market failure

Why are so many famous people so awful?

PNRJ ethics, inequality, market failure , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Oct 12 JDN 2460961

J.K. Rowling is a transphobic bigot. H.P. Lovecraft was an overt racist. Orson Scott Card is homophobic, and so was Frank Herbert. Robert Heinlein was a misogynist. Isaac Asimov was a serial groper and sexual harasser. Neil Gaiman has been credibly accused of multiple sexual assaults.

That’s just among sci-fi and fantasy authors whose work I admire. I could easily go on with lots of other famous people and lots of other serious allegations. (I suppose Bill Cosby and Roman Polanski seem like particularly apt examples.)

Some of these are worse than others; since they don’t seem to be guilty of any actual crimes, we might even cut some slack to Lovecraft, Herbert and Heinlein for being products of their times. (It seems very hard to make that defense for Asimov and Gaiman, with Rowling and Card somewhere in between because they aren’t criminals, but ‘their time’ is now.)

There are of course exceptions: Among sci-fi authors, for instance, Ursula Le Guin, Becky Chambers, Alistair Reynolds and Andy Weir all seem to be ethically unimpeachable. (As far as I know? To be honest, I still feel blind-sided by Neil Gaiman.)

But there really does seem to be pattern here:

Famous people are often bad people.

I guess I’m not quite sure what the baseline rate of being racist, sexist, or homophobic is (and frankly maybe it’s pretty high); but the baseline rate of committing multiple sexual assaults is definitely lower than the rate at which famous men get credibly accused of such.

Lord Acton famously remarked similarly:

Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great men are almost always bad men, even when they exercise influence and not authority; still more when you superadd the tendency of the certainty of corruption by authority.

I think this account is wrong, however. Abraham Lincoln, Mahatma Gandhi, and Nelson Mandela were certainly powerful—and certainly flawed—but they do not seem corrupt to me. I don’t think that Gandhi beat his wife because he led the Indian National Congress, and Mandela supported terrorists precisely during the period when he had the least power and the fewest options. (It’s almost tautologically true that Lincoln couldn’t have suspended habeas corpusif he weren’t extremely powerful—but that doesn’t mean that it was the power that shaped his character.)

I don’t think the problem is that power corrupts. I think the problem is that the corrupt seek power, and are very good at obtaining it.

In fact, I think the reason that so many famous people are such awful people is that our society rewards being awful. People will flock to you if you are overconfident and good at self-promoting, and as long as they like your work, they don’t seem to mind who you hurt along the way; this makes a perfect recipe for rewarding narcissists and psychopaths with fame, fortune, and power.

If you doubt that this is the case:

How else do you explain Donald Trump?

The man has absolutely no redeeming qualities. He is incompetent, willfully ignorant, deeply incurious, arrogant, manipulative, and a pathological liar. He’s also a racist, misogynist, and admitted sexual assaulter. He has been doing everything in his power to prevent the release of the Epstein Files, which strongly suggests he has in fact sexually assaulted teenagers. He’s also a fascist, and now that he has consolidated power, he is rapidly pushing the United States toward becoming a fascist state—complete with masked men with guns who break into your home and carry you away without warrants or trials.

Yet tens of millions of Americans voted for him to become President of the United States—twice.

Basically, it seems to be that Trump said he was great, and they believed him. Simply projecting confidence—however utterly unearned that confidence might be—was good enough.

When it comes to the authors I started this post with, one might ask whether their writing talents were what brought them fame, independently or in spite of their moral flaws. To some extent that is probably true. But we also don’t really know how good they are, compared to all the other writers whose work never got published or never got read. Especially during times—all too recently—when writers who were women, queer, or people of color simply couldn’t get their work published, who knows what genius we might have missed out on? Dune the first book is a masterpiece, but by the time we get to Heretics of Dune the books have definitely lost their luster; maybe there were some other authors with better books that could have been published, but never were because Herbert had the clout and the privilege and those authors didn’t.

I do think genuine merit has some correlation with success. But I think the correlation is much weaker than is commonly supposed. A lot of very obviously terrible and/or incompetent people are extremely successful in life. Many of them were born with advantages—certainly true of Elon Musk and Donald Trump—but not all of them.

Indeed, there are so many awful successful people that I am led to conclude that moral behavior has almost nothing to do with success. I don’t think people actively go out of their way to support authors, musicians, actors, business owners or politicians who are morally terrible; but it’s difficult for me to reject the hypothesis that they literally don’t care. Indeed, when evidence emerges that someone powerful is terrible, usually their supporters will desperately search for reasons why the allegations can’t be true, rather than seriously considering no longer supporting them.

I don’t know what to do about this.

I don’t know how to get people to believe allegations more, or care about them more; and that honestly seems easier than changing the fundamental structure of our society in a way that narcissists and psychopaths are no longer rewarded with power. The basic ways that we decide who gets jobs, who gets published, and who gets elected seem to be deeply, fundamentally broken; they are selecting all the wrong people, and our whole civilization is suffering the consequences.


We are so far from a just world that I honestly can’t see how to get there from here, or even how to move substantially closer.

But I think we still have to try.

Taylor Swift and the means of production

PNRJ development economics, futurism, inequality, market failure, politics , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Oct 5 JDN 2460954

This post is one I’ve been meaning to write for awhile, but current events keep taking precedence.

In 2023, Taylor Swift did something very interesting from an economic perspective, which turns out to have profound implications for our economic future.

She re-recorded an entire album and released it through a different record company.

The album was called 1989 (Taylor’s Version), and she created it because for the last four years she had been fighting with Big Machine Records over the rights to her previous work, including the original album 1989.

A Marxist might well say she seized the means of production! (How rich does she have to get before she becomes bourgeoisie, I wonder? Is she already there, even though she’s one of a handful of billionaires who can truly say they were self-made?)

But really she did something even more interesting than that. It was more like she said:

“Seize the means of production? I am the means of production.”

