You call this a hobby?

Nov 9 JDN 2460989

A review of Politics is for Power by Eitan Hersch

This week, there was an election. It’s a minor midterm election—since it’s an odd-numbered year, many places don’t even have any candidates on the ballot—and as a result, turnout will surely be low. Eitan Hersch has written a book about why that’s a bad thing, and how it is symptomatic of greater problems in our civic culture as a whole.

Buried somewhere in this book, possible to find through committed, concerted effort, there is a book that could have had a large positive effect on our political system, our civic discourse, and our society as a whole. Sadly, Dr. Hersch buried it so well that most people will never find it.

In particular, he starts the booknot even on the first page, but on the cover—by actively alienating his core audience with what seems to be the very utmost effort he can muster.


Yes, even the subtitle is condescending and alienating:

How to Move Beyond Political Hobbyism, Take Action, and Make Real Change

And of course it’s not just there; on page after page he drives the dagger deeper and twists it as hard as he can, repeating the accusation over and over:

This is just a hobby for you. It doesn’t really mean anything.

Today’s hobbyists possess the negative qualities of the amateurs—hyperemotional engagement, obsession with national politics, an insatiable appetite for debate—and none of the amateur’s positive qualities—the neighborhood meetings, the concrete goals, the leadership.

– p.9

You hear that? You’re worse than an amateur. This is on page 9. Page 9.

[…] Much of the time we spend on politics is best described as an inward-focused leisure activity for people who like politics.

We may not easily concede that we are doing politics for fun.[…]

-p. 14

See? You may say it’s not really just for fun, but you’re lying. You’re failing to concede the truth.

To the political hobbyist, news is a form of entertainment and needs to be fun.

-p.19

You hear me? This is fun for you. You’re enjoying this. You’re doing it for yourself.

The real explanation for the dynamics of voter turnout is that we treat politics like a game and follow the spectacle. Turnout is high in presidential elections compared to other US elections in the same way that football viewership is high when the Super Bowl is on. Many people who do not like football or even know the rules of the game end up at a Super Bowl party. They’re there for the commercials, the guacamole, and to be part of a cultural moment. That’s why turnout is high in presidential elections. Without the spectacle, even people who say they care about voting don’t show up.

-p. 48

This is all a game. It’s not real. You don’t really care.

I could go on; he keeps repeating this message—this insult, this accusation—throughout the book. He tells you, over and over, that if you are not already participating in politics in the very particular way he wants you to (and he may even be right that it would be better!), you are a selfish liar, and you are treating what should be vitally important as just meaningless entertainment.

This made it honestly quite painful to get through the book. Several times, I was tempted to just give up and put it back on the shelf. But I’m glad I didn’t, because there are valuable insights about effective grassroots political activism buried within this barrage of personal accusations.

I guess Hersch must not see this as a personal accusation; at one point, he acknowledges that people might find it insulting, but (1) doesn’t seem to care and (2) makes no effort to inquire as to why we might feel that way; in fact, he manages to twist the knife just a little deeper in that very same passage:

For the non-self-identifying junkies, the term political hobbyist can be insulting. Given how important politics is, it doesn’t feel good to call one’s political activity a hobby. The term is also insulting, I have learned, to real hobbyists, who see hobbies as activities with much more depth than the online bickering or addictive news consumption I’m calling a hobby.

-p. 88

You think calling it a “hobby” is insulting? Yeah, well, it’s worse than that, so ha!

But let me tell you something about my own experience of politics. (Actually, one of Hersch’s central messages is that sharing personal experiences is one of the most powerful political tools I know.)

How do most people I know feel about politics, since, oh, say… November 2016?

ABSOLUTE HORROR AND DESPAIR.

For every queer person I know, every trans person, every immigrant, every woman, every person of color, and for plenty of White cishet liberal guys too, the election of President Donald Trump was traumatic. It felt like a physical injury. People who had recovered from depression were thrust back into it. People felt physically nauseated. And especially for immigrants and trans people, people literally feared for their lives and were right to do so.

WHATEVER THIS IS, IT IS NOT A HOBBY.

I’ve had to talk people down from psychotic episodes and suicidal ideation because of this, and you have the fucking audacity to tell me that we’re doing this for fun!?

If someone feared for their life because their team lost the Super Bowl, we would rightfully recognize that as an utterly pathological response. But I know a whole bunch of folks on student visas that are constantly afraid of being kidnapped and taken away by masked men with guns, because that is a thing that has actually happened to other people who were in this country on student visas. I know a whole bunch of trans folks who are afraid of assaulted or even killed for using the wrong bathroom, because that is a thing that actually happens to trans people in this country.

I wish I could tell these people—many of them dear friends of mine—that they are wrong to fear, that they are safe, that everything will be all right. But as long as Donald Trump is in power and the Republicans in Congress and the right-wing Supreme Court continue to enable him, I can’t tell them that, because I would be lying; the danger is real. All I can do is tell them that it is probably not as great a danger as they fear, and that if there is any way I can help them, I am willing to do so.

Indeed, politics for me and those closest to me is so obviously so much not a hobby that repeatedly insisting that I admit that it is starts to feel like gaslighting. I feel like I’m in a struggle session or something: “Admit you are a hobbyist! Repent!”

I don’t know; maybe there are people for whom politics is just a hobby. Maybe the privileged cishet White kids at Tufts that Dr. Hersch lectures to are genuinely so removed from the consequences of public policy that they can engage with politics at their leisure and for their own entertainment. (A lot of the studies he cites are specifically about undergrads; I know this is a thing in pretty much all social science… but maybe undergrads are in fact not a very representative sample of political behavior?) But even so, some of the international students in those lecture halls (11% of Tufts undergrads and 17% of Tufts grads) probably feel pretty differently, I have to imagine.

In fact, maybe genuine political hobbyism is a widespread phenomenon, and its existence explains a lot of otherwise really baffling things about the behavior of our electorate (like how the same districts could vote for both Donald Trump and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez). I don’t find that especially plausible given my own experience, but I’m an economist, not a political scientist, so I do feel like I should offer some deference to the experts on this matter. (And I’m well aware that my own social network is nothing like a representative sample of the American electorate.)

But I can say this for sure:

The target audience of this book is not doing this as a hobby.

Someone who picks up a book by a political scientist hoping for guidance as to how to make their own political engagement more effective is not someone who thinks this is all a game. They are not someone who is engaging with politics as a fun leisure activity. They are someone who cares. They are someone who thinks this stuff matters.

By construction, the person who reads this book to learn about how to make change wants to make change.

So maybe you should acknowledge that at some point in your 200 pages of text? Maybe after spending all these words talking about how having empathy is such an important trait in political activism, you should have some empathy for your audience?

Hersch does have some useful advice to give, buried in all this.

His core message is basically that we need more grassroots activism: Small groups of committed people, acting in their communities. Not regular canvassing, which he acknowledges as terrible (and as well he should; I’ve done it, and it is), but deep canvassing, which also involves going door to door but is really a fundamentally different process.

Actually, he seems to love grassroots organizing so much that he’s weirdly nostalgic for the old days of party bosses. Several times, he acknowledges that these party bosses were corrupt, racist, and utterly unaccountable, but after every such acknowledgment he always follows it up with some variation on “but at least they got things done”.

He’s honestly weirdly dismissive of other forms of engagement, though. Like, I expected him to be dismissive of “slacktivism” (though I am not), if for no other reason than the usual generational curmudgeonry. But he’s also weirdly dismissive of donations and even… honestly… voting? He doesn’t even seem interested in encouraging people to vote more. He doesn’t seem to think that get-out-the-vote campaigns are valuable.

I guess as a political scientist, he’s probably very familiar with the phenomenon of “low information voters”, who frequently swing elections despite being either clueless or actively misled. And okay, maybe turning out those people isn’t all that useful, at least if it’s not coupled with also educating them and correcting their misconceptions. But surely it’s not hobbyism to vote? Surely doing the one most important thing in a democratic system isn’t treating this like a game?

In his section on donations, he takes two tacks against them:

The first is to say that rich donors who pay $10,000 a plate for fancy dinners really just want access to politicians for photo ops. I don’t think that’s right, but the truth is admittedly not much better: I think they want access to politicians to buy influence. This is “political engagement” in some sense—you’re acting to exert power—but it’s corrupt, and it’s the source of an enormous amount of damage to our society—indeed to our planet itself. But I think Hersch has to deny that the goal is influence, because that would in fact be “politics for power”, and in order to remain fiercely non-partisan throughout (which, honestly, probably is a good strategic move), he carefully avoids ever saying that anyone exerting political power is bad.

