremadura: 1.6 M EUR ($1.8 M)

Area: 820 square meters (8800 square feet)

This is a lovely 7-bedroom castle with a guest house, and it’s in the historic region of Cáceres, which is a UNESCO World Heritage Site. It even has its own pool. The only downside is that it’s a fixer-upper. But it’s still somehow cheaper than this $2.4 million 2150-square-foot condo in San Francisco.

5. Torremolinos: 1.8 M EUR ($2.0 M)

Area: 550 square meters (5900 square feet)

Though a bit smaller than the others, this 5-bedroom castle is fully renovated and ready to move in. If you’re looking for an income property, it is already licensed to be converted into a hotel. And it’s still a lot cheaper than this $3.2 million 2850-square-foot condo in Beverly Hills.

I don’t know about you, but I’m thinking maybe housing in California is too expensive?

Green New Deal Part 4: Guaranteeing employment and housing is very hard—but we should still try (public policy)

Apr 28 JDN 2458602

In previous posts I have talked about the “easy parts” of the Green New Deal (infrastructure, healthcare and education), as well as one of the “hard parts” (net-zero carbon emissions). But today it’s time for the “very hard parts”: guaranteed employment and housing.

“Guaranteeing a job with a family-sustaining wage, adequate family and medical leave, paid vacations, and retirement security to all people of the United States.”

“Providing all people of the United States with – […] (ii) affordable, safe, and adequate housing; (iii) economic security; […].

Let me start by giving you a sense of how difficult this is: No country on Earth has ever successfully guaranteed employment and housing. Even Scandinavia’s extensive social safety nets and active labor market programs are not sufficient to eliminate homelessness or unemployment (though they do dramatically reduce them).
The Soviet Union came close to guaranteed employment, but only as part of a labor system that was extremely inefficient and unproductive. Effectively, they guaranteed everyone a job by not even firing people who didn’t actually do the jobs they were given. This is clearly not a sustainable solution.
There are serious proposals on the table for a job guarantee program, but they are extremely ambitious.
The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities has a proposal that would add 9.7 million people to the federal workforce and cost over $500 billion per year to operate. For comparison, the current non-postal federal workforce is only 2.1 million. The postal service has about another 600,000. So we are talking about quintupling the federal workforce, at a cost comparable to the entire (bloated) military budget. That’s a huge number of people and a lot of money.
The basic idea of such a program is that we can (hopefully) find various forms of public service that need to be done, and pay people to do that public service at a certain minimum level of pay and benefits. These jobs would be available to anyone who wanted them, and any time you lost a private-sector job you could always take the guaranteed job. This would effectively create a floor on wages and benefits; any job that offered a worse deal than the government job would be competed out of existence.
I’ve written before about why I’m skeptical of such programs. If there is all this work that needs done, why aren’t we already doing it? If people have the skills they need to do this work, why is no one currently employing them?
Maybe there is a way to solve these problems. Maybe I’m underestimating the public goods that could be produced by people with low levels of skill. But at the very least we need to face up to the fact that it is a problem. We need to actually find work that it makes sense to guarantee—we can’t just wave our hands and say that “obviously” there is plenty of valuable work to be done that will happen to line up exactly with the skills of the people who are currently unemployed.
And then we need to think about the fact that we can’t really guarantee it, not the way the Soviet Union did. We do need to be able to fire people. We need to be able to fire them for not showing up to work, for being drunk at work, for sexually harassing co-workers, or simply for being incompetent. We need to be have some sort of policy in place for what happens to people who get fired: How long before they can get another guaranteed job? And being fired should hurt: It’s supposed to be an incentive to do your job correctly. We don’t need to punish laziness or incompetence with homelessness—but we do need to punish it with something.
Ultimately what I would like to see is not guaranteed jobs but guaranteed income: A basic income that everyone gets, no questions asked. And then I would hope that our norms about work would change, and people would stop defining themselves by their paid employment and start defining themselves by other things, like creating art, supporting their family, or contributing to their community.
What about guaranteed housing? On that front I am more optimistic.
Housing is quite expensive, particularly in major cities. But homelessness is also very expensive from a societal perspective. In the long run, free housing might actually pay for itself.
One of the most successful programs at reducing homelessness is called Housing First. Rather than going through the usual machinations of shelters and transitional housing, the program just takes people off the streets and gives them homes. Like a basic income, it sounds ludicrously simple; it’s the sort of thing a five-year-old would suggest. Surely it can’t be that easy?
Well, the results speak for themselves. Implementation of Housing First programs in several major US cities has resulted in reductions in homeless of over 30% and reductions in the social cost of homelessness of over 50%.