Singing and songwriting are what is known as a human-capital-intensive industry. That is, the most important factor of production is not land, or natural resources, or physical capital (yes, you need musical instruments, amplifiers, recording equipment and the like—but these are a small fraction of what it costs to get Talor Swift for a concert), or even labor in the ordinary sense. It’s one where so-called (honestly poorly named) “human capital” is the most important factor of production.

A labor-intensive industry is one where you just need a lot of work to be done, but you can get essentially anyone to do it: Cleaning floors is labor-intensive. A lot of construction work is labor-intensive (though excavators and the like also make it capital-intensive).

No, for a human-capital-intensive industry, what you need is expertise or talent. You don’t need a lot of people doing back-breaking work; you need a few people who are very good at doing the specific thing you need to get done.

Taylor Swift was able to re-record and re-release her songs because the one factor of production that couldn’t be easily substituted was herself. Big Machine Records overplayed their hand; they thought they could control her because they owned the rights to her recordings. But she didn’t need her recordings; she could just sing the songs again.

But now I’m sure you’re wondering: So what?

Well, Taylor Swift’s story is, in large part, the story of us all.

For most of the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries, human beings in developed countries saw a rapid increase in their standard of living.

Yes, a lot of countries got left behind until quite recently.

Yes, this process seems to have stalled in the 21st century, with “real GDP” continuing to rise but inequality and cost of living rising fast enough that most people don’t feel any richer (and I’ll get to why that may be the case in a moment).

But for millions of people, the gains were real, and substantial. What was it that brought about this change?

The story we are usually told is that it was capital; that as industries transitioned from labor-intensive to capital-intensive, worker productivity greatly increased, and this allowed us to increase our standard of living.

That’s part of the story. But it can’t be the whole thing.

Why not, you ask?

Because very few people actually own the capital.

When capital ownership is so heavily concentrated, any increases in productivity due to capital-intensive production can simply be captured by the rich people who own the capital. Competition was supposed to fix this, compelling them to raise wages to match productivity, but we often haven’t actually had competitive markets; we’ve had oligopolies that consolidate market power in a handful of corporations. We had Standard Oil before, and we have Microsoft now. (Did you know that Microsoft not only owns more than half the consumer operating system industry, but after acquiring Activision Blizzard, is now the largest video game company in the world?) In the presence of an oligopoly, the owners of the capital will reap the gains from capital-intensive productivity.

But standards of living did rise. So what happened?

The answer is that production didn’t just become capital-intensive. It became human-capital-intensive.

More and more jobs required skills that an average person didn’t have. This created incentives for expanding public education, making workers not just more productive, but also more aware of how things work and in a stronger bargaining position.

Today, it’s very clear that the jobs which are most human-capital-intensive—like doctors, lawyers, researchers, and software developers—are the ones with the highest pay and the greatest social esteem. (I’m still not 100% sure why stock traders are so well-paid; it really isn’t that hard to be a stock trader. I could write you an algorithm in 50 lines of Python that would beat the average trader (mostly by buying ETFs). But they pretend to be human-capital-intensive by hiring Harvard grads, and they certainly pay as if they are.)

The most capital-intensive industries—like factory work—are reasonably well-paid, but not that well-paid, and actually seem to be rapidly disappearing as the capital simply replaces the workers. Factory worker productivity is now staggeringly high thanks to all this automation, but the workers themselves have gained only a small fraction of this increase in higher wages; by far the bigger effect has been increased profits for the capital owners and reduced employment in manufacturing.

And of course the real money is all in capital ownership. Elon Musk doesn’t have $400 billion because he’s a great engineer who works very hard. He has $400 billion because he owns a corporation that is extremely highly valued (indeed, clearly overvalued) in the stock market. Maybe being a great engineer or working very hard helped him get there, but it was neither necessary nor sufficient (and I’m sure that his dad’s emerald mine also helped).

Indeed, this is why I’m so worried about artificial intelligence.

Most forms of automation replace labor, in the conventional labor-intensive sense: Because you have factory robots, you need fewer factory workers; because you have mountaintop removal, you need fewer coal miners. It takes fewer people to do the same amount of work. But you still need people to plan and direct the process, and in fact those people need to be skilled experts in order to be effective—so there’s a complementarity between automation and human capital.

But AI doesn’t work like that. AI substitutes for human capital. It doesn’t just replace labor; it replaces expertise.

So far, AI is currently too unreliable to replace any but entry-level workers in human-capital-intensive industries (though there is some evidence it’s already doing that). But it will most likely get more reliable over time, if not via the current LLM paradigm, than through the next one that comes after. At some point, AI will come to replace experienced software developers, and then veteran doctors—and I don’t think we’ll be ready.

The long-term pattern here seems to be transitioning away from human-capital-intensive production to purely capital-intensive production. And if we don’t change the fact that capital ownership is heavily concentrated and so many of our markets are oligopolies—which we absolutely do not seem poised to do anything about; Democrats do next to nothing and Republicans actively and purposefully make it worse—then this transition will be a recipe for even more staggering inequality than before, where the rich will get even more spectacularly mind-bogglingly rich while the rest of us stagnate or even see our real standard of living fall.

The tech bros promise us that AI will bring about a utopian future, but that would only work if capital ownership were equally shared. If they continue to own all the AIs, they may get a utopia—but we sure won’t.

We can’t all be Taylor Swift. (And if AI music catches on, she may not be able to much longer either.)

The AI bubble is going to crash hard

PNRJ critique of neoclassical economics, current events, futurism, market failure, public policy , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Sep 7 JDN 2460926

Based on the fact that it only sort of works and yet corps immediately put it in everything, I had long suspected that the current wave of AI was a bubble. But after reading Ed Zitron’s epic takedowns of the entire industry, I am not only convinced it’s a bubble; I’m convinced it is probably the worst bubble we’ve had in a very long time. This isn’t the dot-com crash; it’s worse.

The similarity to the dot-com crash is clear, however: This a huge amount of hype over a new technology that genuinely could be a game-changer (the Internet certainly was!), but won’t be in the time horizon on which the most optimistic investors have assumed it will be. The gap between “it sort of works” and “it radically changes our economy” is… pretty large, actually. It’s not something you close in a few years.