Actually the closest he gets to admitting his own political beliefs (surprise, the Massachusetts social science professor is a center-left liberal!) comes in a passage where he bemoans the fact that… uh… Democrats… aren’t… corrupt enough? If you don’t believe me, read it for yourself:

The hobbyist motivation among wealthy donors is also problematic for a reason that doesn’t have a parallel in the nonprofit world: Partisan asymmetry. Unlike Democratic donors, Republican donors typically support politicians whose policy priorities align with a wealthy person’s financial interests. The donors can view donations as an investment. When Schaffner and I asked max-out donors why they made their contribution, many more Republicans than Democrats said that a very or extremely important reason for their gift was that the politician could affect the donor’s own industry (37 percent of Republicans versus 22 percent of Democrats).

This asymmetry puts Democrats at a disadvantage. Not motivated by their own bottom line, Democratic donors instead have to be motivated by ideology, issues, or even by the entertainment value that a donation provides.

-p.80

Yes, God forbid they be motivated by issues or ideology. That would involve caring about other people. Clearly only naked self-interest and the profit motive could ever be a good reason for political engagement! (Quick question: You haven’t been, uh, reading a lot of… neoclassical economists lately, have you? Why? Oh, no reason.) Oh why can’t Democrats just be more like Republicans, and use their appallingly vast hoards of money to make sure that we cut social services and deregulate everything until the polluted oceans flood the world!?

The second is to say that the much broader population who makes small donations of $25 or $50 is “ideologically extreme” compared to the rest of the population, which is true, but seems to me utterly unsurprising. The further the world is from how you’d like to see it, the greater the value is to you of changing the world, and therefore the more you should be willing to invest into making that change—or even into a small probability of possibly making that change. If you think things are basically okay, why would you pay money to try to make them different? (I guess maybe you’d try to pay money to keep them the same? But even so-called “conservatives” never actually seem to campaign on that.)

I also don’t really see “ideologically extreme” as inherently a bad thing.

Sure, some extremists are very bad: Nazis are extreme and bad (weird that this seems controversial these days), Islamists are extreme and bad, Christian nationalists are extreme and bad, tankie leftists are extreme and bad.

But vegetarians—especially vegans—are also “ideologically extreme”, but quite frankly we are objectively correct, and maybe don’t even go far enough (I only hope that future generations will forgive me for my cheese). Everyone knows that animals can suffer, and everyone who is at all informed knows that factory farms make them suffer severely. The “moderate” view that all this horrible suffering is justifiable in the name of cheap ground beef and chicken nuggets is a fundamentally immoral one. (Maybe I could countenance a view that free-range humane meat farming is acceptable, but even that is far removed from our current political center.)

Trans activism is in some sense “ideologically extreme”—and frequently characterized as such—but it basically amounts to saying that the human rights of free expression, bodily autonomy, and even just personal safety outweigh other people’s narrow, blinkered beliefs about sex and gender. Okay, maybe we can make some sort of compromise on trans kids in sports (because why should I care about sports?), and I’m okay with gender-neutral bathrooms instead of letting trans women in women’s rooms (because gender-neutral bathrooms give more privacy and safety anyway!), and the evidence on the effects of puberty blockers and hormones is complicated (which is why it should be decided by doctors and scientists, not by legislators!), but in our current state, trans people die to murder and suicide at incredibly alarming rates. The only “moderate” position here is to demand, at minimum, enforced laws against discrimination and hate crimes. (Also, calling someone by the name and pronouns they ask you to costs you basically nothing. Failing to do that is not a brave ideological stand; it’s just you being rude and obnoxious. Indeed, since it can trigger dysphoria, it’s basically like finding out someone’s an arachnophobe and immediately putting a spider in their hair.)

Open borders is regarded as so “ideologically extreme” that even the progressive Democrats won’t touch it, despite the fact that I literally am not aware of a single ethical philosopher in the 21st century who believes that our current system of immigration control is morally justifiable. Even the ones who favor “closed borders” in principle are almost unanimous that our current system is cruel and racist. The Lifeboat Theory is ridiculous; allowing immigrants in wouldn’t kill us, it would just maybe—maybe—make us a little worse off. Their lives may be at stake, but ours are not. We are not keeping people out of a lifeboat so it doesn’t sink; we are keeping them out of a luxury cruise liner so it doesn’t get dirty and crowded.

Indeed, even so-called “eco-terrorists”, who are not just ideologically extreme but behaviorally extreme as well, don’t even really seem that bad. They are really mostly eco-vandals; they destroy property, they don’t kill people. There is some risk to life and limb involved in tree spiking or blowing up a pipeline, but the goal is clearly not to terrorize people; it’s to get them to stop doing a particular thing—a particular thing that they in fact probably should stop doing. I guess I understand why this behavior has to be illegal and punished as such; but morally, I’m not even sure it’s wrong. We may not be able to name or even precisely count the children saved who would have died if that pipeline had been allowed to continue pumping oil and thus spewing carbon emissions, but that doesn’t make them any less real.

So really, if anything, the problem is not “extremism” in some abstract sense, but particular beliefs and ideologies, some of which are not even regarded as extreme. A stronger vegan lobby would not be harmful to America, however “extreme” they might be, and a strong Republican lobby, however “mainstream” it is perceived to be, is rapidly destroying our nation on a number of different levels.

Indeed, in parts of the book, it almost seems like Hersch is advocating in some Nietzschean sense for power for its own sake. I don’t think that’s really his intention; I think he means to empower the currently disempowered, for the betterment of society as a whole. But his unwillingness to condemn rich Republicans who donate the maximum allowed in order to get their own industry deregulated is at least… problematic, as both political activists and social scientists are wont to say.

I’m honestly not even sure that empowering the disempowered is what we need right now. I think a lot of the disempowered are also terribly misinformed, and empowering them might actually make things worse. In fact, I think the problem with the political effect of social media isn’t that it has failed to represent the choices of the electorate, but that it has represented them all too well and most people are really, really bad—just, absolutely, shockingly, appallingly bad—at making good political choices. They have wildly wrong beliefs about really basic policy questions, and often think that politicians’ platforms are completely different from what they actually are. I don’t go quite as far as this article by Dan Williams in Conspicuous Cognition, but it makes some really good points I can’t ignore. Democracy is currently failing to represent the interests of a great many Americans, but a disturbingly large proportion of this failure must be blamed on a certain—all too large—segment of the American populace itself.

I wish this book had been better.

More grassroots organizing does seem like a good thing! And there is some advice in this book about how to do it better—though in my opinion, not nearly enough. A lot of what Hersch wants to see happen would require tremendous coordination between huge numbers of people, which almost seems like saying “politics would be better if enough people were better about politics”. What I wanted to hear more about was what I can do; if voting and donating and protesting and blogging isn’t enough, what should I be doing? How do I make it actually work? It feels like Hersch spent so long trying to berate me for being a “hobbyist” that he forgot to tell me what he actually thinks I should be doing.

I am fully prepared to believe that online petitions and social media posts don’t accomplish much politically. (Indeed, I am fully prepared to believe that blogging doesn’t accomplish much politically.) I am open to hearing what other options are available, and eager for guidance about how to have the most effective impact.

But could you please, please not spend half the conversation repeatedly accusing me of not caring!?

Taylor Swift and the means of production

Oct 5 JDN 2460954

This post is one I’ve been meaning to write for awhile, but current events keep taking precedence.

In 2023, Taylor Swift did something very interesting from an economic perspective, which turns out to have profound implications for our economic future.

She re-recorded an entire album and released it through a different record company.

The album was called 1989 (Taylor’s Version), and she created it because for the last four years she had been fighting with Big Machine Records over the rights to her previous work, including the original album 1989.

A Marxist might well say she seized the means of production! (How rich does she have to get before she becomes bourgeoisie, I wonder? Is she already there, even though she’s one of a handful of billionaires who can truly say they were self-made?)

But really she did something even more interesting than that. It was more like she said:

Seize the means of production? I am the means of production.”

Singing and songwriting are what is known as a human-capital-intensive industry. That is, the most important factor of production is not land, or natural resources, or physical capital (yes, you need musical instruments, amplifiers, recording equipment and the like—but these are a small fraction of what it costs to get Talor Swift for a concert), or even labor in the ordinary sense. It’s one where so-called (honestly poorly named) “human capital” is the most important factor of production.

A labor-intensive industry is one where you just need a lot of work to be done, but you can get essentially anyone to do it: Cleaning floors is labor-intensive. A lot of construction work is labor-intensive (though excavators and the like also make it capital-intensive).

No, for a human-capital-intensive industry, what you need is expertise or talent. You don’t need a lot of people doing back-breaking work; you need a few people who are very good at doing the specific thing you need to get done.

Taylor Swift was able to re-record and re-release her songs because the one factor of production that couldn’t be easily substituted was herself. Big Machine Records overplayed their hand; they thought they could control her because they owned the rights to her recordings. But she didn’t need her recordings; she could just sing the songs again.