The current population of about 80,000 chronically homeless Americans each cost taxpayers about $40,000 per year in social costs, via emergency room visits, shelter maintenance, crime, court costs, and so on. This is about $3 billion per year. For that same amount of money—or potentially even less—we could have put all those people into homes.

There is an additional population of about 500,000 transient homeless—people who are homeless for a short period after an adverse life event (such as losing a job, having a divorce, or getting their mortgage foreclosed) but will find housing within a few weeks or months. Their situation is not as dire, and the costs they impose on society are not as large. But standard estimates are still generally over $10,000 per person per year—which, if given to them in cash, would probably be enough to get most of these people into homes.
So this is not a question of affordability: We are already paying these costs, but doing so in a way that doesn’t actually solve homelessness.
The real challenge is subtler than that: How do we make this fair and politically feasible?
When we’re talking about chronically homelessness, I think we can make a pretty strong case: These people are in a really bad way and they need our help. Since we’re already spending all this money anyway, we may as well spend it in a way that would actually help them.
But transient homelessness gets a bit more complicated. Many people who are transiently homeless are not all that poor. They may be college students, or recent divorcees, or failed entrepreneurs, or people who could afford a home but not the expensive home they actually tried to buy. Once they get back on their feet, they will probably go on to maintain a middle-class standard of living. So it really does seem unfair to just hand these people free homes that other people would not get.
And making housing in general completely free is simply a pipe dream. No country has ever even gotten close to that. Housing is such a huge part of a country’s expenditures that even a country like Denmark where the government is half the economy still can’t afford to put everyone in public housing.
I think what I would do instead is provide guaranteed subsidized loans—much as we do for student loans. These loans could be used to pay rent, to pay a mortgage, or even to make a down payment. They would be available to any adult US citizen, regardless of credit history, in relatively large amounts (the average down payment in the US is about $14,000, but as high as $50,000 is not unusual), at very low interest rates (I’d say aim for 0% real interest, so target the nominal interest rate to inflation) and very generous repayment terms (like student loans, you would never be required to pay more than a certain percentage of your adjusted gross income on the loan). If someone did try to avoid paying, their wages could be garnished or their taxes could be increased—this would make the default rates very low.
This policy would allow people who are temporarily homeless to get back into a home immediately, rather than having to wait until they can get more income—which can become a paradox as most employers will require a permanent address. But it wouldn’t be a free home; this policy would cost taxpayers next to nothing. The only costs would come from subsidizing interest rates and bearing defaults, which wouldn’t be more than about 5% of the outstanding balance—even if we loaned out as much as $100 billion, that still wouldn’t be more than what we’re currently losing in social costs of homelessness.
Had this policy been in place during the 2008 crash, people who lost their homes to foreclosure would have been able to immediately re-borrow and buy new homes. This would have blunted the financial crisis and maybe even done as much as the far more expensive stimulus package and quantitative easing programs.
These policies would not, unfortunately, eliminate unemployment and homelessness. Maybe that’s not even possible. But they would at least greatly reduce the harm caused by unemployment and homelessness, and that alone makes them worth doing.

How we can actually solve the housing shortage

Sep 16 JDN 2458378

In previous posts I’ve talked about the housing crisis facing most of the world’s major cities. (Even many cities in Africa are now facing a housing crisis!) In this post, I’m going to look at the empirical data to see if we can find a way to solve this crisis.

Most of the answer, it turns out, is really not that complicated: Build more housing.

There is a little bit more to it than that, but only a little bit. The basic problem is simply that there are more households than there are houses to hold them.

One of the biggest hurdles to fixing the housing crisis comes ironically from the left, in resistance to so-called “gentrification”. Local resistance to new construction is one of the greatest obstacles to keeping housing affordable. State and federal regulations are generally quite sensible: No industrial waste near the playgrounds. It’s the local regulations that make new housing so difficult.

I can understand why people fight “gentrification”: They see new housing going in as housing prices increase, and naturally assume that new houses cause higher prices. But it’s really the other way around: High prices cause new construction, which brings prices down. By its nature, new housing is almost always more expensive than existing housing. Building new housing still brings down the overall price of housing, even when the new housing is expensive. Building luxury condos does make existing apartments more affordable—and not building anything most certainly does not.

California’s housing crisis is particularly severe: California has been building less than half the units needed to sustain its current population trend since the crash in 2008. It’s worst of all in the Bay Area, where 500,000 jobs were added since 2009—and only 50,000 homes. California also has a big problem with delays in the permit process: Typically it takes as long as three or four years between approval and actual breaking ground.