The headline figure here is that based on current projections, US corporations will have spent $560 billion on capital expenditure, for anticipated revenue of only $35 billion.

They won’t pay it off for 16 years!? That kind of payoff rate would make sense for large-scale physical infrastructure, like a hydroelectric dam. It absolutely does not make sense in an industry that is dependent upon cutting-edge technology that wears out fast and becomes obsolete even faster. They must think that revenue is going to increase to something much higher, very soon.

The corps seem to be banking on the most optimistic view of AI: That it will soon—very soon—bring about a radical increase in productivity that brings GDP surging to new heights, or even a true Singularity where AI fundamentally changes the nature of human existence.

Given the kind of errors I’ve seen LLMs make when I tried to use them to find research papers or help me with tedious coding, this is definitely not what’s going to happen. Claude gives an impressive interview, and (with significant guidance and error-correction) it also managed pretty well at making some simple text-based games; but it often recommended papers to me that didn’t exist, and through further experimentation, I discovered that it could not write me a functional C++ GUI if its existence depended on it. Somewhere on the Internet I heard someone describe LLMs as answering not the question you asked directly, but the question, “What would a good answer to this question look like?” and that seems very accurate. It always gives an answer that looks valid—but not necessarily one that is valid.

AI will find some usefulness in certain industries, I’m sure; and maybe the next paradigm (or the one after that) will really, truly, effect a radical change on our society. (Right now the best thing to use LLMs for seems to be cheating at school—and it also seems to be the most common use. Not exactly the great breakthrough we were hoping for.) But LLMs are just not reliable enough to actually use for anything important, and sooner or later, most of the people using them are going to figure that out.

Of course, by the Efficient Roulette Hypothesis, it’s extremely difficult to predict exactly when a bubble will burst, and it could well be that NVIDIA stock will continue to grow at astronomical rates for several years yet—or it could be that the bubble bursts tomorrow and NVIDIA stock collapses, if not to worthless, then to far below its current price.

Krugman has an idea of what might be the point that bursts the bubble: Energy costs. There is a clear mismatch between the anticipated energy needs of these ever-growing data centers and the actual energy production we’ve been installing—especially now that Trump and his ilk have gutted subsidies for solar and wind power. That’s definitely something to watch out for.

But the really scary thing is that the AI bubble actually seems to be the only thing holding the US economy above water right now. It’s the reason why Trump’s terrible policies haven’t been as disastrous as economists predicted they would; our economy is being sustained by this enormous amount of capital investment.

US GDP is about $30 trillion right now, but $500 billion of that is just AI investment. That’s over 1.6%, and last quarter our annualized GDP growth rate was 3.3%—so roughly half of our GDP growth was just due to building more data centers that probably won’t even be profitable.

Between that, the tariffs, the loss of immigrants, and rising energy costs, a crashing AI bubble could bring down the whole stock market with it.

So I guess what I’m saying is: Don’t believe the AI hype, and you might want to sell some stocks.

Solving the student debt problem

PNRJ education, inequality, market failure, politics, public policy, science and academia , , , , , , , ,

Aug 24 JDN 2460912

A lot of people speak about student debt as a “crisis”, which makes it sound like the problem is urgent and will have severe consequences if we don’t soon intervene. I don’t think that’s right. While it’s miserable to be unable to pay your student loans, student loans don’t seem to be driving people to bankruptcy or homelessness the way that medical bills do.

Instead I think what we have here is a long-term problem, something that’s been building for a long time and will slowly but surely continue getting worse if we don’t change course. (I guess you can still call it a “crisis” if you want; climate change is also like this, and arguably a crisis.)

But there is a problem here: Student loan balances are rising much faster than other kinds of debt, and the burden falls the worst on Black women and students who went to for-profit schools. A big part of the problem seems to be predatory schools that charge high prices and make big promises but offer poor results.

Making all this worse is the fact that some of the most important income-based repayment plans were overturned by a federal court, forcing everyone who was on them into forebearance. Income-based repayment was a big reason why student loans actually weren’t as bad a burden as their high loan balances might suggest; unlike a personal loan or a mortgage, if you didn’t have enough income to repay your student loans at the full amount, you could get on a plan that would let you make smaller payments, and if you paid on that plan for long enough—even if it didn’t add up to the full balance—your loans would be forgiven.

Now the forebearance is ending for a lot of borrowers, and so they are going into default; and most of that loan forgiveness has been ruled illegal. (Supposedly this is because Congress didn’t approve it. I’ll believe that was the reason when the courts overrule Trump’s tariffs, which clearly have just as thin a legal justification and will cause far more harm to us and the rest of the world.)

In theory, student loans don’t really seem like a bad idea.

College is expensive, because it requires highly-trained professors, who demand high salaries. (The tuition money also goes other places, of course….)

College is valuable, because it provides you with knowledge and skills that can improve your life and also increase your long-term earnings. It’s a big difference: Median salary for someone with a college degree is about $60k, while median salary for someone with only a high school diploma is about $34k.

Most people don’t have enough liquidity to pay for college.

So, we provide loans, so that people can pay for college, and then when they make more money after graduating, they can pay the loans back.

That’s the theory, anyway.

The problem is that average or even median salaries obscure a lot of variation. Some college graduates become doctors, lawyers, or stockbrokers and make huge salaries. Others can’t find jobs at all. In the absence of income-based repayment plans, all students have to pay back their loans in full, regardless of their actual income after graduation.

There is inherent risk in trying to build a career. Our loan system—especially with the recent changes—puts most of this risk on the student. We treat it as their fault they can’t get a good job, and then punish them with loans they can’t afford to repay.

In fact, right now the job market is pretty badfor recent graduates—while usually unemployment for recent college grads is lower than that of the general population, since about 2018 it has actually been higher. (It’s no longer sky-high like it was during COVID; 4.8% is not bad in the scheme of things.)

Actually the job market may even be worse than it looks, because new hires are actually the lowest rate they’ve been since 2020. Our relatively low unemployment currently seems to reflect a lack of layoffs, not a healthy churn of people entering and leaving jobs. People seem to be locked into their jobs, and if they do leave them, finding another is quite difficult.