But now I’m sure you’re wondering: So what?

Well, Taylor Swift’s story is, in large part, the story of us all.

For most of the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries, human beings in developed countries saw a rapid increase in their standard of living.

Yes, a lot of countries got left behind until quite recently.

Yes, this process seems to have stalled in the 21st century, with “real GDP” continuing to rise but inequality and cost of living rising fast enough that most people don’t feel any richer (and I’ll get to why that may be the case in a moment).

But for millions of people, the gains were real, and substantial. What was it that brought about this change?

The story we are usually told is that it was capital; that as industries transitioned from labor-intensive to capital-intensive, worker productivity greatly increased, and this allowed us to increase our standard of living.

That’s part of the story. But it can’t be the whole thing.

Why not, you ask?

Because very few people actually own the capital.

When capital ownership is so heavily concentrated, any increases in productivity due to capital-intensive production can simply be captured by the rich people who own the capital. Competition was supposed to fix this, compelling them to raise wages to match productivity, but we often haven’t actually had competitive markets; we’ve had oligopolies that consolidate market power in a handful of corporations. We had Standard Oil before, and we have Microsoft now. (Did you know that Microsoft not only owns more than half the consumer operating system industry, but after acquiring Activision Blizzard, is now the largest video game company in the world?) In the presence of an oligopoly, the owners of the capital will reap the gains from capital-intensive productivity.

But standards of living did rise. So what happened?

The answer is that production didn’t just become capital-intensive. It became human-capital-intensive.

More and more jobs required skills that an average person didn’t have. This created incentives for expanding public education, making workers not just more productive, but also more aware of how things work and in a stronger bargaining position.

Today, it’s very clear that the jobs which are most human-capital-intensive—like doctors, lawyers, researchers, and software developers—are the ones with the highest pay and the greatest social esteem. (I’m still not 100% sure why stock traders are so well-paid; it really isn’t that hard to be a stock trader. I could write you an algorithm in 50 lines of Python that would beat the average trader (mostly by buying ETFs). But they pretend to be human-capital-intensive by hiring Harvard grads, and they certainly pay as if they are.)

The most capital-intensive industries—like factory work—are reasonably well-paid, but not that well-paid, and actually seem to be rapidly disappearing as the capital simply replaces the workers. Factory worker productivity is now staggeringly high thanks to all this automation, but the workers themselves have gained only a small fraction of this increase in higher wages; by far the bigger effect has been increased profits for the capital owners and reduced employment in manufacturing.

And of course the real money is all in capital ownership. Elon Musk doesn’t have $400 billion because he’s a great engineer who works very hard. He has $400 billion because he owns a corporation that is extremely highly valued (indeed, clearly overvalued) in the stock market. Maybe being a great engineer or working very hard helped him get there, but it was neither necessary nor sufficient (and I’m sure that his dad’s emerald mine also helped).

Indeed, this is why I’m so worried about artificial intelligence.

Most forms of automation replace labor, in the conventional labor-intensive sense: Because you have factory robots, you need fewer factory workers; because you have mountaintop removal, you need fewer coal miners. It takes fewer people to do the same amount of work. But you still need people to plan and direct the process, and in fact those people need to be skilled experts in order to be effective—so there’s a complementarity between automation and human capital.

But AI doesn’t work like that. AI substitutes for human capital. It doesn’t just replace labor; it replaces expertise.

So far, AI is currently too unreliable to replace any but entry-level workers in human-capital-intensive industries (though there is some evidence it’s already doing that). But it will most likely get more reliable over time, if not via the current LLM paradigm, than through the next one that comes after. At some point, AI will come to replace experienced software developers, and then veteran doctors—and I don’t think we’ll be ready.

The long-term pattern here seems to be transitioning away from human-capital-intensive production to purely capital-intensive production. And if we don’t change the fact that capital ownership is heavily concentrated and so many of our markets are oligopolies—which we absolutely do not seem poised to do anything about; Democrats do next to nothing and Republicans actively and purposefully make it worse—then this transition will be a recipe for even more staggering inequality than before, where the rich will get even more spectacularly mind-bogglingly rich while the rest of us stagnate or even see our real standard of living fall.

The tech bros promise us that AI will bring about a utopian future, but that would only work if capital ownership were equally shared. If they continue to own all the AIs, they may get a utopia—but we sure won’t.

We can’t all be Taylor Swift. (And if AI music catches on, she may not be able to much longer either.)

Reflections on the Charlie Kirk assassination

Sep 28 JDN 2460947

No doubt you are well aware that Charlie Kirk was shot and killed on September 10. His memorial service was held on September 21, and filled a stadium in Arizona.

There have been a lot of wildly different takes on this event. It’s enough to make you start questioning your own sanity. So while what I have to say may not be that different from what Krugman (or for that matter Jacobin) had to say, I still thought I would try to contribute to the small part of the conversation that’s setting the record straight.

First of all, let me say that this is clearly a political assassination, and as a matter of principle, that kind of thing should not be condoned in a democracy.

The whole point of a democratic system is that we don’t win by killing or silencing our opponents, we win by persuading or out-voting them. As long as someone is not engaging in speech acts that directly command or incite violence (like, say, inciting people to attack the Capitol), they should be allowed to speak in peace; even abhorrent views should be not be met with violence.

Free speech isn’t just about government censorship (though that is also a major problem right now); it’s a moral principle that underlies the foundation of liberal democracy. We don’t resolve conflicts with violence unless absolutely necessary.

So I want to be absolutely clear about this: Killing Charlie Kirk was not acceptable, and the assassin should be tried in a court of law and, if duly convicted, imprisoned for a very long time.

Second of all, we still don’t know the assassin’s motive, so stop speculating until we do.

At first it looked like the killer was left-wing. Then it looked like maybe he was right-wing. Now it looks like maybe he’s left-wing again. Maybe his views aren’t easily categorized that way; maybe he’s an anarcho-capitalist, or an anarcho-communist, or a Scientologist. I won’t say it doesn’t matter; it clearly does matter. But we simply do not know yet.

There is an incredibly common and incredibly harmful thing that people do after any major crime: They start spreading rumors and speculating about things that we actually know next to nothing about. Stop it. Don’t contribute to that.


The whole reason we have a court system is to actually figure out the real truth, which takes a lot of time and effort. The courts are one American institution that’s actually still functioning pretty well in this horrific cyberpunk/Trumpistan era; let them do their job.

It could be months or years before we really fully understand what happened here. Accept that. You don’t need to know the answer right now, and it’s far more dangerous to think you know the answer when you actually don’t.

But finally, I need to point out that Charlie Kirk was an absolutely abhorrent, despicable husk of a human being and no one should be honoring him.

First of all, he himself advocated for political violence against his opponents. I won’t say anyone deserves what happened to him—but if anyone did, it would be him, because he specifically rallied his followers to do exactly this sort of thing to other people.

He was also bigoted in almost every conceivable way: Racist, sexist, ableist, homophobic, and of course transphobic. He maintained a McCarthy-esque list of college professors that he encouraged people to harass for being too left-wing. He was a covert White supremacist, and only a little bit covert. He was not covert at all about his blatant sexism and misogyny that seems like it came from the 1950s instead of the 2020s.

He encouraged his—predominantly White, male, straight, cisgender, middle-class—audience to hate every marginalized group you can think of: women, people of color, LGBT people, poor people, homeless people, people with disabilities. Not content to merely be an abhorrent psychopath himself, he actively campaigned against the concept of empathy.

Charlie Kirk deserves no honors. The world is better off without him. He made his entire career out of ruining the lives of innocent people and actively making the world a worse place.

It was wrong to kill Charlie Kirk. But if you’re sad he’s gone, what is wrong with you!?

For my mother, on her 79th birthday

Sep 21 JDN 2460940

When this post goes live, it will be mother’s 79th birthday. I think birthdays are not a very happy time for her anymore.

I suppose nobody really likes getting older; children are excited to grow up, but once you hit about 25 or 26 (the age at which you can rent a car at the normal rate and the age at which you have to get your own health insurance, respectively) and it becomes “getting older” instead of “growing up”, the excitement rapidly wears off. Even by 30, I don’t think most people are very enthusiastic about their birthdays. Indeed, for some people, I think it might be downhill past 21—you wanted to become an adult, but you had no interest in aging beyond that point.

But I think it gets worse as you get older. As you get into your seventies and eighties, you begin to wonder which birthday will finally be your last; actually I think my mother has been wondering about this even earlier than that, because her brothers died in their fifties, her sister died in her sixties, and my father died at 63. At this point she has outlived a lot of people she loved. I think there is a survivor’s guilt that sets in: “Why do I get to keep going, when they didn’t?”

These are also very hard times in general; Trump and the people who enable him have done tremendous damage to our government, our society, and the world at large in a shockingly short amount of time. It feels like all the safeguards we were supposed to have suddenly collapsed and we gave free rein to a madman.