We are seeing this in Oakland currently: The government has approved an actually reasonable amount of housing for once (vastly more than what they usually do), and as a result they may have a chance at keeping Oakland affordable even as it grows its population and economy. And yet we still get serious journalists saying utter nonsense like The building boom and resulting gentrification are squeezing the city’s most vulnerable.” Building booms don’t cause gentrification. Building booms are the best response to gentrification. When you say things like that, you sound to an economist like you’re saying “Pizza is so expensive; we need to stop people from making pizza!”

Homeowners who want to increase their property values may actually be rational—if incredibly selfish and monopolistic—in trying to block new construction. But activists who oppose “gentrification” need to stop shooting themselves in the foot by fighting the very same development that would have made housing cheaper.

The simplest thing we can do is make it easier to build housing. Streamline the permit process, provide subsidies, remove unnecessary regulations. Housing is one of the few markets where I can actually see a lot of unnecessary regulations. We don’t need to require parking; we should provide better public transit instead. And while requiring solar panels (as the whole state is now doing) sounds nice, it makes everything a lot more expensive—and by only requiring it on new housing, you are effectively saying you don’t want any new housing. I love solar panels, but what you should be doing is subsidizing solar panels, not requiring them. Does that cost the state budget more? Yes. Raise taxes on something else (a particularly good idea: electricity consumption) if you have to. But by mandating solar panels without any subsidies to support them, you are effectively putting a tax on new housing—which is exactly what California does not need.

It’s still a good idea to create incentives to build not simply housing, but affordable housing. There are ways to do this as well. Denver did an excellent job in creating an Affordable Housing Fund that they immediately spent in converting vacant apartments into affordable housing units.

There are also good reasons to try to fight foreign ownership of housing (and really, speculative ownership of housing in general). There is a strong correlation between current account deficits and housing appreciation, which makes sense if foreign investors are buying up our housing and making it more expensive. If Trump could actually reduce our trade deficit, that would drive down our current account deficit and quite likely make our housing more affordable. Of course, he has absolutely no idea how to do that.

Victor Duggan has a pretty good plan for lowering housing prices in Ireland which includes a land tax (as I’ve discussed previously) and a tax on foreign ownership of real estate. I disagree with him about the “Help-to-Buy” program, however; I actually think that was a fine idea, since the goal is not simply to keep housing cheap but to get people into houses. That wealth transfer is going to raise prices at the producer side—increasing production—but not at the consumer side—because people get compensated by the tax rebate. The net result should be more housing without more cost for buyers. You could have done the same thing by subsidizing construction, but I actually like the idea of putting the money directly in the pockets of homeowners. The tax incidence shouldn’t be much different in the long run, but it makes for a much more appealing and popular program.

The asymmetric impact of housing prices

Jul 22 JDN 2458323

In several previous posts I’ve talked about the international crisis of high housing prices. Today, I want to talk about some features of housing that make high housing prices particularly terrible, in a way that other high prices would not be.

First, there is the fact that some amount of housing is a basic necessity, and houses are not easily divisible. So even if the houses being built are bigger than you need, you still need some kind of house, and you can’t buy half a house; the best you could really do would be to share it with someone else, and that introduces all sorts of other complications.

Second, t here is a deep asymmetry here. While rising housing prices definitely hurt people who want to buy houses, they benefit hardly anyone.


If you bought a house for $200,000 and then all housing prices doubled so it would now sell for $400,000, are you richer? You might feel richer. You might even have access to home equity loans that would give you more real liquidity. But are you actually richer?

I contend you are not, because the only way for you to access that wealth would be to sell your home, and then you’d need to buy another home, and that other home would also be twice as expensive. The amount of money you can get for your house may have increased, but the amount of house you can get for your house is exactly the same.

Conversely, suppose that housing prices fell by half, and now that house only sells for $100,000. Are you poorer? You still have your house. Even if your mortgage isn’t paid off, it’s still the same mortgage. Your payments haven’t changed. And once again, the amount of house you can get for your house will remain the same. In fact, if you are willing to accept a deed in lieu of foreclosure (it’s bad for your credit, of course), you can walk away from that underwater house and buy a new one that’s just as good with lower payments than what you are currently making. You may actually be richer because the price of your house fell.

Relative housing prices matter, certainly. If you own a $400,000 house and move to a city where housing prices have fallen to $100,000, you are definitely richer. And if you own a $100,000 house and move to a city where housing prices have risen to $400,000, you are definitely poorer. These two effects necessarily cancel out in the aggregate.