What I think we need is a system that makes the government take on more of the risk, instead of the students.

There are lots of ways to do this. Actually, the income-based repayment systems we used to have weren’t too bad.

But there is actually a way to do it without student loans at all. College could be free, paid for by taxes.


Now, I know what you’re thinking: Isn’t this unfair to people who didn’t go to college? Why should they have to pay?

Who said they were paying?

There could simply be a portion of the income tax that you only pay if you have a bachelor’s degree. Then you would only pay this tax if you both graduated from college and make a lot of money.

I don’t think this would create a strong incentive not to get a bachelor’s degree; the benefits of doing so remain quite large, even if your taxes were a bit higher as a result.

It might create incentives to major in subjects that aren’t as closely linked to higher earnings—liberal arts instead of engineering, medicine, law, or business. But this I see as fundamentally a public good: The world needs people with liberal arts education. If the market fails to provide for them, the government should step in.

This plan is not as progressive as Elizabeth Warren’s proposal to use wealth taxes to fund free college; but it might be more politically feasible. The argument that people who didn’t go to college shouldn’t have to pay for people who did actually seems reasonable to me; but this system would ensure that in fact they don’t.

The transfer of wealth here would be from people who went to college and make a lot of money to people who went to college and don’t make a lot of money. It would be the government bearing some of the financial risk of taking on a career in an uncertain world.

I can’t not talk about tariffs right now

PNRJ current events, market failure, politics, public policy , , , , , , , , , ,

Apr 13 JDN 2460779

On the one hand, I’m sure every economics blog on the Internet is already talking about this, including Paul Krugman who knows the subject way better than I ever will (and literally won a Nobel Prize for his work on it). And I have other things I’d rather be writing about, like the Index of Necessary Expenditure. But on the other hand, when something this big happens in economics, it just feels like there’s really no alternative: I have to talk about tariffs right now.

What is a tariff, anyway?

This feels like a really basic question, but it also seems like a lot of people don’t really understand tariffs, or didn’t when they voted for Trump.

A tariff, quite simply, is an import tax. It’s a tax that you impose on imported goods (either a particular kind, or from a particular country, or just across the board). On paper, it is generally paid by the company importing the goods, but as I wrote about in my sequence on tax incidence, that doesn’t matter. What matters is how prices change in response to the tax, and this means that in real terms, prices will go up.

In fact, in some sense that’s the goal of a protectionist tariff, because you’re trying to fix the fact that local producers can’t compete on the global market. So you compensate by making international firms pay higher taxes, so that the local producers can charge higher prices and still compete. So anyone who is saying that tariffs won’t raise prices is either ignorant or lying: Raising prices is what tariffs do.

Why are people so surprised?

The thing that surprises me about all this, (a bit ironically) is how surprised people seem to be. Trump ran his whole campaign promising two things: Deport all the immigrants, and massive tariffs on all trade. Most of his messaging was bizarre and incoherent, but on those two topics he was very consistent. So why in the world are people—including stock traders, who are supposedly savvy on these things—so utterly shocked that he has actually done precisely what he promised he would do?

What did people think Trump meant when he said these things? Did they assume he was bluffing? Did they think cooler heads in his administration would prevail (if so, whose?)?

But I will admit that even I am surprised at just how big the tariffs are. I knew they would be big, but I did not expect them to be this big.

How big?

Well, take a look at this graph:

The average tariff rate on US imports will now be higher than it was at the peak in 1930 with the Smoot-Hawley Act. Moreover, Smoot-Hawley was passed during a time when protectionist tariffs were already in place, while Trump’s tariffs come at a time when tariffs had previously been near zero—so the change is dramatically more sudden.

This is worse than Smoot-Hawley.

For the uninitiated, Smoot-Hawley was a disaster. Several countries retaliated with their own tariffs, and the resulting trade war clearly exacerbated the Great Depression, not only in the US but around the world. World trade dropped by an astonishing 66% over the next few years. It’s still debated as to how much of the depression was caused by the tariffs; most economists believe that the gold standard was the bigger culprit. But it definitely made it worse.

Politically, the aftermath cost the Republicans (including Smoot and Hawley themselves) several seats in Congress. (I guess maybe the silver lining here is we can hope this will do the same?)

And I would now like to remind you that these tariffs are bigger than Smoot-Hawley’s and were implemented more suddenly.

Unlike in 1930, we are not currently in a depression—though nor is our economy as hunky-dory as a lot of pundits seem to think, once we consider things like the Index of Necessary Expenditure. But stock markets do seem to be crashing, and if trade drops as much as it did in the 1930s—and why wouldn’t it?—we may very well end up in another depression.

And it’s not as if we didn’t warn you all. Economists across the political spectrum have been speaking out against Trump’s tariffs from the beginning, and nobody listened to us.

So basically the mood of all economists right now is:

A new theoretical model of co-ops

PNRJ critique of neoclassical economics, inequality, market failure, mathematical models, public policy , , , , , , , , ,

Mar 30 JDN 2460765

A lot of economists seem puzzled by the fact that co-ops are just as efficient as corporate firms, since they have this idea that profit-sharing inevitably results in lower efficiency due to perverse incentives.

I think they’ve been modeling co-ops wrong. Here I present a new model, a very simple one, with linear supply and demand curves. Of course one could make a more sophisticated model, but this should be enough to make the point (and this is just a blog post, not a research paper, after all).

Demand curve is p = a – b q

Marginal cost is f q

There are n workers, who would hold equal shares of the co-op.

Competitive market

First, let’s start with the traditional corporate firm in a competitive market.

Since the market is competitive, price would equal marginal cost would equal wage:

a – b q = d q

q = a/(b+f)

w = d (a/(b+f)) = (a d)/(b+f)

Total profit will be

(p – w)q = 0.