But while there are many loved ones we have lost, there are many we still have; and nor need our set of loved ones be fixed, only to dwindle with each new funeral. We can meet new people, and they can become part of our lives. New children can be born into our family, and they can make our family grow. It is my sincere hope that my mother still has grandchildren yet to meet; in my case they would probably need to be adopted, as the usual biological route is pretty much out of the question, and surrogacy seems beyond our budget for the foreseeable future. But we would still love them, and she could still love them, and it is worth sticking around in this world in order to be a part of their lives.

I also believe that this is not the end for American liberal democracy. This is a terrible time, no doubt. Much that we thought would never happen already has, and more still will. It must be so unsettling, so uncanny, for someone who grew up in the triumphant years after America helped defeat fascism in Europe, to grow older and then see homegrown American fascism rise ascendant here. Even those of us who knew history all too well still seem doomed to repeat it.

At this point it is clear that victory over corruption, racism, and authoritarianism will not be easy, will not be swift, may never be permanent—and is not even guaranteed. But it is still possible. There is still enough hope left that we can and must keep fighting for an America worth saving. I do not know when we will win; I do not even know for certain that we will, in fact, win. But I believe we will.

I believe that while it seems powerful—and does everything it can to both promote that image and abuse what power it does have—fascism is a fundamentally weak system, a fundamentally fragile system, which simply cannot sustain itself once a handful of critical leaders are dead, deposed, or discredited. Liberal democracy is kinder, gentler—and also slower, at times even clumsier—than authoritarianism, and so it may seem weak to those whose view of strength is that of the savanna ape or the playground bully; but this is an illusion. Liberal democracy is fundamentally strong, fundamentally resilient. There is power in kindness, inclusion, and cooperation that the greedy and cruel cannot see. Fascism in Germany arrived and disappeared within a generation; democracy in America has stood for nearly 250 years.

We don’t know how much more time we have, Mom; none of us do. I have heard it said that you should live your life as though you will live both a short life and a long one; but honestly, you should probably live your life as though you will live a randomly-decided amount of time that is statistically predicted by actuarial tables—because you will. Yes, the older you get, the less time you have left (almost tautologically); but especially in this age of rapid technological change, none of us really know whether we’ll die tomorrow or live another hundred years.

I think right now, you feel like there isn’t much left to look forward to. But I promise you there is. Maybe it’s hard to see right now; indeed, maybe you—or I, or anyone—won’t even ever get to see it. But a brighter future is possible, and it’s worth it to keep going, especially if there’s any way that we might be able to make that brighter future happen sooner.

Solving the student debt problem

Aug 24 JDN 2460912

A lot of people speak about student debt as a “crisis”, which makes it sound like the problem is urgent and will have severe consequences if we don’t soon intervene. I don’t think that’s right. While it’s miserable to be unable to pay your student loans, student loans don’t seem to be driving people to bankruptcy or homelessness the way that medical bills do.

Instead I think what we have here is a long-term problem, something that’s been building for a long time and will slowly but surely continue getting worse if we don’t change course. (I guess you can still call it a “crisis” if you want; climate change is also like this, and arguably a crisis.)

But there is a problem here: Student loan balances are rising much faster than other kinds of debt, and the burden falls the worst on Black women and students who went to for-profit schools. A big part of the problem seems to be predatory schools that charge high prices and make big promises but offer poor results.

Making all this worse is the fact that some of the most important income-based repayment plans were overturned by a federal court, forcing everyone who was on them into forebearance. Income-based repayment was a big reason why student loans actually weren’t as bad a burden as their high loan balances might suggest; unlike a personal loan or a mortgage, if you didn’t have enough income to repay your student loans at the full amount, you could get on a plan that would let you make smaller payments, and if you paid on that plan for long enough—even if it didn’t add up to the full balance—your loans would be forgiven.

Now the forebearance is ending for a lot of borrowers, and so they are going into default; and most of that loan forgiveness has been ruled illegal. (Supposedly this is because Congress didn’t approve it. I’ll believe that was the reason when the courts overrule Trump’s tariffs, which clearly have just as thin a legal justification and will cause far more harm to us and the rest of the world.)

In theory, student loans don’t really seem like a bad idea.

College is expensive, because it requires highly-trained professors, who demand high salaries. (The tuition money also goes other places, of course….)

College is valuable, because it provides you with knowledge and skills that can improve your life and also increase your long-term earnings. It’s a big difference: Median salary for someone with a college degree is about $60k, while median salary for someone with only a high school diploma is about $34k.

Most people don’t have enough liquidity to pay for college.

So, we provide loans, so that people can pay for college, and then when they make more money after graduating, they can pay the loans back.

That’s the theory, anyway.

The problem is that average or even median salaries obscure a lot of variation. Some college graduates become doctors, lawyers, or stockbrokers and make huge salaries. Others can’t find jobs at all. In the absence of income-based repayment plans, all students have to pay back their loans in full, regardless of their actual income after graduation.

There is inherent risk in trying to build a career. Our loan system—especially with the recent changes—puts most of this risk on the student. We treat it as their fault they can’t get a good job, and then punish them with loans they can’t afford to repay.

In fact, right now the job market is pretty badfor recent graduates—while usually unemployment for recent college grads is lower than that of the general population, since about 2018 it has actually been higher. (It’s no longer sky-high like it was during COVID; 4.8% is not bad in the scheme of things.)

Actually the job market may even be worse than it looks, because new hires are actually the lowest rate they’ve been since 2020. Our relatively low unemployment currently seems to reflect a lack of layoffs, not a healthy churn of people entering and leaving jobs. People seem to be locked into their jobs, and if they do leave them, finding another is quite difficult.

What I think we need is a system that makes the government take on more of the risk, instead of the students.

There are lots of ways to do this. Actually, the income-based repayment systems we used to have weren’t too bad.

But there is actually a way to do it without student loans at all. College could be free, paid for by taxes.


Now, I know what you’re thinking: Isn’t this unfair to people who didn’t go to college? Why should they have to pay?

Who said they were paying?

There could simply be a portion of the income tax that you only pay if you have a bachelor’s degree. Then you would only pay this tax if you both graduated from college and make a lot of money.

I don’t think this would create a strong incentive not to get a bachelor’s degree; the benefits of doing so remain quite large, even if your taxes were a bit higher as a result.

It might create incentives to major in subjects that aren’t as closely linked to higher earnings—liberal arts instead of engineering, medicine, law, or business. But this I see as fundamentally a public good: The world needs people with liberal arts education. If the market fails to provide for them, the government should step in.

This plan is not as progressive as Elizabeth Warren’s proposal to use wealth taxes to fund free college; but it might be more politically feasible. The argument that people who didn’t go to college shouldn’t have to pay for people who did actually seems reasonable to me; but this system would ensure that in fact they don’t.

The transfer of wealth here would be from people who went to college and make a lot of money to people who went to college and don’t make a lot of money. It would be the government bearing some of the financial risk of taking on a career in an uncertain world.

Conflict without shared reality

Aug 17 JDN 2460905

Donald Trump has federalized the police in Washington D.C. and deployed the National Guard. He claims he is doing this in response to a public safety emergency and crime that is “out of control”.

Crime rates in Washington, D.C. are declining and overall at their lowest level in 30 years. Its violent crime rate has not been this low since the 1960s.

By any objective standard, there is no emergency here. Crime in D.C. is not by any means out of control.

Indeed, across the United States, homicide rates are as low as they have been in 60 years.

But we do not live in a world where politics is based on objective truth.

We live in a world where the public perception of reality itself is shaped by the political narrative.

One of the first things that authoritarians do to control these narratives is try to make their followers distrust objective sources. I watch in disgust as not simply the Babylon Bee (which is a right-wing satire site that tries really hard to be funny but never quite manages it) but even the Atlantic (a mainstream news outlet generally considered credible) feeds—in multiple articles—into this dangerous lie that crime is increasing and the official statistics are somehow misleading us about that.

Of course the Atlantic‘s take is much more nuanced; but quite frankly, now is not the time for nuance. A fascist is trying to take over our government, and he needs to be resisted at every turn by every means possible. You need to be calling him out on every single lie he makes—yes, every single one, I know there are a lot of them, and that’s kind of the point—rather than trying to find alternative framings on which maybe part of what he said could somehow be construed as reasonable from a certain point of view. Every time you make Trump sound more reasonable than he is—and mainstream news outlets have done this literally hundreds of times—you are pushing America closer to fascism.

I really don’t know what to do here.

It is impossible to resolve conflicts when they are not based on shared reality.

No policy can solve a crime wave that doesn’t exist. No trade agreement can stop unfair trading practices that aren’t happening. Nothing can stop vaccines from causing autism that they already don’t cause. There is no way to fix problems when those problems are completely imaginary.