But do absolute housing prices matter for homeowners? It really seems to me that they don’t. The people who care about absolute housing prices are not homeowners; they are people trying to enter the market for the first time.
And this means that lower housing prices are almost always better. If you could buy a house for $1,000, we would live in a paradise where it was basically impossible to be homeless. (When social workers encountered someone who was genuinely homeless, they could just buy them a house then and there.) If every home cost $10 million, those who bought homes before the price surge would be little better off than they are, but the rest of us would live on the streets.

Psychologically, people very strongly resist falling housing prices. Even in very weak housing markets, most people will flatly refuse to sell their house for less than they paid for it. As a result, housing prices usually rise with inflation, but don’t usually fall in response to deflation. Rents also display similar rigidity over time. But in reality, lower prices are almost always better for almost everyone.

There is a group of people who are harmed by low housing prices, but it is a very small group of people, most of whom are already disgustingly rich: The real estate industry. Yes, if you build new housing, or flip houses, or buy and sell houses on speculation, you will be harmed by lower housing prices. Of these, literally the only one I care about even slightly is developers; and I only care about developers insofar as they are actually doing their job building housing that people need. If falling prices hurt developers, it would be because the supply of housing was so great that everyone who needs a house could have one.

There is a subtler nuance here, which is that some people may be buying more expensive housing as a speculative saving vehicle, hoping that they can cash out on their house when they retire. To that, I really only have one word of advice: Don’t. Don’t contribute to another speculative housing bubble that could cause another Great Recession. A house is not even a particularly safe investment, because it’s completely undiversified. Buy stocks. Buy all the stocks. Buy a house because you want that house, not because you hope to make money off of it.

And if the price of your house does fall someday? Don’t panic. You may be no worse off, and other people are probably much better off.

The housing shortage is an international phenomenon

Jul 1 JDN 2458301

My posts for the next couple of weeks are going to be shorter, since I am in Europe and will be either on vacation (at the time I write this) or busy with a conference and a workshop (by the time this post goes live).

For today, I’d just like to point out that the crisis of extremely high housing prices is not unique to California or even the United States. In some respects it may even be worse elsewhere.

San Francisco remains especially bad; the median price for a home in San Francisco is a horrifying $1.6 million.

But London (where I am at the time of writing) is also terrible; the median price for a home in London recently fell to 430,000 pounds (about $600,000 at current exchange rates). The most expensive flat—not house, flat—sold a couple years ago for the mind-boggling sum of 150 million pounds (about $200 million). If I had $200 million, I would definitely not use it to buy a flat. At that point it would literally be cheaper to buy a yacht with a helipad, park it in the harbor, and commute by helicopter. Here’s a yacht with a helipad for only $20 million, and a helicopter to go with it for $6 million. That leaves $174 million; keep $20 million in stocks to be independently wealthy for the rest of your life, and then donate the remaining $154 million to charity.

The median price of a house in Vancouver stands at 1.1 million Canadian dollars, about $830,000 US.

A global comparison finds that on a per-square-meter basis, the most expensive real estate in the world is in Monaco, where $1 million US will only buy you 15 square meters. The remaining cities in the top 10 are Hong Kong, London, Singapore, Geneva, New York, Sydney, Paris, Moscow, and Shanghai.

There is astonishing variation in the level of housing prices, even within countries. Some of the most affordable markets in the US (like San Antonio and Oklahoma City) cost as little as $80 per square foot; that means that $1 million would buy you 1,160 square meters. That’s not an error; real estate in Monaco is literally 77 times more expensive than real estate in Oklahoma City. 15 square meters is a studio apartment; 1,160 square meters is a small mansion. Just comparing within the US, the price per square foot in San Francisco is over $1,120, 14 times as high as Oklahoma City. $1 million in San Francisco will buy you about 80 square meters, which is at least a two or three-bedroom house.

This says to me that policy choices matter. It may not be possible to make San Francisco as cheap as Oklahoma City—most people would definitely rather live in San Francisco, so demand is always going to be higher there. But I don’t think it’s very plausible to say that housing is just inherently 14 times as expensive to construct as housing in Oklahoma City. If it’s really that much more expensive to construct (and that may not even be the issue—this could be more a matter of oligopoly than high costs), it must be at least in part because of something the local and state governments are doing differently. Cross-national comparisons underscore that point even further: The geography of Hong Kong and Taiwan is not that different, but housing prices in Taiwan are not nearly as high.