Monopoly firm

In a monopoly, marginal revenue would equal marginal cost:
d[pq]/dq = a – 2 b q

If they are also a monopsonist in the labor market, this marginal cost would be marginal cost of labor, not wage:

d[d q2]/dq = 2 f q

a – 2 b q = 2 f q

q = a/(2b + 2f)

p = a – b q = a (1 – b/(2b + 2f)) = (a (b + 2f))/(2b + 2f)

w = d q = (a f)/(2b + 2f)

Total profit will be

(p – w) q = ((a (b + 2f))/(2b + 2f) – (a f)/(2b + 2f))a/(2b + 2f) = a2/(4b + 2f)

Now consider the co-op.

First, suppose that instead of working for a wage, I work for profit sharing.

If our product market is competitive, we’ll be price-takers, and we will produce until price equals marginal cost:

p = f q

a – b q = f q

q = a/(a+b)

But will we, really? I only get 1/n share of the profits. So let’s see here. My marginal cost of production is still f q, but the marginal benefit I get from more sales may only be p/n.

In that case I would work until:

p/n = f q

(a – b q)/n = fq

a – b q = n f q

q = (a/(b+nf))

Thus I would under-produce. This is the usual argument against co-ops and similar shared ownership.

Co-ops with wages

But that’s not actually how co-ops work. They pay wages. Why do they do that? Well, consider what happens if I am offered a wage as a worker-owner of the co-op.

Is there any reason for the co-op to vote on a wage that is less than the competitive market? No, because owners are workers, so any additional profit from a lower wage would simply be taken from their own wages.

If there any reason for the co-op to vote on a wage that is more than the competitive market? No, because workers are owners, and any surplus lost by paying higher wages would simply be taken from their own profits.

So if the product market is competitive, the co-op will produce the same amount and charge the same price as a firm in perfect competition, even if they have market power over their own wages.

Monopoly co-ops

The argument above doesn’t assume that the co-op has no market power in the labor market. Thus if they are a monopoly in the product market and a monopsony in the labor market, they still pay a competitive wage.

Thus they would set marginal revenue equal to marginal cost:

a – 2 b q = f q

q = a/(2b + f)

The co-op will produce more than the monopoly firm..

This is the new price:

p = a – b q = a(1 – b/(2b+f)) = a(b+f)/(2b + f)

It’s not obvious that this is lower than the price charged by the monopoly firm, but it is.

(a (b + 2f))/(2b + 2f) – a(b+f)/(2b + f) = (a (2b + f)(b + 2f) – 2 a(b+f)2)/(2(b+f)(2b+f))

This is proportional to:

(2b + f)(b + 2f) – 2(b+f)2

2b2 + 5bf + 2f2 – (2b2 + 4bf + 2f2) = bf

So it’s not a large difference, but it’s there. In the presence of market power in the labor market, the co-op is better for consumers, because they get more goods and pay a lower price.

Thus, there is actually no lost efficiency from being a co-op. There is simply much lower inequality, and potentially higher efficiency.

But that’s just in theory.

What do we see in practice?

Exactly that.

Co-ops have the same productivity and efficiency as corporate firms, but they pay higher wages, provide better benefits, and offer collateral benefits to their communities. In fact, they are sometimes more efficient than corporate firms.

Since they’re just as efficient—if not more so—and produce much lower inequality, switching more firms over to co-ops would clearly be a good thing.

Why, then, aren’t co-ops more common?

Because the people who have the money don’t like them.

The biggest barrier facing co-ops is their inability to get financing, because they don’t pay shareholders (so no IPOs) and banks don’t like to lend to them. They tend to make less profit than corporate firms, which offers investors a lower return—instead that money goes to the worker-owners. This lower return isn’t due to inefficiency; it’s just a different distribution of income, more to labor and less to capital.

We will need new financial institutions to support co-ops, such as the Cooperative Fund of New England. And general redistribution of wealth would also help, because if middle class people had more wealth they could afford to finance co-ops. (It would also be good for many other reasons, of course.)

Housing should be cheap

PNRJ core principles, development economics, inequality, macroeconomics, market failure, public policy , , ,

Sep 1 JDN 2460555

We are of two minds about housing in our society. On the one hand, we recognize that shelter is a necessity, and we want it to be affordable for all. On the other hand, we see real estate as an asset, and we want it to appreciate in value and thereby provide a store of wealth. So on the one hand we want it to be cheap, but on the other hand we want it to be expensive. And of course it can’t be both.

This is not a uniquely American phenomenon. As Noah Smith points out, it seems to be how things are done in almost every country in the world. It may be foolish for me to try to turn such a tide. But I’m going to try anyway.

Housing should be cheap.

For some reason, inflation is seen as a bad thing for every other good, necessity and luxury alike; but when it comes to housing in particular—the single biggest expense for almost everyone—suddenly we are conflicted about it, and think that maybe inflation is a good thing actually.

This is because owning a home that appreciates in value provides the illusion of increasing wealth.

Yes, I said illusion. In some particular circumstances it can sometimes increase real wealth, but when housing is getting more expensive everywhere at once (which is basically true), it doesn’t actually increase real wealth—because you still need to have a home. So while you’d get more money if you sold your current home, you’d have to go buy another home that would be just as expensive. That extra wealth is largely imaginary.

In fact, what isn’t an illusion is your increased property tax bill. If you aren’t planning on selling your home any time soon, you should really see its appreciation as a bad thing; now you suddenly owe more in taxes.

Home equity lines of credit complicate this a bit; for some reason we let people collateralize part of the home—even though the whole home is already collateralized with a mortgage to someone else—and thereby turn that largely-imaginary wealth into actual liquid cash. This is just one more way that our financial system is broken; we shouldn’t be offering these lines of credit, just as we shouldn’t be creating mortgage-backed securities. Cleverness is not a virtue in finance; banking should be boring.

But you’re probably still not convinced. So I’d like you to consider a simple thought experiment, where we take either view to the extreme: Make housing 100 times cheaper or 100 times more expensive.

Currently, houses cost about $400,000. So in Cheap World, houses cost $4,000. In Expensive World, they cost $40 million.