I used to think that political conflict was about different values which had to be balanced against one another: Liberty versus security, efficiency versus equality, justice versus mercy. I thought that we all agreed on the basic facts and even most of the values, and were just disagreeing about how to weigh certain values over others.

Maybe I was simply naive; maybe it’s never been like that. But it certainly isn’t right now. We aren’t disagreeing about what should be done; we are disagreeing about what is happening in front of our eyes. We don’t simply have different priorities or even different values; it’s like we are living in different worlds.

I have read, e.g. by Jonathan Haidt, that conservatives largely understand what liberals want, but liberals don’t really understand what conservatives want. (I would like to take one of the tests they use in these experiments, see how I actually do; but I’ve never been able to find one.)

Haidt’s particular argument seems to be that liberals don’t “understand” the “moral dimensions” of loyalty, authority, and sanctity, because we only “understand” harm and fairness as the basis of morality. But just because someone says something is morally relevant, that doesn’t mean it is morally relevant! And indeed, based on more or less the entirety of ethical philosophy, I can say that harm and fairness are morality, and the others simply aren’t. They are distortions of morality, they are inherently evil, and we are right to oppose them at every turn. Loyalty, authority, and sanctity are what fed Nazi Germany and the Spanish Inquisition.

This claim that liberals don’t understand conservatives has always seemed very odd to me: I feel like I have a pretty clear idea what conservatives want, it’s just that what they want is terrible: Kick out the immigrants, take money from the poor and give it to the rich, and put rich straight Christian White men back in charge of everything. (I mean, really, if that’s not what they want, why do they keep voting for people who do it? Revealed preferences, people!)

Or, more sympathetically: They want to go back to a nostalgia-tinted vision of the 1950s and 1960s in which it felt like things were going well for our country—because they were blissfully ignorant of all the violence and injustice in the world. No, thank you, Black people and queer people do not want to go back to how we were treated in the 1950s—when segregation was legal and Alan Turing was chemically castrated. (And they also don’t seem to grasp that among the things that did make some things go relatively well in that period were unions, antitrust law and progressive taxes, which conservatives now fight against at every turn.)

But I think maybe part of what’s actually happening here is that a lot of conservatives actually “want” things that literally don’t make sense, because they rest upon assumptions about the world that simply aren’t true.

They want to end “out of control” crime that is the lowest it’s been in decades.

They want to stop schools from teaching things that they already aren’t teaching.

They want the immigrants to stop bringing drugs and crime that they aren’t bringing.

They want LGBT people to stop converting their children, which we already don’t and couldn’t. (And then they want to do their own conversions in the other direction—which also don’t work, but cause tremendous harm.)

They want liberal professors to stop indoctrinating their students in ways we already aren’t and can’t. (If we could indoctrinate our students, don’t you think we’d at least make them read the syllabus?)

They want to cut government spending by eliminating “waste” and “fraud” that are trivial amounts, without cutting the things that are actually expensive, like Social Security, Medicare, and the military. They think we can balance the budget without cutting these things or raising taxes—which is just literally mathematically impossible.

They want to close off trade to bring back jobs that were sent offshore—but those jobs weren’t sent offshore, they were replaced by robots. (US manufacturing output is near its highest ever, even though manufacturing employment is half what it once was.)


And meanwhile, there’s a bunch of real problems that aren’t getting addressed: Soaring inequality, a dysfunctional healthcare system, climate change, the economic upheaval of AI—and they either don’t care about those, aren’t paying attention to them, or don’t even believe they exist.

It feels a bit like this:

You walk into a room and someone points a gun at you, shouting “Drop the weapon!” but you’re not carrying a weapon. And you show your hands, and try to explain that you don’t have a weapon, but they just keep shouting “Drop the weapon!” over and over again. Someone else has already convinced them that you have a weapon, and they expect you to drop that weapon, and nothing you say can change their mind about this.

What exactly should you do in that situation?

How do you avoid getting shot?

Do you drop something else and say it’s the weapon (make some kind of minor concession that looks vaguely like what they asked for)? Do you try to convince them that you have a right to the weapon (accept their false premise but try to negotiate around it)? Do you just run away (leave the country?)? Do you double down and try even harder to convince them that you really, truly, have no weapon?

I’m not saying that everyone on the left has a completely accurate picture of reality; there are clearly a lot of misconceptions on this side of the aisle as well. But at least among the mainstream center left, there seems to be a respect for objective statistics and a generally accurate perception of how the world works—the “reality-based community”. Sometimes liberals make mistakes, have bad ideas, or even tell lies; but I don’t hear a lot of liberals trying to fix problems that don’t exist or asking for the government budget to be changed in ways that violate basic arithmetic.

I really don’t know what do here, though.

How do you change people’s minds when they won’t even agree on the basic facts?

On foxes and hedgehogs, part II

Aug 3 JDN 2460891

In last week’s post I described Philip E. Tetlock’s experiment showing that “foxes” (people who are open-minded and willing to consider alternative views) make more accurate predictions than “hedgehogs” (people who are dogmatic and conform strictly to a single ideology).

As I explained at the end of the post, he, uh, hedges on this point quite a bit, coming up with various ways that the hedgehogs might be able to redeem themselves, but still concluding that in most circumstances, the foxes seem to be more accurate.

Here are my thoughts on this:

I think he went too easy on the hedgehogs.

I consider myself very much a fox, and I honestly would never assign a probability of 0% or 100% to any physically possible event. Honestly I consider it a flaw in Tetlock’s design that he included those as options but didn’t include probabilities I would assign, like 1%, 0.1%, or 0.01%.

He only let people assign probabilities in 10% increments. So I guess if you thought something was 3% likely, you’re supposed to round to 0%? That still feels terrible. I’d probably still write 10%. There weren’t any questions like “Aliens from the Andromeda Galaxy arrive to conquer our planet, thus rendering all previous political conflicts moot”, but man, had there been, I’d still be tempted to not put 0%. I guess I would put 0% for that though? Because in 99.999999% of cases, I’d get it right—it wouldn’t happen—and I’d get more points. But man, even single-digit percentages? I’d mash the 10% button. I am pretty much allergic to overconfidence.

In fact, I think in my mind I basically try to use a logarithmic score, which unlike a Brier score, severely (technically, infinitely) punishes you for saying that something impossible happened or something inevitable didn’t. Like, really, if you’re doing it right, that should never, ever happen to you. If you assert that something has 0% probability and it happens, you have just conclusively disproven your worldview. (Admittedly it’s possible you could fix it with small changes—but a full discussion of that would get us philosophically too far afield. “outside the scope of this paper”.)

So honestly I think he was too lenient on overconfidence by using a Brier score, which does penalize this kind of catastrophic overconfidence, but only by a moderate amount. If you say that something has a 0% chance and then it happens, you get a Brier score of -1. But if you say that something has a 50% chance and then it happens (which it would, you know, 50% of the time), you’d get a Brier score of -0.25. So even absurd overconfidence isn’t really penalized that badly.

Compare this to a logarithmic rule: Say 0% and it happens, and you get negative infinity. You lose. You fail. Go home. Your worldview is bad and you should feel bad. This should never happen to you if you have a coherent worldview (modulo the fact that he didn’t let you say 0.01%).

So if I had designed this experiment, I would have given finer-grained options at the extremes, and then brought the hammer down on anybody who actually asserted a 0% chance of an event that actually occurred. (There’s no need for the finer-grained options elsewhere; over millennia of history, the difference between 0% and 0.1% is whether it won’t happen or it will—quite relevant for, say, full-scale nuclear war—while the difference between 40% and 42.1% is whether it’ll happen every 2 to 3 years or… every 2 to 3 years.)

But okay, let’s say we stick with the Brier score, because infinity is scary.

  1. About the adjustments:
    1. The “value adjustments” are just absolute nonsense. Those would be reasons to adjust your policy response, via your utility function—they are not a reason to adjust your probability. Yes, a nuclear terrorist attack would be a really big deal if it happened and we should definitely be taking steps to prevent that; but that doesn’t change the fact that the probability of one happening is something like 0.1% per year and none have ever happened. Predicting things that don’t happen is bad forecasting, even if the things you are predicting would be very important if they happened.
    2. The “difficulty adjustments” are sort of like applying a different scoring rule, so that I’m more okay with; but that wasn’t enough to make the hedgehogs look better than the foxes.
    3. The “fuzzy set” adjustments could be legitimate, but only under particular circumstances. Being “almost right” is only valid if you clearly showed that the result was anomalous because of some other unlikely event, and—because the timeframe was clearly specified in the questions—“might still happen” should still get fewer points than accurately predicting that it hasn’t happened yet. Moreover, it was very clear that people only ever applied these sort of changes when they got things wrong; they rarely if ever said things like “Oh, wow, I said that would happen and it did, but for completely different reasons that I didn’t expect—I was almost wrong there.” (Crazy example, but if the Soviet Union had been taken over by aliens, “the Soviet Union will fall” would be correct—but I don’t think you could really attribute that to good political prediction.)
  2. The second exercise shows that even the foxes are not great Bayesians, and that some manipulations can make people even more inaccurate than before; but the hedgehogs also perform worse and also make some of the same crazy mistakes and still perform worse overall than the foxes, even in that experiment.
  3. I guess he’d call me a “hardline neopositivist”? Because I think that your experiment asking people to predict things should require people to, um, actually predict things? The task was not to get the predictions wrong but be able to come up with clever excuses for why they were wrong that don’t challenge their worldview. The task was to not get the predictions wrong. Apparently this very basic level of scientific objectivity is now considered “hardline neopositivism”.