What exactly are different cities (and countries) doing differently that has such large effects on housing prices? That’s something I’ll try to figure out in future posts.

Downsides of rent control

May 13 JDN 2458252

One of the largest ideological divides between economists and the rest of the population concerns rent control.

Tent control is very popular among the general population, especially in California—with support hovering around 60% in Orange County, San Diego County, and across California in general. About 60% of people in the UK and over 50% in Ontario, Canada also support rent control.

Meanwhile, economists overwhelmingly oppose rent control: When evaluating the statement “A ceiling on rents reduces the quantity and quality of housing available.”, over 76% of economists agreed, and 16% agreed with qualifications. For the record, I would be an “agree with qualifications” as well (as they say, there are few one-handed economists).

There is evidence of some benefits of rent control, at least for the small number of people who can actually manage to stay in rent-controlled units. People who live in rent-controlled units are about 15% more likely to stay where they are, even in places as expensive as San Francisco, which could be considered a good thing (though I’m not convinced it always is; mobility is one of the key forces driving the dynamism of the US economy).

But there are winners and losers. Landlords whose properties are rent-controlled decreased their supply of housing by an average of 15%, via a combination of converting them to condos, removing them from the market, or demolishing the buildings outright. As a result, rent control increases average rent in a city by an average of 5%. One of the most effective ways to get out of rent control is to remove a building from the market entirely; this allows you to evict all of your tenants with very little notice, and is responsible for thousands of tenants being evicted every year in Los Angeles.

Rent control disincentivizes both new housing construction and the proper maintenance of existing housing. The quality of rent-controlled homes is systematically lower than the quality of other homes.

The benefits of rent control mainly fall upon the upper-middle class, not the poor. Rent control can make an area more racially diverse—but it benefits middle-class members of racial minorities, not poor members. Most of the benefits of rent control go to older families who have lived in a city for a long time—which makes them a transfer of wealth away from young people.

Cities such as Chicago without rent control systematically have lower rents, not higher; partly this is a cause, rather than an effect, as tenants are less likely to panic and demand rent control when rents are not high. But it’s also an effect, as rent control holds down the price in part of the market but ends up driving it up in the rest. Over 40% of San Francisco’s apartments are rent-controlled, and they have the highest rents in the world.

Rent control also contributes to the tendency toward building high-end luxury apartments; if you know that you will never be able to raise the rent on your existing buildings, and may end up being stuck with whatever rent you charge the first year on your new buildings, you have a strong reason to want to charge as much as possible the first year you build new apartments. Rent control also creates subtler distortions in the size and location of apartment construction. The effects of rent control even spill over into other housing markets, such as owner-occupied homes and mobile homes.
Because it locks people into place and reduces the construction of new homes near city centers, rent control increases commute times and carbon emissions. This is probably something we should especially point out to people in California, as the two things Californians hate most are environmental degradation and traffic congestion. (Then again, the third is high rent.) California is good at avoiding the first one—our GDP/carbon emission ratio is near the best in the US. The other two? Not so much.

Of course, simply removing rent control would not immediately solve the housing shortage; while it would probably have benefits in the long run, during the transition period a lot of people currently protected by rent control would lose their homes. Even in the long run, it would probably not be enough to actually make rent affordable in the largest coastal cities.

But it’s vital not to confuse “lower rent” with “rent control”; there are much, much better ways to reduce rent prices than simply enforcing arbitrary caps on them.

We have learned not to use price controls in other markets, but not housing for some reason. Think about the gasoline market, for example. High gas prices are very politically unpopular (though frankly I never quite understood why; it’s a tiny fraction of consumption expenditure, and if we ever want to make a dent in our carbon emissions we need to make our gas prices much higher), but imagine how ridiculous it would seem for a politician to propose simply making an arbitrary cap that says you aren’t allowed to sell gasoline for more than $2.50 per gallon in a particular city. The obvious outcome would be for most gas stations in that city to immediately close, and everyone to end up buying their gas at the new gas stations that spring up just outside the city limits charging $4.00 per gallon. This is basically what happens in the housing market: Rent-controlled apartments apartments are taken off the market, and the new housing that is built ends up even more expensive.

In a future post, I’ll discuss things we can do instead of rent control that would reliably make housing more affordable. Most of these would involve additional government spending; but there are two things I’d like to say about that. First, we are already spending this money, we just don’t see it, because it comes in the form of inefficiencies and market distortions instead of a direct expenditure. Second, do we really care about making housing affordable, or not? If we really care, we should be willing to spend money on it. If we aren’t willing to spend money on it, then we must not really care.