In Cheap World, there is no homelessness. Seriously, zero. It would make no sense at all for the government not to simply buy everyone a house. If you want to also buy your own house—or a dozen—go ahead, that’s fine; but you get one for free, paid for by tax dollars, because that’s cheaper than a year of schooling for a high-school student; it’s in fact not much more than what we’d currently spend to house someone in a homeless shelter for a year. So given the choice of offering someone two years at a shelter versus never homeless ever again, it’s pretty obvious we should choose the latter. Thus, in Cheap World, we all have a roof over our heads. And instead of storing their wealth in their homes in Cheap World, people store their wealth in stocks and bonds, which have better returns anyway.

In Expensive World, the top 1% are multi-millionaires who own homes, maybe the top 10% can afford rent, and the remaining 89% of the population are homeless. There’s simply no way to allocate the wealth of our society such that a typical middle class household has $40 million. We’re just not that rich. We probably never will be that rich. It may not even be possible to make a society that rich. In Expensive World, most people live in tents on the streets, because housing has been priced out of reach for all but the richest families.

Cheap World sounds like an amazing place to live. Expensive World is a horrific dystopia. The only thing I changed was the price of housing.


Yes, I changed it a lot; but that was to make the example as clear as possible, and it’s not even as extreme as it probably sounds. At 10% annual growth, 100 times more expensive only takes 49 years. At the current growth rate of housing prices of about 5% per year, it would take 95 years. A century from now, if we don’t fix our housing market, we will live in Expensive World. (Yes, we’ll most likely be richer then too; but will we be that much richer? Median income has not been rising nearly as fast as median housing price. If current trends continue, median income will be 5 times bigger and housing prices will be 100 times bigger—that’s still terrible.)

We’re already seeing something that feels a lot like Expensive World in some of our most expensive cities. San Francisco has ludicrously expensive housing and also a massive homelessness crisis—this is not a coincidence. Homelessness does still exist in more affordable cities, but clearly not at the same crisis level.

I think part of the problem is that people don’t really understand what wealth is. They see the number go up, and they think that means there is more wealth. Real wealth consists in goods, not in prices. The wealth we have is made of real things, not monetary prices. Prices merely decide how wealth is allocated.

A home is wealth, yes. But it’s the same amount of real wealth regardless of what price it has, because what matters is what it’s good for. If you become genuinely richer by selling an appreciated home, you gained that extra wealth from somewhere else; it was not contained within your home. You have appropriated wealth that someone else used to have. You haven’t created wealth; you’ve merely obtained it.

For you as an individual, that may not make a difference; you still get richer. But as a society, it makes all the difference: Moving wealth around doesn’t make our society richer, and all higher prices can do is move wealth around.

This means that rising housing prices simply cannot make our whole society richer. Better houses could do that. More houses could do that. But simply raising the price tag isn’t making our society richer. If it makes anyone richer—which, again, typically it does not—it does so by moving wealth from somewhere else. And since homeowners are generally richer than non-homeowners (even aside from their housing wealth!), more expensive homes means moving wealth from poorer people to richer people—increased inequality.

We used to have affordable housing, just a couple of generations ago. But we may never have truly affordable housing again, because people really don’t like to see that number go down, and they vote for policies accordingly—especially at the local level. Our best hope right now seems to be to keep it from going up faster than the growth rate of income, so that homes don’t become any more unaffordable than they already are.

But frankly I’m not optimistic. I think part of the cyberpunk dystopia we’re careening towards is Expensive World.

Adverse selection and all-you-can-eat

PNRJ core principles, heuristics and biases, market failure, public policy , , , ,

Jul 7 JDN 2460499

The concept of adverse selection is normally associated with finance and insurance, and they certainly do have a lot of important applications there. But finance and insurance are complicated (possibly intentionally?) and a lot of people are intimidated by them, and it turns out there’s a much simpler example of this phenomenon, which most people should find familiar:

All-you-can-eat meals.

At most restaurants, you buy a specific amount of food: One cheeseburger, one large order of fries. But at some, you have another option: You can buy an indeterminate amount of food, as much as you are able to eat at one sitting.

Now think about this from the restaurant’s perspective: How do you price an all-you-can-eat meal and turn a profit? Your cost obviously depends on how much food you need to prepare, but you don’t know exactly how much each customer is going to eat.

Fortunately, you don’t need to! You only need to know how much people will eat on average. As long as the average customer’s meal is worth less than what they paid for it, you will continue to make a profit, even though some customers end up eating more than what they paid for.

Insurance works the same way: Some people will cash in on their insurance, costing the company money; but most will not, providing the company with revenue. In fact, you could think of an all-you-can-eat-meal as a form of food insurance.

So, all you need to do is figure out how much an average person eats in one meal, and price based on that, right?

Wrong. Here’s the problem: The people who eat at your restaurant aren’t a random sample of people. They are specifically the kind of people who eat at all-you-can-eat restaurants.

Someone who eats very little probably won’t want to go to your restaurant very much, because they’ll have to pay a high price for very little food. But someone with a big appetite will go to your restaurant frequently, because they get to eat a large amount of food for that same price.

This means that, on average, your customers will end up eating more than what an average restaurant customer eats. You’ll have to raise the price accordingly—which will make the effect even stronger.

This can end in one of two ways: Either an equilibrium is reached where the price is pretty high and most of the customers have big appetites, or no equilibrium is reached, and the restaurant either goes bankrupt or gets rid of its all-you-can-eat policy.

But there’s basically no way to get the outcome that seems the best, which is a low price and a wide variety of people attending the restaurant. Those who eat very little just won’t show up.

That’s adverse selection. Because there’s no way to charge people who eat more a higher price (other than, you know, not being all-you-can-eat), people will self-select by choosing whether or not to attend, and the people who show up at your restaurant will be the ones with big appetites.

The same thing happens with insurance. Say we’re trying to price health insurance; we don’t just need to know the average medical expenses of our population, even if we know a lot of specific demographic information. People who are very healthy may choose not to buy insurance, leaving us with only the less-healthy people buying our insurance—which will force us to raise the price of our insurance.

Once again, you’re not getting a random sample; you’re getting a sample of the kind of people who buy health insurance.