I guess we can reasonably acknowledge that making policy is about more than just prediction, and indeed maybe being consistent and decisive is advantageous in a game-theoretic sense (in much the same way that the way to win a game of Chicken is to very visibly throw away your steering wheel). So you could still make a case for why hedgehogs are good decision-makers or good leaders.

But I really don’t see how you weasel out of the fact that hedgehogs are really bad predictors. If I were running a corporation, or a government department, or an intelligence agency, I would want accurate predictions. I would not be interested in clever excuses or rich narratives. Maybe as leaders one must assemble such narratives in order to motivate people; so be it, there’s a division of labor there. Maybe I’d have a separate team of narrative-constructing hedgehogs to help me with PR or something. But the people who are actually analyzing the data should be people who are good at making accurate predictions, full stop.

And in fact, I don’t think hedgehogs are good decision-makers or good leaders. I think they are good politicians. I think they are good at getting people to follow them and believe what they say. But I do not think they are actually good at making the decisions that would be the best for society.

Indeed, I think this is a very serious problem.

I think we systematically elect people to higher office—and hire them for jobs, and approve them for tenure, and so on—because they express confidence rather than competence. We pick the people who believe in themselves the most, who (by regression to the mean if nothing else) are almost certainly the people who are most over-confident in themselves.

Given that confidence is easier to measure than competence in most areas, it might still make sense to choose confident people if confidence were really positively correlated with competence, but I’m not convinced that it is. I think part of what Tetlock is showing us is that the kind of cognitive style that yields high confidence—a hedgehog—simply is not the kind of cognitive style that yields accurate beliefs—a fox. People who are really good at their jobs are constantly questioning themselves, always open to new ideas and new evidence; but that also means that they hedge their bets, say “on the other hand” a lot, and often suffer from Impostor Syndrome. (Honestly, testing someone for Impostor Syndrome might be a better measure of competence than a traditional job interview! Then again, Goodhart’s Law.)

Indeed, I even see this effect within academic science; the best scientists I know are foxes through and through, but they’re never the ones getting published in top journals and invited to give keynote speeches at conferences. The “big names” are always hedgehog blowhards with some pet theory they developed in the 1980s that has failed to replicate but somehow still won’t die.

Moreover, I would guess that trustworthiness is actually pretty strongly inversely correlated to confidence—“con artist” is short for “confidence artist”, after all.

Then again, I tried to find rigorous research comparing openness (roughly speaking “fox-ness”) or humility to honesty, and it was surprisingly hard to find. Actually maybe the latter is just considered an obvious consensus in the literature, because there is a widely-used construct called honesty-humility. (In which case, yeah, my thinking on trustworthiness and confidence is an accepted fact among professional psychologists—but then, why don’t more people know that?)

But that still doesn’t tell me if there is any correlation between honesty-humility and openness.

I did find these studies showing that both honesty-humility and openness are both positively correlated with well-being, both positively correlated with cooperation in experimental games, and both positively correlated with being left-wing; but that doesn’t actually prove they are positively correlated with each other. I guess it provides weak evidence in that direction, but only weak evidence. It’s entirely possible for A to be positively correlated with both B and C but B and C are uncorrelated or negatively correlated. (Living in Chicago is positively correlated with being a White Sox fan and positively correlated with being a Cubs fan, but being a White Sox fan is not positively correlated with being a Cubs fan!)

I also found studies showing that higher openness predicts less right-wing authoritarianism and higher honesty predicts less social conformity; but that wasn’t the question either.

Here’s a factor analysis specifically arguing for designing measures of honesty-humility so that they don’t correlate with other personality traits, so it can be seen as its own independent personality trait. There are some uncomfortable degrees of freedom in designing new personality metrics, which may make this sort of thing possible; and then by construction honesty-humility and openness would be uncorrelated, because any shared components were parceled out to one trait or the other.

So, I guess I can’t really confirm my suspicion here; maybe people who think like hedgehogs aren’t any less honest, or are even more honest, than people who think like foxes. But I’d still bet otherwise. My own life experience has been that foxes are honest and humble while hedgehogs are deceitful and arrogant.

Indeed, I believe that in systematically choosing confident hedgehogs as leaders, the world economy loses tens of trillions of dollars a year in inefficiencies. In fact, I think that we could probably end world hunger if we only ever put leaders in charge who were both competent and trustworthy.

Of course, in some sense that’s a pipe dream; we’re never going to get all good leaders, just as we’ll never get zero death or zero crime.

But based on how otherwise-similar countries have taken wildly different trajectories based on differences in leadership, I suspect that even relatively small changes in that direction could have quite large impacts on a society’s outcomes: South Korea isn’t perfect at picking its leaders; but surely it’s better than North Korea, and indeed that seems like one of the primary things that differentiates the two countries. Botswana is not a utopian paradise, but it’s a much nicer place to live than Nigeria, and a lot of the difference seems to come down to who is in charge, or who has been in charge for the last few decades.

And I could put in a jab here about the current state of the United States, but I’ll resist. If you read my blog, you already know my opinions on this matter.

On foxes and hedgehogs, part I

Aug 3 JDN 2460891

Today I finally got around to reading Expert Political Judgment by Philip E. Tetlock, more or less in a single sitting because I’ve been sick the last week with some pretty tight limits on what activities I can do. (It’s mostly been reading, watching TV, or playing video games that don’t require intense focus.)

It’s really an excellent book, and I now both understand why it came so highly recommended to me, and now pass on that recommendation to you: Read it.

The central thesis of the book really boils down to three propositions:

  1. Human beings, even experts, are very bad at predicting political outcomes.
  2. Some people, who use an open-minded strategy (called “foxes”), perform substantially better than other people, who use a more dogmatic strategy (called “hedgehogs”).
  3. When rewarding predictors with money, power, fame, prestige, and status, human beings systematically favor (over)confident “hedgehogs” over (correctly) humble “foxes”.

I decided I didn’t want to make this post about current events, but I think you’ll probably agree with me when I say:

That explains a lot.

How did Tetlock determine this?

Well, he studies the issue several different ways, but the core experiment that drives his account is actually a rather simple one:

  1. He gathered a large group of subject-matter experts: Economists, political scientists, historians, and area-studies professors.
  2. He came up with a large set of questions about politics, economics, and similar topics, which could all be formulated as a set of probabilities: “How likely is this to get better/get worse/stay the same?” (For example, this was in the 1980s, so he asked about the fate of the Soviet Union: “By 1990, will they become democratic, remain as they are, or collapse and fragment?”)
  3. Each respondent answered a subset of the questions, some about their own particular field, some about another, more distant field; they assigned probabilities on an 11-point scale, from 0% to 100% in increments of 10%.
  4. A few years later, he compared the predictions to the actual results, scoring them using a Brier score, which penalizes you for assigning high probability to things that didn’t happen or low probability to things that did happen.
  5. He compared the resulting scores between people with different backgrounds, on different topics, with different thinking styles, and a variety of other variables. He also benchmarked them using some automated algorithms like “always say 33%” and “always give ‘stay the same’ 100%”.

I’ll show you the key results of that analysis momentarily, but to help it make more sense to you, let me elaborate a bit more on the “foxes” and “hedgehogs”. The notion is was first popularized by Isaiah Berlin in an essay called, simply, The Hedgehog and the Fox.

“The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one very big thing.”

That is, someone who reasons as a “fox” combines ideas from many different sources and perspective, and tries to weigh them all together into some sort of synthesis that then yields a final answer. This process is messy and complicated, and rarely yields high confidence about anything.

Whereas, someone who reasons as a “hedgehog” has a comprehensive theory of the world, an ideology, that provides clear answers to almost any possible question, with the surely minor, insubstantial flaw that those answers are not particularly likely to be correct.

He also considered “hedge-foxes” (people who are mostly fox but also a little bit hedgehog) and “fox-hogs” (people who are mostly hedgehog but also a little bit fox).

Tetlock has decomposed the scores into two components: calibration and discrimination. (Both very overloaded words, but they are standard in the literature.)