Obamacare was specifically designed to prevent this, by imposing a small fine on people who choose not to buy health insurance. The goal was to get more healthy people buying insurance, in order to bring the cost down. It worked, at least for awhile—but now that individual mandate has been nullified, so adverse selection will once again rear its ugly head. Had our policymakers better understood this concept, they might not have removed the individual mandate.

Another option might occur to you, analogous to the restaurant: What if we just didn’t offer insurance, and made people pay for all their own healthcare? This would be like the restaurant ending its all-you-can-eat policy and charging for each new serving. Most restaurants do that, so maybe it’s the better option in general?

There are two problems here, one ethical, one economic.

The ethical problem is that people don’t deserve to be sick or injured. They didn’t choose those things. So it isn’t fair to let them suffer or bear all the costs of getting better. As a society, we should share in those costs. We should help people in need. (If you don’t already believe this, I don’t know how to convince you of it. But hopefully most people do already believe this.)

The economic problem is that some healthcare is rarely needed, but very expensive. That’s exactly the sort of situation where insurance makes sense, to spread the cost around. If everyone had to pay for their own care with no insurance at all, then most people who get severe illnesses simply wouldn’t be able to afford it. They’d go massively into debt, go bankrupt—people already do, even with insurance!—and still not even get much of the care they need. It wouldn’t matter that we have good treatments for a lot of cancers now; they are all very expensive, so most people with cancer would be unable to pay for them, and they’d just die anyway.

In fact, the net effect of such a policy would probably be to make us all poorer, because a lot of illness and disability would go untreated, making our workforce less productive. Even if you are very healthy and never need health insurance, it may still be in your own self-interest to support a policy of widespread health insurance, so that sick people get treated and can go back to work.

A world without all-you-can-eat restaurants wouldn’t be so bad. But a world without health insurance would be one in which millions of people suffer needlessly because they can’t afford healthcare.

Why does everyone work full-time?

PNRJ core principles, critique of neoclassical economics, inequality, macroeconomics, market failure, public policy , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Jun 30 JDN 2460492

Over 70% of US workers work “full-time”, that is, at least 40 hours a week. The average number of hours worked per week is 33.8, and the average number of overtime hours is only 3.6. So basically, about 2/3 of workers work almost exactly 40 hours per week.

We’re accustomed to this situation, so it may not seem strange to you. But stop and think for a moment: What are the odds that across every industry, exactly 40 hours per week is the most efficient arrangement?

Indeed, there is mounting evidence that in many industries, 40 hours is too much, and something like 5 or even 30 would actually be more efficient. Yet we continue to work 40-hour weeks.

This looks like a corner solution: Rather than choosing an optimal amount, we’re all up against some kind of constraint.


What’s the constraint? Well, the government requires (for most workers) that anything above 40 hours per week must be paid as overtime, that is, at a higher wage rate. So it looks like we would all be working more than 40 hours per week, but we hit the upper limit due to these regulations.

Does this mean we would be better off without the regulations? Clearly not. As I just pointed out, the evidence is mounting that 40 hours is too much, not too little. But why, then, would we all be trying to work so many hours?

I believe this is yet another example of hyper-competition, where competition drives us to an inefficient outcome.

Employers value employees who work a lot of hours. Indeed, I contend that they do so far more than makes any rational sense; they seem to care more about how many hours you work than about the actual quality or quantity of your output. Maybe this is because hours worked is easier to measure, or because it seems like a fairer estimate of your effort; but for whatever reason, employers really seem to reward employees who work a lot of hours, regardless of almost everything else.

In the absence of a limit on hours worked, then, employers are going to heap rewards on whoever works the most hours, and so people will be pressured to work more and more hours. Then we would all work ourselves to death, and it’s not even clear that this would be good for GDP.

Indeed, this seems to be what happened, before the 40-hour work week became the standard. In the 1800s, the average American worked over 60 hours per week. It wasn’t until the 1940s that 40-hour weeks became the norm.

But speaking of norms, that also seems to be a big factor here. The truth is, overtime isn’t really that expensive, and employers could be smarter about rewarding good work rather than more hours. But once a norm establishes itself in a society, it can be very hard to change. And right now, the norm is that 40 hours is a “normal” “standard” “full” work week—any more is above and beyond, and any less is inferior.

This is a problem, because a lot of people can’t work 40-hour weeks. Our standard for what makes someone “disabled” isn’t that you can’t work at all; it’s that you can’t work as much as society expects. I wonder how many people are currently living on disability who could have been working part-time, but there just weren’t enough part-time jobs available. The employment rate among people with a disability is only 41%, compared to 77% of the general population.

And it’s not that we need to work this much. Our productivity is now staggeringly high: We produce more than five times as much wealth per hour of work than we did as recently as the 1940s. So in theory, we should be able to live just as well while working one-fifth as much… but that’s clearly not what happened.

Keynes accurately predicted our high level of productivity; but he wrongly predicted that we would work less, when instead we just kept right on working almost as hard as before.

Indeed, it doesn’t even seem like we live five times as well while working just as much. Many things are better now—healthcare, entertainment, and of course electronics—but somehow, we really don’t feel like we are living better lives than our ancestors.

The Economic Policy Institute offers an explanation for this phenomenon: Our pay hasn’t kept up with our productivity.


Up until about 1980, productivity and pay rose in lockstep. But then they started to diverge, and they never again converged. Productivity continued to soar, while real wages only barely increased. The result is that since then, productivity has grown by 64%, and hourly pay has only grown 15%.

This is definitely part of the problem, but I think there’s more to it as well. Housing and healthcare have become so utterly unaffordable in this country that it really doesn’t matter that our cars are nice and our phones are dirt cheap. We are theoretically wealthier now, but most of that extra wealth goes into simply staying healthy and having a home. Our consumption has been necessitized.

If we can solve these problems, maybe people won’t feel a need to work so many hours. Or, maybe competition will continue to pressure them to work those hours… but at least we’ll actually feel richer when we do it.

Wrongful beneficence

PNRJ core principles, critique of neoclassical economics, development economics, ethics, inequality, market failure, public policy , , , , , , , ,

Jun 9 JDN 2460471

One of the best papers I’ve ever read—one that in fact was formative in making me want to be an economist—is Wrongful Beneficence by Chris Meyers.

This paper opened my eyes to a whole new class of unethical behavior: Acts that unambiguously make everyone better off, but nevertheless are morally wrong. Hence, wrongful beneficence.

A lot of economists don’t even seem to believe in such things. They seem convinced that as long as no one is made worse off by a transaction, that transaction must be ethically defensible.

Chris Meyers convinced me that they are wrong.

The key insight here is that it’s still possible to exploit someone even if you make them better off. This happens when they are in a desperate situation and you take advantage of that to get an unfair payoff.


Here one of the cases Meyers offers to demonstrate this:

Suppose Carole is driving across the desert on a desolate road when her car breaks down. After two days and two nights without seeing a single car pass by, she runs out of water and feels rather certain that she will perish if not rescued soon. Now suppose that Jason happens to drive down this road and finds Carole. He sees that her situation is rather desperate and that she needs (or strongly desires) to get to the nearest town as soon as possible. So Jason offers her a ride but only on the condition that […] [she gives him] her entire net worth, the title to her house and car, all of her money in the bank, and half of her earnings for the next ten years.

Carole obviously is better off than she would be if Jason hadn’t shown up—she might even have died. She freely consented to this transaction—again, because if she didn’t, she might die. Yet it seems absurd to say that Jason has done nothing wrong by making such an exorbitant demand. If he had asked her to pay for gas, or even to compensate him for his time at a reasonable rate, we’d have no objection. But to ask for her life savings, all her assets, and half her earnings for ten years? Obviously unfair—and obviously unethical. Jason is making Carole (a little) better off while making himself (a lot) better off, so everyone is benefited; but what he’s doing is obviously wrong.

Once you recognize that such behavior can exist, you start to see it all over the place, particularly in markets, where corporations are quite content to gouge their customers with high prices and exploit their workers with low wages—but still, technically, we’re better off than we would be with no products and no jobs at all.

Indeed, the central message of Wrongful Beneficence is actually about sweatshop labor: It’s not that the workers are worse off than they would have been (in general, they aren’t); it’s that they are so desperate that corporations can get away with exploiting them with obviously unfair wages and working conditions.

Maybe it would be easier just to move manufacturing back to First World countries?

Right-wingers are fond of making outlandish claims that making products at First World wages would be utterly infeasible; here’s one claiming that an iPhone would need to cost $30,000 if it were made in the US. In fact, the truth is that it would only need to cost about $40 more—because hardly any of its cost is actually going to labor. Most of its price is pure monopoly profit for Apple; most of the rest is components and raw materials. (Of course, if those also had to come from the US, the price would go up more; but even so, we’re talking something like double its original price, not thirty times. Workers in the US are indeed paid a lot more than workers in China; they are also more productive.)

It’s true that actually moving manufacturing from other countries back to the US would be a substantial undertaking, requiring retooling factories, retraining engineers, and so on; but it’s not like we’ve never done that sort of thing before. I’m sure it could not be done overnight; but of course it could be done. We do this sort of thing all the time.

Ironically, this sort of right-wing nonsense actually seems to feed the far left as well, supporting their conviction that all this prosperity around us is nothing more than an illusion, that all our wealth only exists because we steal it from others. But this could scarcely be further from the truth; our wealth comes from technology, not theft. If we offered a fairer bargain to poorer countries, we’d be a bit less rich, but they would be much less poor—the overall wealth in the world would in fact probably increase.

A better argument for not moving manufacturing back to the First World is that many Third World economies would collapse if they stopped manufacturing things for other countries, and that would be disastrous for millions of people.

And free trade really does increase efficiency and prosperity for all.

So, yes; let’s keep on manufacturing goods wherever it is cheapest to do so. But when we decide what’s cheapest, let’s evaluate that based on genuinely fair wages and working conditions, not the absolute cheapest that corporations think they can get away with.

Sometimes they may even decide that it’s not really cheaper to manufacture in poorer countries, because they need advanced technology and highly-skilled workers that are easier to come by in First World countries. In that case, bringing production back here is the right thing to do.

Of course, this raises the question:

What would be fair wages and working conditions?

That’s not so easy to answer. Since workers in Third World countries are less educated than workers in First World countries, and have access to less capital and worse technology, we should in fact expect them to be less productive and therefore get paid less. That may be unfair in some cosmic sense, but it’s not anyone’s fault, and it’s not any particular corporation’s responsibility to fix it.

But when there are products for which less than 1% of the sales price of the product goes to the workers who actually made the product, something is wrong. When the profit margin is often wildly larger than the total amount spent on labor, something is wrong.

It may be that we will never have precise thresholds we can set to decide what definitely is or is not exploitative; but that doesn’t mean we can’t ever recognize it when we see it. There are various institutional mechanisms we could use to enforce better wages and working conditions without ever making such a sharp threshold.

One of the simplest, in fact, is Fair Trade.

Fair Trade is by no means a flawless system; in fact there’s a lot of research debating how effective it is at achieving its goals. But it does seem to be accomplishing something. And it’s a system that we already have in place, operating successfully in many countries; it simply needs to be scaled up (and hopefully improved along the way).

One of the clearest pieces of evidence that it’s helping, in fact, is that farmers are willing to participate in it. That shows that it is beneficent.

Of course, that doesn’t mean that it’s genuinely fair! This could just be another kind of wrongful beneficence. Perhaps Fair Trade is really just less exploitative than all the available alternatives.

If so, then we need something even better still, some new system that will reliably pass on the increased cost for customers all the way down to increased wages for workers.

Fair Trade shows us something else, too: A lot of customers clearly are willing to pay a bit more in order to see workers treated better. Even if they weren’t, maybe they should be forced to. But the fact is, they are! Even those who are most adamantly opposed to Fair Trade can’t deny that people really are willing to pay more to help other people. (Yet another example of obvious altruism that neoclassical economists somehow manage to ignore.) They simply deny that it’s actually helping, which is an empirical matter.

But if this isn’t helping enough, fine; let’s find something else that does.