Calibration is how well your stated probabilities matched up with the actual probabilities; that is, if you predicted 10% probability on 20 different events, you have very good calibration if precisely 2 of those events occurred, and very poor calibration if 18 of those events occurred.

Discrimination more or less describes how useful your predictions are, what information they contain above and beyond the simple base rate. If you just assign equal probability to all events, you probably will have reasonably good calibration, but you’ll have zero discrimination; whereas if you somehow managed to assign 100% to everything that happened and 0% to everything that didn’t, your discrimination would be perfect (and we would have to find out how you cheated, or else declare you clairvoyant).

For both measures, higher is better. The ideal for each is 100%, but it’s virtually impossible to get 100% discrimination and actually not that hard to get 100% calibration if you just use the base rates for everything.


There is a bit of a tradeoff between these two: It’s not too hard to get reasonably good calibration if you just never go out on a limb, but then your predictions aren’t as useful; we could have mostly just guessed them from the base rates.

On the graph, you’ll see downward-sloping lines that are meant to represent this tradeoff: Two prediction methods that would yield the same overall score but different levels of calibration and discrimination will be on the same line. In a sense, two points on the same line are equally good methods that prioritize usefulness over accuracy differently.

All right, let’s see the graph at last:

The pattern is quite clear: The more foxy you are, the better you do, and the more hedgehoggy you are, the worse you do.

I’d also like to point out the other two regions here: “Mindless competition” and “Formal models”.

The former includes really simple algorithms like “always return 33%” or “always give ‘stay the same’ 100%”. These perform shockingly well. The most sophisticated of these, “case-specific extrapolation” (35 and 36 on the graph, which basically assumes that each country will continue doing what it’s been doing) actually performs as well if not better than even the foxes.

And what’s that at the upper-right corner, absolutely dominating the graph? That’s “Formal models”. This describes basically taking all the variables you can find and shoving them into a gigantic logit model, and then outputting the result. It’s computationally intensive and requires a lot of data (hence why he didn’t feel like it deserved to be called “mindless”), but it’s really not very complicated, and it’s the best prediction method, in every way, by far.

This has made me feel quite vindicated about a weird nerd thing I do: When I have a big decision to make (especially a financial decision), I create a spreadsheet and assemble a linear utility model to determine which choice will maximize my utility, under different parameterizations based on my past experiences. Whichever result seems to win the most robustly, I choose. This is fundamentally similar to the “formal models” prediction method, where the thing I’m trying to predict is my own happiness. (It’s a bit less formal, actually, since I don’t have detailed happiness data to feed into the regression.) And it has worked for me, astonishingly well. It definitely beats going by my own gut. I highly recommend it.

What does this mean?

Well first of all, it means humans suck at predicting things. At least for this data set, even our experts don’t perform substantially better than mindless models like “always assume the base rate”.

Nor do experts perform much better in their own fields than in other fields; they do all perform better than undergrads or random people (who somehow perform worse than the “mindless” models)

But Tetlock also investigates further, trying to better understand this “fox/hedgehog” distinction and why it yields different performance. He really bends over backwards to try to redeem the hedgehogs, in the following ways:

  1. He allows them to make post-hoc corrections to their scores, based on “value adjustments” (assigning higher probability to events that would be really important) and “difficulty adjustments” (assigning higher scores to questions where the three outcomes were close to equally probable) and “fuzzy sets” (giving some leeway on things that almost happened or things that might still happen later).
  2. He demonstrates a different, related experiment, in which certain manipulations can cause foxes to perform a lot worse than they normally would, and even yield really crazy results like probabilities that add up to 200%.
  3. He has a whole chapter that is a Socratic dialogue (seriously!) between four voices: A “hardline neopositivist”, a “moderate neopositivist”, a “reasonable relativist”, and an “unrelenting relativist”; and all but the “hardline neopositivist” agree that there is some legitimate place for the sort of post hoc corrections that the hedgehogs make to keep themselves from looking so bad.

This post is already getting a bit long, so that will conclude part I. Stay tuned for part II, next week!

Quantifying stereotypes

Jul 6 JDN 2460863

There are a lot of stereotypes in the world, from the relatively innocuous (“teenagers are rebellious”) to the extremely harmful (“Black people are criminals”).

Most stereotypes are not true.

But most stereotypes are not exactly false, either.

Here’s a list of forty stereotypes, all but one of which I got from this list of stereotypes:

(Can you guess which one? I’ll give you a hint: It’s a group I belong to and a stereotype I’ve experienced firsthand.)

  1. “Children are always noisy and misbehaving.”
  2. “Kids can’t understand complex concepts.”
  3. “Children are tech-savvy.”
  4. “Teenagers are always rebellious.”
  5. Teenagers are addicted to social media.”
  6. “Adolescents are irresponsible and careless.”
  7. “Adults are always busy and stressed.”
  8. “Adults are responsible.”
  9. “Adults are not adept at using modern technologies.”
  10. “Elderly individuals are always grumpy.”
  11. “Old people can’t learn new skills, especially related to technology.”
  12. “The elderly are always frail and dependent on others.”
  13. “Women are emotionally more expressive and sensitive than men.”
  14. “Females are not as good at math or science as males.”
  15. “Women are nurturing, caring, and focused on family and home.”
  16. “Females are not as assertive or competitive as men.”
  17. “Men do not cry or express emotions openly.”
  18. “Males are inherently better at physical activities and sports.”
  19. “Men are strong, independent, and the primary breadwinners.”
  20. “Males are not as good at multitasking as females.”
  21. “African Americans are good at sports.”
  22. “African Americans are inherently aggressive or violent.”
  23. “Black individuals have a natural talent for music and dance.”
  24. “Asians are highly intelligent, especially in math and science.”
  25. “Asian individuals are inherently submissive or docile.”
  26. “Asians know martial arts.”
  27. “Latinos are uneducated.”
  28. “Hispanic individuals are undocumented immigrants.”
  29. “Latinos are inherently passionate and hot-tempered.”
  30. “Middle Easterners are terrorists.”
  31. “Middle Eastern women are oppressed.”
  32. “Middle Eastern individuals are inherently violent or aggressive.”
  33. “White people are privileged and unacquainted with hardship.”
  34. White people are racist.”
  35. “White individuals lack rhythm in music or dance.”
  36. Gay men are excessively flamboyant.”
  37. Gay men have lisps.”
  38. Lesbians are masculine.”
  39. Bisexuals are promiscuous.”
  40. Trans people get gender-reassignment surgery.”

If you view the above 40 statements as absolute statements about everyone in the category (the first-order operator “for all”), they are obviously false; there are clear counter-examples to every single one. If you view them as merely saying that there are examples of each (the first-order operator “there exists”), they are obviously true, but also utterly trivial, as you could just as easily find examples from other groups.

But I think there’s a third way to read them, which may be more what most people actually have in mind. Indeed, it kinda seems uncharitable not to read them this third way.

That way is:

This is more true of the group I’m talking about than it is true of other groups.”

And that is not only a claim that can be true, it is a claim that can be quantified.

Recall my new favorite effect size measure, because it’s so simple and intuitive; I’m not much for the official name probability of superiority (especially in this context!), so I’m gonna call it the more down-to-earth chance of being higher.

It is exactly what it sounds like: If you compare a quantity X between group A and group B, what is the chance that the person in group A has a higher value of X?

Let’s start at the top: If you take one randomly-selected child, and one randomly-selected adult, what is the chance that the child is one who is more prone to being noisy and misbehaving?

Probably pretty high.

Or let’s take number 13: If you take one randomly-selected woman and one randomly-selected man, what is the chance that the woman is the more emotionally expressive one?

Definitely more than half.

Or how about number 27: If you take one randomly-selected Latino and one randomly-selected non-Latino (especially if you choose a White or Asian person), what is the chance that the Latino is the less-educated one?

That one I can do fairly precisely: Since 95% of White Americans have completed high school but only 75% of Latino Americans have, while 28% of Whites have a bachelor’s degree and only 21% of Latinos do, the probability of the White person being at least as educated as the Latino person is about 82%.

I don’t know the exact figures for all of these, and I didn’t want to spend all day researching 40 different stereotypes, but I am quite prepared to believe that at least all of the following exhibit a chance of being higher that is over 50%:

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 40.

You may have noticed that that’s… most of them. I had to shrink the font a little to fit them all on one line.

I think 30 is an important one to mention, because while terrorists are a tiny proportion of the Middle Eastern population, they are in fact a much larger proportion of that population than they are of most other populations, and it doesn’t take that many terrorists to make a place dangerous. The Middle East is objectively a more dangerous place for terrorism than most other places, and only India and sub-Saharan Africa close (and both of which are also largely driven by Islamist terrorism). So while it’s bigoted to assume that any given Muslim or Middle Easterner is a terrorist, it is an objective fact that a disproportionate share of terrorists are Middle Eastern Muslims. Part of what I’m trying to do here is get people to more clearly distinguish between those two concepts, because one is true and the other is very, very false.

40 also deserves particular note, because the chance of being higher is almost certainly very close to 100%. While most trans people don’t get gender-reassignment surgery, virtually all people who get gender-reassignment surgery are trans.

Then again, you could see this as a limitation of the measure, since we might expect a 100% score to mean “it’s true of everyone in the group”, when here it simply means “if we ask people whether they have had gender-reassignment surgery, the trans people sometimes say yes and the cis people always say no.”


We could talk about a weak or strict chance of being higher: The weak chance is the chance of being greater than or equal to (which is the normal measure), while the strict chance is the chance of being strictly greater. In this case, the weak chance is nearly 100%, while the strict chance is hard to estimate but probably about 33% based on surveys.

This doesn’t mean that all stereotypes have some validity.

There are some stereotypes here, including a few pretty harmful ones, for which I’m not sure how the statistics would actually shake out:
10, 14, 22, 23, 25, 32, 35, 39

But I think we should be honestly prepared for the possibility that maybe there is some statistical validity to some of these stereotypes too, and instead of simply dismissing the stereotypes as false—or even bigoted—we should instead be trying to determine how true they are, and also look at why they might have some truth to them.

My proposal is to use the chance of being higher as a measure of the truth of a stereotype.

A stereotype is completely true if it has a chance of being higher of 100%.

It is completely false if it has a chance of being higher of 50%.

And it is completely backwards if it has a chance of being higher of 0%.

There is a unique affine transformation that does this: 2X-1.

100% maps to 100%, 50% maps to 0%, and 0% maps to -100%.

With discrete outcomes, the difference between weak and strong chance of being higher becomes very important. With a discrete outcome, you can have a 100% weak chance but a 1% strong chance, and honestly I’m really not sure whether we should say that stereotype is true or not.

For example, for the claim “trans men get bottom surgery”, the figures would be 100% and 6% respectively. The vast majority of trans men don’t get bottom surgery—but cis men almost never do. (Unless I count penis enlargement surgery? Then the numbers might be closer than you’d think, at least in the US where the vast majority of such surgery is performed.)

And for the claim “Middle Eastern Muslims are terrorists”, well, given two random people of whatever ethnicity or religion, they’re almost certainly not terrorists—but if it one of them is, it’s probably the Middle Eastern Muslim. It may be better in this case to talk about the conditional chance of being higher: If you have two random people, you know that one is a terrorist and one isn’t, and one is a Middle Eastern Muslim and one isn’t, how likely is it that the Middle Eastern Muslim is the terrorist? Probably about 80%. Definitely more than 50%, but also not 100%. So that’s the sense in which the stereotype has some validity. It’s still the case that 99.999% of Middle Eastern Muslims aren’t terrorists, and so it remains bigoted to treat every Middle Eastern Muslim you meet like a terrorist.

We could also work harder to more clearly distinguish between “Middle Easterners are terrorists” and “terrorists are Middle Easterners”; the former is really not true (99.999% are not), but the latter kinda is (the plurality of the world’s terrorists are in the Middle East).

Alternatively, for discrete traits we could just report all four probabilities, which would be something like this: 99.999% of Middle Eastern Muslims are not terrorists, and 0.001% are; 99.9998% of other Americans are not terrorists, and 0.0002% are. Compared to Muslim terrorists in the US, White terrorists actually are responsible for more attacks and a similar number of deaths, but largely because there just are a lot more White people in America.

These issues mainly arise when a trait is discrete. When the trait is itself quantitative (like rebelliousness, or math test scores), this is less of a problem, and the weak and strong chances of being higher are generally more or less the same.


So instead of asking whether a stereotype is true, we could ask: How true is it?

Using measures like this, we will find that some stereotypes probably have quite high truth levels, like 1 and 4; but others, if they are true at all, must have quite low truth levels, like 14; if there’s a difference, it’s a small difference!

The lower a stereotype’s truth level, the less useful it is; indeed, by this measure, it directly predicts how accurate you’d be at guessing someone’s score on the trait if you knew only the group they belong to. If you couldn’t really predict, then why are you using the stereotype? Get rid of it.

Moreover, some stereotypes are clearly more harmful than others.

Even if it is statistically valid to say that Black people are more likely to commit crimes in the US than White people (it is), the kind of person who goes around saying “Black people are criminals” is (1) smearing all Black people with the behavior of a minority of them, and (2) likely to be racist in other ways. So we have good reason to be suspect of people who say such things, even if there may be a statistical kernel of truth to their claims.

But we might still want to be a little more charitable, a little more forgiving, when people express stereotypes. They may make what sounds like a blanket absolute “for all” statement, but actually intend something much milder—something that might actually be true. They might not clearly grasp the distinction between “Middle Easterners are terrorists” and “terrorists are Middle Easterners”, and instead of denouncing them as a bigot immediately, you could try taking the time to listen to what they are saying and carefully explain what’s wrong with it.

Failing to be charitable like this—as we so often do—often feels to people like we are dismissing their lived experience. All the terrorists they can think of were Middle Eastern! All of the folks they know with a lisp turned out to be gay! Lived experience is ultimately anecdotal, but it still has a powerful effect on how people think (too powerful—see also availability heuristic), and it’s really not surprising that people would feel we are treating them unjustly if we immediately accuse them of bigotry simply for stating things that, based on their own experience, seem to be true.

I think there’s another harm here as well, which is that we damage our own credibility. If I believe that something is true and you tell me that I’m a bad person for believing it, that doesn’t make me not believe it—it makes me not trust you. You’ve presented yourself as the sort of person who wants to cover up the truth when it doesn’t fit your narrative. If you wanted to actually convince me that my belief is wrong, you could present evidence that might do that. (To be fair, this doesn’t always work; but sometimes it does!) But if you just jump straight to attacking my character, I don’t want to talk to you anymore.

And just like that, we’re at war.

Jun 29 JDN 2460856

Israel attacked Iran. Iran counter-attacked. Then Israel requested US support.

President Trump waffled about giving that support, then, late Jun 21 (US time—early June 22 Iran time), without any authorization from anyone else, he ordered an attack, using B-2 stealth bombers to drop GBU-57 MOP bombs on Iranian nuclear enrichment facilities.

So apparently we’re at war now, because Donald Trump decided we would be.

We could talk about the strategic question of whether that attack was a good idea. We could talk about the moral question of whether that attack was justified.

But I have in mind a different question: Why was he allowed to do that?

In theory, the United States Constitution grants Congress the authority to declare war. The President is the Commander-in-Chief of our military forces, but only once war has actually been declared. What’s supposed to happen is that if a need for military action arises, Congress makes a declaration of war, and then the President orders the military into action.

Yet in fact we haven’t actually done that since 1942. Despite combat in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, Libya, Kosovo, and more, we have never officially declared war since World War 2. In some of these wars, there was a UN resolution and/or Congressional approval, so that’s sort of like getting a formal declaration of war. But in others, there was no such thing; the President just ordered our troops to fight, and they fought.

This is not what the Constitution says, nor is it what the War Powers Act says. The President isn’t supposed to be able to do this. And yet Presidents have done it over a dozen times.

How did this happen? Why have we, as a society, become willing to accept this kind of unilateral authority on such vitally important matters?

Part of the problem seems to be that Congress is (somewhat correctly) perceived as slow and dysfunctional. But that doesn’t seem like an adequate explanation, because surely if we were actually under imminent threat, even a dysfunctional Congress could find it in itself to approve a declaration of war. (And if we’re not under imminent threat, then it isn’t so urgent!)

I think the more important reason may be that Congress consistently fails to hold the President accountable for overstepping his authority. It doesn’t even seem to matter which party is in which branch; they just never actually seem to remove a President from office for overstepping his authority. (Indeed, while three Presidents have been impeached—Trump twice—not one has ever actually been removed from office for any reason.) The checks and balances that are supposed to rein in the President simply are not ever actually deployed.

As a result, the power of the Executive Branch has gradually expanded over time, as Presidents test the waters by asserting more authority—and then are literally never punished for doing so.

I suppose we have Congress to blame for this: They could be asserting their authority, and aren’t doing so. But voters bare some share of the blame as well: We could vote out representatives who fail to rein in the President, and we haven’t been doing that.

Surely it would also help to elect better Presidents (and almost literally anyone would have been better than Donald Trump), but part of the point of having a Constitution is that the system is supposed to be able to defend against occasionally putting someone awful in charge. But as we’ve seen, in practice those defenses seem to fall apart quite easily.

So now we live in a world where a maniac can simply decide to drop a bunch of bombs wherever he wants and nobody will stop him.